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End-of-Life Medical Care and Religiosity in New Zealand 
Studies from around the world indicate that highly religious people request and receive more 
aggressive end-of-life medical care than their less religious counterparts. Research suggests that 
patients who express strong religiosity are less likely to engage in advanced care planning and 
more likely to desire and receive life-prolonging medical care such as resuscitation and 
mechanical ventilation. 
Why would religious people be more likely to request and receive extraordinary end-of-life 
medical intervention than those who are less religious? The underlying mechanisms are currently 
unknown and seem to contradict a commonly held assumption that increased religiosity would 
ease dying. 
The purpose of this study is to explore and understand the connection between an individual’s 
religiosity and his or her end-of-life medical decisions. End-of-life decisions are, at once, 
intensely personal and also a matter of public interest. Individuals want the option and wisdom to 
die well. Policy-makers and administrators have noticed the exponential increase in spending 
associated with end-of-life care. Physicians report concern that extraordinary end-of-life 
intervention may be harming more patients more than it helps. The current research can inform 
both religious and medical communities about who receives extraordinary end-of-life medical 
care and why.   
This study used a qualitative approach that combined a literature review with in-depth interviews 
(n=14). The interview questions evaluated six hypotheses that have been proposed to explain the 
connection between religiosity and an increased likelihood of aggressive end-of-life medical 
care: suffering, sanctity of life, God’s sovereignty, miracles, afterlife, and social support. 
Interviews suggest that religious and nonreligious people hold different beliefs and opinions on 
theological topics, but these beliefs and opinions have little direct effect on a preference for life-
prolonging medical care. In other words, the observed connection between religious patients and 
intensive end-of-life medical care may have less to do with the theological beliefs of the patient 
and more to do with the social support that religious people experience. Findings suggest that 
theological-based mechanisms may be more active in end-of-life situations involving younger 
patients who are perceived to have been thwarted in completing a natural course of aging.   
Keywords: CPR, resuscitation, end of life, palliative care, prolonging life, DNR, advanced care 
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1.1 Thesis Rationale 
End-of-life (EOL) care has become increasingly controversial in developed countries, 
corresponding to the expanding availability of extraordinary1 life-preserving medical 
interventional techniques and machines.  Physicians may now use extraordinary measures of life 
support to extend a patient’s life by artificially inducing a comatose or semi-comatose state.  
Patients in distress may be intubated or tracheated and connected to a ventilator to extend their 
life.  Other terminal patients undergo surgery with low chances of success and high rates of 
discomfort. Some patients recover from this extraordinary treatment, but at least 80% do not, and 
the ones who survive often deal with negative consequences of extraordinary medical techniques 
(Yuen, Reid & Fetters, 2011; Cherniack, 2002).  
 
One of the most aggressive and costly forms of extraordinary end-of-life treatment is the 
resuscitation of a patient with a terminal disease.  In a medical context, the term “resuscitation” 
refers to extraordinary medical care, including CPR (cardiopulmonary resuscitation), high-
voltage shocking, intubation, and ventilator-placement.  Patients who desire that they would not 
be placed on life-supporting machinery in the first place may sign a “Do Not Resuscitate” (DNR) 
order.  A DNR order is a legal document recording the patient’s wish not to receive CPR nor to 
be placed on a ventilator in the event that the person’s heart stops beating.  Do-Not-Intubate is a 
separate order, and similar to the DNR.  There are other legal documents such as living wills and 
advance life directives that patients use to record their end-of-life desires.   
 
 
1 Extraordinary medical care includes procedures such as resuscitation, mechanical ventilation, and high-
risk surgeries, and will be described in more detail in the Literature Review chapter. Ordinary medical 
care includes the basics of nutrition, pain control, and comfort care. 
     




The creation and effectiveness of documents such as the DNR order, living wills, and advance 
life directives is under debate in the EOL medical literature (Santonocito et al., 2012). To be 
clear, resuscitation is the procedure associated with re-starting a heart that has stopped beating. 
Resuscitation is alternately viewed (positively) as the ability to reverse premature death or 
(negatively) as the ability to thwart a natural death. Resuscitation keeps approximately 20% of 
patients who receive the procedure alive, but it also prolongs terminal illness, increases 
discomfort, increases the family’s anxiety, and consumes resources (Yuen et al., 2011; 
Santonocito et al., 2012). In other words, resuscitation is a powerful medical procedure which, 
although sometimes successful in restarting a patient’s heart, is attended by serious negative side 
effects and is often regarded as futile and aggressive (Yuen et al., 2011; Santonocito et al., 2013).  
 
The Do-Not-Resuscitate (DNR) order is a written medical directive that records a patient’s 
decision to avoid the administration of CPR, tracheation, and the resulting ventilator machinery 
in the case that his or her heart stops beating. It is one of the most discussed EOL decisions 
because of the dramatic and irreversible consequences (Santonocito et al., 2012). The DNR order 
serves two purposes: to support patient autonomy and to prevent non-beneficial medical 
intervention (Yuen et al., 2011). The definition of a DNR order does not change in different 
geographical areas or countries, but the legal status, medical protocols, and community 
perception of the DNR vary widely around the globe (Santonocito et al., 2012). Most commonly, 
the DNR is created by a physician based on a combination of medical judgement, and/or the 
patient’s desires or the desires of a patient surrogate. Patient-centred medical care advocates 
around the world are arguing for more widespread patient participation in DNR and other 
advanced life care directives (ACD) (Santonocito et al., 2012). Wider patient participation in 
DNR and ACD, it is commonly believed, would achieve desirable outcomes for both patients 
desiring a “good death” and medical institutions desiring to allocate resources wisely (Cohen et 
al., 2010). The rationale of a DNR order is not to limit access to care but to avert burdensome 
overtreatment. The patient’s benefit is at the ethical centre of all advanced directives (AD’s), 
including the DNR.  
 
     




End-of-life (EOL) decisions are, at once, intensely personal and also a matter of public interest.  
Individuals want the option and wisdom to die well (Jha, 2018). Policy-makers and 
administrators have noticed an exponential increase in spending associated with EOL care, 
which far outpaces the growth rate of general medical spending and threatens the stability and 
sustainability of the current health care systems in developed nations (Bekelman et al., 2016, Jha, 
2018).  Physicians, meanwhile, express concern that extraordinary EOL intervention may be 
harming more patients more than it helps, yet they report feeling pressure and obligation to 
administer extraordinary care for a variety of reasons.  Physicians report that they often 
administer life-prolonging treatment that they would not want for themselves or their loved ones 
(Yuen et al. 2011; Cherniack, 2002).  EOL medical care is a matter of high priority to many 
medical analysts:  improving EOL care and achieving patient-centred care have been identified 
as two of six priorities that have the potential to rapidly and substantially improve health care 
quality (Yuen et al., 2011). 
Research about EOL medical care has increased substantially in the last 50 years since the 
hospice movement was founded in Britain. A link has emerged connecting a person’s self-
perceived religiosity2 and his or her desire for extraordinary EOL medical intervention as 
compared to nonreligious cohorts.  To be specific, research has shown that individuals who view 
themselves as highly religious are more likely to prefer and receive extraordinary life-prolonging 
medical care in EOL situations (Torke et al., 2019; Sullivan et al., 2004; Balboni et al., 2013; 
Phelps et al., 2009; Cohen et al, 2010; Smith et al. 2008; Lin et al., 2016). Evidence supports the 
idea that this finding is cross-culturally consistent, according to studies in USA, Europe, UK, 
Australia, the Middle East and Asia (Steinberg, 2011; Sullivan et al., 2004; Lin et al., 2016; 
Babgi, 2009). 
The connection between religiosity and EOL medical care has been investigated through a 
variety of behaviours and attitudes. Religiosity or high levels of religious coping have been 
 
2 A working definition of religiosity will be explored in more detail in later sections of this paper. In general 
terms, however, religiosity in this paper and in the literature under discussion was determined by a 
combination of person’s self-identification as “extremely” or “very” religious along with other indicators. 
Other indicators of religiosity usually include high scores on questionnaires such as the Brief RCOPE, as 
will be discussed in a later section.  
     




associated with less hospice utilisation, more aggressive EOL treatment and increased medical 
costs (True et al., 2005; Torke et al., 2019; Sullivan et al., 2004; Balboni et al., 2013; Phelps et 
al., 2009; Cohen et al, 2010; Smith et al., 2008; Lin et al., 2016).  Religiosity, moreover, is 
negatively linked to signing a DNR order, writing an advance life plan, or creating a living will 
(Torke et al., 2019; Sullivan et al., 2004; Phelps et al., 2009; Lin et al., 2016). Studies indicate 
that patients who express strong religiosity are less likely to acknowledge that they have a 
terminal illness, and more likely to receive life-prolonging terminal care (Ibid.). The literature 
supports grouping subjects by the intensity and orthodoxy of their religiosity rather than their 
denomination, as will be discussed in more detail in a later chapter (Schroepfer, 2008; Sharp et 
al., 2012; Garrido et al., 2012). 
These findings seem to contradict a commonly held assumption that increased religiosity would 
cause people to be less reluctant to die. Religions offer strategies and philosophies to help 
individuals cope with the inevitability of death; indeed, managing death anxiety is at the core of 
most religious teachings. Sharp et al. suggest that, of all sources of religion “the supreme and 
final crisis of life - death - is of the greatest importance” (Sharp, Carr & Macdonald 2012:279). 
Are religions failing to fulfil their raison d’etre, or even making the death process more difficult 
for adherents? High religiosity in patients and their families has been linked with medical 
interventions and behaviours that are considered poor outcomes by the medical profession.  
On the other hand, high religiosity has been positively linked to many desirable health outcomes 
in physical and mental health outside the EOL community (Koenig, 2002; Cragun et al., 2016). 
Correlations have been found between religiosity and lower levels of anxiety and psychosocial 
distress, overall mental health, and an ability to adapt to mental health challenges when 
compared to those who are less spiritual/religious (Koenig, 2002) although these relationships 
are disputed by some (Cragun et al., 2016). In addition, highly religious people are commonly 
assumed to have lived an integrated, relationship-oriented life, looking forward toward death as a 
graduation into a better life.  So why would people who report high religiosity prefer and receive 
more extraordinary EOL medical care?   
Interestingly, the connection between religiosity and more extraordinary EOL medical care 
seems to transcend international borders and applies to world religions other than Christianity. 
     




Living wills and advanced directives are not recognized in Islamic law, as it is believed that only 
Allah can make decisions on life and death (Steinberg, 2011). A quantitative study in 
predominantly-Buddhist Taiwan, moreover, examined whether religious patients or nonreligious 
patients were more likely to have a DNR order in their medical files, and found that Buddhist 
patients were significantly less likely to have a DNR order in their files (Lin et al., 2016). 
Multiple studies in Christian-predominant countries (Netherlands, USA, Australia) have 
produced similar results (Steinberg, 2011).  
A gap in the research has been noted: research consistently links high religiosity to increased use 
of extraordinary EOL care and decreased use of DNR orders and other kinds of advanced 
directives (AD’s), but the mechanism behind these findings remains unclear. Several researchers 
have called for qualitative approaches or more focused studies on this question (Garrido et al., 
2012; Seale, 2010; Torke et al., 2019; Balboni et al., 2013), especially outside the United States 
(Cherniack, 2002). This thesis research builds upon previous research by 1) exploring the 
mechanisms of a previously established link between religiosity and extraordinary EOL medical 
care, and 2) broadening the geographic range of investigation of EOL research.  
 
1.2 Statement of Purpose 
Understanding why religious patients request and receive more extraordinary EOL medical care 
than nonreligious patients would help medical professionals to better care for terminal patients, 
help administrators to know how to allocate resources and create effective protocols, and help 
patients access the “promise of a good death” (Emanuel & Emanuel, 1998). In addition, 
understanding why religious patients request and receive more extraordinary EOL medical care 
than nonreligious patients is a matter of interest to anthropologists, psychologists and religious 
studies scholars who seek to understand how culture and global religions affect human 
motivation and behaviour. EOL medical decisions are a highly relevant focus for scholars 
working toward an understanding of the impact of religious beliefs on measurable behaviours 
(Sharp et al., 2012).  
 
     




In this thesis, I do not intend to replicate the finding of a connection between religiosity and 
extraordinary EOL care, but will proceed with the assumption that such a connection exists as it 
has been previously established in the literature (see Literature Review chapter).  Rather, this 
study will attempt to uncover the mechanisms underlying this connection.  This study thus 
addresses the research question:  Why are religious people more likely to ask for and receive 
extraordinary EOL medical intervention?  
 
Many researchers have hypothesized possible mechanisms regarding the link between religiosity 
and an increased desire for extraordinary medical care.  As a result of an extensive literature 
survey, I found over twelve hypotheses advanced by researchers, which I have grouped in the 
following six categories : 
 
a. Sanctity in suffering - “My suffering will be rewarded.”3  
b. Sanctity (vs quality) of life - “All human life is sacred, no matter the quality.” 
c. God’s sovereignty - “Not accepting extraordinary EOL medical care is 
tantamount to suicide. God should decide when I die.” 
d. Miracles - “I might be healed, no matter what my doctor says.” 
e. Afterlife - “I harbour fears about an afterlife and therefore desire to delay the 
transition.” 
f. Social support - “My friends and family don’t want me to die yet … and I have a 
lot of friends and family.”       
      
This thesis research explored the connection between a person’s religiosity and his or her EOL 
medical decision-making. Fourteen New Zealanders over the age of 70 were interviewed and 
asked to explain how their religious commitment would influence the medical intervention they 
would like during a terminal illness. A purposefully selective sample was designed to meet the 
aims of the research. Specifically, respondents were pre-screened to identify seven respondents 
who both self-identified as “extremely” or “highly” religious and scored 100% on the RCOPE 
 
3 The quotations attached to each category title, used here and in subsequent section headings, are 
rhetorical devices composed by the author. 
     




assessment of positive religious coping behaviour (Pargament et al., 2011; Pargament et al., 
2000). The remaining seven respondents were chosen if they both self-identified as “non” 
religious and scored 0% on the RCOPE assessment of positive religious coping behaviour. In 
addition, respondents were selectively chosen to roughly reflect the demographics of religious 
affiliation in New Zealand according to the 2018 Census, with Catholic, Anglicans, Presbyterian 
and Christian-Other representing the largest Christian subgroups. With appropriate cultural 
support (i.e. Māori advisement and consent), I included Māori in the study, also roughly 
reflecting national population demographics. Religiosity was determined using self-identification 
and the RCOPE scale (Pargament et al., 2000:51). The interview questions were based on the 
hypotheses outlined previously and intersected specifically with publications by Phelps et al. 
(2009) and Balboni et al. (2019).  
      
Although respondents may harbour both conscious and subconscious motivations regarding EOL 
medical preferences that may be obscured by the direct questioning that I proposed, direct 
questioning seems to be a natural and important place to start an investigation into the question at 
hand. EOL researchers have reported that, counter to prevailing wisdom, older patients are able 
and willing to speak openly about EOL issues and decisions. As one research team wrote, “Our 
study challenges the assumption that many older people are unable to speak openly about death” 
(Lloyd-Williams, et al. 2007:65). Indeed, respondents included in this study gave every 
appearance of gratitude for the time I spent listening to their experiences and opinions. 
      
    
1.3 Outline of Thesis 
This thesis is organised as follows:  
●   Chapter one is this introduction. The thesis topic and rationale are presented along 
with a statement of purpose. Also included here is the outline of the thesis. 
 
     




●   Chapter two presents a literature review justifying the thesis rationale and 
contextualizing the assumptions upon which it rests. The literature review will answer 
the following questions: 
● What is extraordinary EOL medical care and why is it considered a 
negative outcome? 
● What are the key findings linking high religiosity with more intensive 
EOL medical interventions? 
● What hypotheses have been proposed to account for this relationship?  
● What methods have been proposed to determine an individual’s 
religiosity? 
 
●   Chapter three presents the methodology of this qualitative study. A selective sample 
of fourteen New Zealanders (seven highly religious and seven nonreligious) were 
asked to discuss their life experiences and beliefs regarding religion and EOL medical 
care. 
 
●   Chapter four presents the results of the study. This chapter is organized by 
hypothesis. Evidence for and/or against each of the hypotheses is presented.  
 
●   Chapter five presents a discussion of the results within the context of existing 
literature in the field. 
 







     




2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
A growing body of literature reports that end-of-life (EOL) decision-making takes an enormous 
emotional, social, and economic toll on families in the developed world (Freytag & Rauscher, 
2017). EOL decision-making and medical care are, therefore, areas of intense interest to medical 
providers and patient advocates (Cherniack, 2002; Yuen et al., 2011). Among other arrangements 
that a family must make at the EOL of a family member, some of the most difficult decisions 
revolve around the acceptance or refusal of so-called “intensive” medical care (Chidwick, 
Sibbald & Hawryluck, 2013). 
 
Definition of terms 
 
EOL is a common acronym in medical literature but, at the current writing, is not attached to a 
widely-accepted technical definition. EOL sometimes refers to the last 24 hours of life, the last 
week of life, the last month of life, or even the last 6- or 12-months. “Medical futility” is another 
term widely albeit imprecisely used throughout the medical, legal, and ethics (Swetz et al., 
2014).  
 
Similarly, “intensive” is a loosely-acknowledged but non-technical term. “Intensive” medical 
procedures may not - indeed, are usually not - viewed as burdensome when administered in a 
non-EOL, non-futile situation. “Intensive,” “aggressive,” “extraordinary,” “life-sustaining,” 
“life-prolonging,” “burdensome,” and “protocol-driven” are used interchangeably in the medical 
literature, depending on the focus or assumptions of each study’s author/s. Ambiguous and non-
technical definitions hamper research in the field, making it difficult to compare studies or 
integrate research findings.  
 
Recently, a team of researchers developed a list of medical interventions that may be considered 
aggressive and argued that any of these procedures would be considered burdensome to the 
     




patient in the last 30 days of life (Torke et al., 2019:7). This list consists of the following 
interventions:  
● cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR or “resuscitation”),  
● intubation/ventilation,  
● surgery,  
● other medical procedures requiring informed consent,  
● chemotherapy,  
● dialysis,  
● hospitalization,  
● stay in an intensive care unit (ICU),  
● an emergency department visit, or  
● artificial nutrition or transfusion.  
 
All EOL studies define intensive or burdensome medical care as the active intervention of a 
subset of the above list (Lin et al. 2016; Wright et al., 2008). Torke’s research team, however, 
used the entirety of the list in their study of aggressive EOL medical care (Torke et al., 2019). 
Many studies define intensive EOL care simply as the receipt of CPR (resuscitation), a definition 
that is at the core of many, if not most, EOL intervention studies (Phelps et al., 2009). Therefore, 
a brief discussion of both resuscitation and the associated DNR-order follows. 
 
Cardiopulmonary resuscitation (also known as CPR or resuscitation) is an emergency procedure 
consisting of chest compressions and ventilation (Martin et al., 2019; Atkins et al., 2015). 
Ventilation may be provided via mouth-to-mouth ventilation or mechanical ventilation. CPR is 
recommended for individuals who are not breathing and unresponsive as a result of the onset of 
sudden death. Causes of sudden death in which CPR is recommended include cardiac arrest, 
electric shock/lightning strike, drowning, and respiratory arrest.  CPR is unlikely to restart a 
heart once the heart has stopped; CPR’s purpose, then, is to restore some flow of blood to the 
brain and heart, which extends the window of opportunity for the heart to begin beating again 
before the onset of permanent brain damage. CPR is generally continued until a person has a 
     




return of spontaneous circulation (ROSC) or is declared dead. Administration of an electric 
shock to the individual’s heart (defibrillation) is usually needed to restart the heart beating. 
 
Resuscitation or CPR is a useful medical procedure that saves thousands of lives. CPR is 
considered a fundamental medical procedure and is taught to virtually all medical personnel and 
first responders. In addition, organ donation is usually made possible by CPR, even if CPR does 
not save the life of the patient (American Heart Association Guidelines, 2015). Resuscitation, 
then, becomes “aggressive” or “burdensome” primarily in the context of a futile medical 
condition involving a frail patient.  
 
Patients and surrogates, when considering EOL alternatives or confronted with a decision to sign 
a DNR, may imagine resuscitation as it is often portrayed in the movies, as relatively-gentle 
chest compressions with mouth-to-mouth ventilation, resulting in the stricken individual soon 
gasping back to consciousness. In situations of terminal illness or geriatric frailty, however, 
resuscitation would more likely involve repeated and vigorous electric shocks to the patient’s 
chest. The patient’s family would be removed from the room or kept at a distance.  Resuscitation 
would be continued until the patient either has a return of spontaneous circulation (ROSC), is 
connected to a mechanical ventilator in a comatose state, or pronounced dead. A patient who dies 
during resuscitation is not in a quiet room surrounded by family. Instead, such a patient is 
surrounded by medical personnel executing a “full-code.” 
 
Resuscitation, specifically CPR, is considered a burdensome procedure for several reasons. The 
average survival rate to hospital discharge for patients undergoing CPR in the US is 
approximately 15% (Yuen et al. 2011). For patients whose strength is compromised by disease or 
age, the survival rates are even lower (Yuen et al., 2011; Santonocito et al., 2013).  Patients, 
however, routinely overestimate the probable CPR survival rate by at least 200%, possibly 
because of its inaccurate portrayal in the mass media (Jones et al., 2000; Cherniack 2002). 
Furthermore, patients who were successfully resuscitated are often burdened by accompanying 
procedures in the ICU, enduring complications such as rib fractures, permanent neurological 
deficits, and impaired functional status (Yuen et al., 2011). Even without physical injury, CPR 
     




may result in psychological harm that lowers survivors’ quality of life (Yuen et al., 2011). For 
these reasons, intensive EOL medical care, and specifically resuscitation and the accompanying 
mechanical ventilation, has been found to represent a negative outcome for individuals and 
families. 
 
CPR is only one item on the above list of procedures that may be considered burdensome if 
administered at the EOL, but it is an exemplar. All of the “burdensome” procedures on the list 
are valid life-saving methods that improve the quality and length of life for thousands of people 
in developed nations. They are considered burdensome only when administered in a futile 
situation. Unfortunately, even trained physicians and other medical professionals are not able to 
accurately predict how long a terminally-ill or elderly patient will live, although an experienced 
ICU physician currently gives a more accurate prognosis than the most finely calibrated, 
computer-based prognostic scoring system (i.e., APACHE III) (Swetz et al., 2014). Who, then, 
decides when a patient’s situation is futile? How can it be determined if a terminally-ill or 
geriatric patient’s quality of life is high enough to justify intensive medical procedures? Who 
decides which medical procedures are burdensome?  
 
Consent and Patient Autonomy 
Although some countries practice a more paternalistic model of medicine than others, the idea of 
patient-based medicine has permeated the international medical literature. Patient-based 
medicine, as an ideal, has consolidated into an international ethical consensus (Santonocito et al., 
2013). Although homage to patient-based care is widespread, implementation varies widely from 
country to country (Santonocito et al., 2013). Patient-based medical care includes involving the 
patient or surrogates in medical decision making and gaining “informed consent” before medical 
personnel administer medicine, perform procedures or enrol a patient in a research study 
(Santonocito et al., 2013).  
Depending on the country, informed consent may be oral or written. In most westernized 
countries, including New Zealand, informed consent is a document that is written in language 
understood by the patient and dated and signed by the patient and at least one witness 
     




(Santonocito et al., 2013). Patient-based medical care considers the patient’s will and not only 
what physicians advise. The current medical literature on the subject of EOL medical protocol 
values a dialogue between patients, families, religious representatives, and hospital staff to 
clarify the patient’s preferences while s/he is still mentally competent. (Santonocito et al., 2013). 
The Do-Not-Resuscitate (DNR) order is arguably the principal Advanced Directive (AD). A 
DNR may be included as part of a more broad-ranging AD. The literature suggests that there is a 
widespread need for advanced care planning and AD to minimize the gap between what 
individuals and patients desire from the medical community and what they eventually receive 
(Cohen et al., 2010). Doctors are legally obligated in most developed countries to administer 
intensive medical treatments, including resuscitation, when a patient’s heart has stopped. In the 
absence of an AD or DNR, “full code” is the default order (Torke et al. 2019; Solomon, 2014; 
Santonocito et al., 2013). As a result, aggressive EOL medical care is sometimes simply referred 
to as “protocol-driven care” (Gopalraj et al., 2012).  
Interestingly, the DNR order is the only type of informed consent in which a patient requests that 
a particular medical procedure be prevented from being performed. There is evidence that 
obtaining this specific kind of informed consent may cause considerable distress for patients and 
families (Curtis & Burt, 2007). It is unclear whether the distress is because of the topic (death), 
because of the negative perception that the patient is asking that the physician “do nothing,” or 
because of other religious or cultural values (Santonocito et al., 2013). Several alternatives 
viewed as less distressing to traditional AD’s have been proposed in the literature. These 
alternatives include the “informed assent” created by Curtis and Burt (2007). Evidence suggests 
that renaming the “Do-Not-Resuscitate” (DNR) order as the “Allow-Natural-Death” (AND) 
order increases the likelihood of appropriate care and decreases unnecessary suffering by the 
patient (Venneman et al., 2008).  
In one hospital, doctors experimented with an oral protocol meant to introduce patients to the 
DNR in a non-distressing manner: 
There are a number of things doctors can do to try to revive someone whose heart has 
stopped beating, which usually includes shocks to the heart and the use of a machine to 
help with breathing. Some patients choose to not have these interventions and die 
     




peacefully. Thinking of (Patient’s) current situation, would you want the doctors to try to 
revive him/her? (Torke et al., 2019:7) 
 
“No” responses were coded as a preference for DNR status, although neither the term “DNR” or 
“Do-Not-Resuscitate” was ever employed. “Yes” and “don’t know” responses were coded as 
preferences for full code status (Torke et al., 2019). 
 
Experienced medical personnel cannot predict with technical accuracy the time of a patient’s 
death, nor can an individual patient’s “will to live” be empirically measured. The predictions of 
physicians as to whether their patients want resuscitation corresponds poorly with the opinions 
expressed by their patients (Wenger et al., 2015). Therefore, despite protocols and frameworks 
which have been developed to address the patient’s clinical condition and values, disagreement 
on what constitutes the “best interests” for individual patients at the EOL persists (Chidwick et 
al., 2013).  
 
Why is intensive EOL medical care considered a negative outcome? 
 
Aggressive EOL medical care has been associated with poor quality death experience and more 
difficult caregiver bereavement (Yuen et al., 2011; Wright et al., 2008). For example, one 
multisite, prospective, longitudinal study of terminal patients and their informal caregivers 
(n=332 dyads) found that more intensive medical care (defined as ventilation, resuscitation and 
ICU admission) was associated with lower patient quality of life and a higher risk of major 
depressive disorder in bereaved caregivers (Wright et al., 2008). Conversely, better patient 
quality of life at the patient’s EOL was associated with better caregiver quality of life at the 
follow-up assessment. Longer hospice stays before patient death have been associated with better 
patient quality of life as well (Wright et al., 2008). 
 
Intensive medical care in EOL situations is considered invasive and undesirable by medical 
practitioners who have witnessed it (Solomon, 2014; Phelps et al., 2009). Most physicians would 
choose not to undergo resuscitation themselves and prefer less EOL care for themselves than 
those expressed preferences of their patients (Cherniack, 2002; Gramelspacher, Zhou, Hanna & 
     




Tierney, 1997). In one US-based study, 47% of all physicians and nurses and 70% of all house 
officers reported acting against their conscience in administering resuscitation to terminally ill 
patients (Solomon et al., 1993). Four times as many practitioners in this study were concerned 
about providing overly burdensome treatment than were concerned about the undertreatment of 
terminally ill patients (Solomon et al., 1993). While there is some evidence that awareness has 
increased in the US since Solomon’s initial study, the problem itself persists (Solomon, 2014; 
Cherniack, 2002). There is evidence that overtreatment in EOL situations in the UK and New 
Zealand is less extreme as in the US, although the general problems of protocol-driven care, 
identifying medical futility, and allowing natural death are similar in both geographic areas 
(Cherniack, 2002; Faith and Belief, 2018). 
 
Why are intensive EOL medical procedures ever administered if viewed by medical 
personnel, patients, and families as a negative outcome?  
 
There are many reasons why intensive EOL medical procedures are administered despite the 
misgivings of attendant medical personnel. As previously stated, physicians are legally obligated 
in most countries to “full-code” patients in distress unless an AD or DNR order is in place. Thus 
physicians often defer to the preferences of patients or patient-surrogates. Many patients and 
caregivers have little experience with what intensive EOL procedures involve, and, without 
information from experienced professionals, may be under-equipped to make decisions about 
whether to engage or not (Cherniack, 2002; Solomon, 2014; Yuen et al., 2011; Sullivan et al., 
2004). However, many medical professionals do not feel that they have time or financial 
incentives to engage in these conversations (Yuen et al., 2011; Solomon, 2014). Compounding 
the problem is the finding that many medical practitioners harbour an underlying discomfort 
about talking with patients about death and feel ambiguity about whether such discussions may 
be psychologically upsetting to patients, families, and themselves and therefore should be 
avoided (Curtis & Burt, 2007; Wright et al., 2008; Cherniack 2002). In an age that prizes 
individual autonomy and disparages physician authoritarianism, particularly in countries that 
allow legal challenges of physician decisions, the burden of EOL decision-making is 
increasingly transferred from physicians to patients and their families (Yuen et al., 2011).   
     





Decisions about initiating CPR and other aggressive medical procedures are complicated by 
several factors. Often these decisions must be made within seconds by health care providers who 
may have very little knowledge about the specific patient’s illness, pre-existing quality of life, or 
AD’s (Muñiz, 2005). Compounding the problem is the difficulty in recognizing when a situation 
is EOL (except in retrospect), as well as the impossibility of creating an objective rubric for 
determining medical futility (Swetz et al., 2014). Futility has quantitative, qualitative, and 
physiologic aspects. The quantitative and qualitative elements of futility rely on value 
judgements about the quality and meaning of life (Swetz et al., 2014). In summary, burdensome 
EOL medical procedures are administered for many reasons including under-educated patients 
and surrogates expressing a preference for such procedures, legal measures mandating aggressive 
EOL medical procedures in situations where patient preferences are unknown or undocumented, 
the acute presentations of compromised patients, and the general impossibility of assessing an 
EOL situation as such without a retrospective view. 
 
2.2 Religiosity and a preference for intensive EOL medical care 
 
What support exists in the literature for a link between religiosity and an increased 
preference for intensive EOL medical care? 
 
Religiosity and positive religious coping are significant predictors of a patient’s preference for, 
and reception of, aggressive EOL medical care (True et al., 2005; Torke et al., 2019; Sullivan et 
al., 2004; Balboni et al., 2013; Phelps et al., 2009; Cohen et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2008; Lin et 
al., 2016). In a multisite, prospective, longitudinal study (n=345), Phelps et al. found a 
significant association between a patient’s level of religious coping behaviours and the receipt of 
mechanical ventilation or resuscitation in the last week of life (Phelps et al., 2009). Although 
Phelps and associates acknowledge that the mechanisms for the association remain obscure, their 
study showed that the relationship between positive religious coping and “intensive life-
prolonging care” (defined as resuscitation and ventilation) remained significant after controlling 
     




for other coping methods such as terminal illness acknowledgement, support of spiritual needs, 
preference for heroics, and completion of advance directions (Phelps et al., 2009). Positive 
religious coping remained a significant predictor of intensive life-prolonging care after 
researchers adjusted for multiple demographic and psychosocial variables (Phelps et al., 2009). 
Although Phelps’ team used various scales for determining religiosity, they relied heavily on the 
RCOPE scale that will be reviewed in more detail below. The religious denominations involved 
in this study were Catholic, Protestant, Baptist, and “Other,” with no separation of non-Christian 
from Christian respondents in the latter group. 
 
The work of Phelps and associates (2009) expanded on earlier studies that investigated a link 
between religiosity and intensive EOL medical decisions and care. For example, True et al. 
reported that religion and religious coping (as analysed using patient self-assessment of 
religiosity, importance of religion, belief in divine intervention, turning to a higher power for 
strength, support and guidance, and using spirituality to cope) are associated with an increased 
preference for CPR/resuscitation, mechanical ventilation, and hospitalization near death (2005).  
True’s study also showed an inverse relationship between religiosity and the likelihood of a 
patient writing a living will (2005). Religiosity in patients has been linked to lower rates of 
advanced care planning (ACP) in multiple studies (Garrido et al., 2012; Balboni et al., 2013; 
True et al., 2005; Bullock, 2006; Crawley et al., 2000). Family members of patients who 
themselves report high religiosity were more likely to oppose a physician-recommended 
implementation of an existing DNR for a patient (Lin et al., 2015).  
 
Hospice utilisation is another specific behaviour which has been linked to religiosity. Hospice 
care4  is associated with better patient quality of life (Wright et al., 2008), yet religiosity is 
associated with decreased hospice care. For example, Torke et al. surveyed 291 patient/surrogate 
dyads within 2-10 days of ICU admission and later assessed the electronic charts of patients who 
had died (2019). The study found that belief in miracles and higher intrinsic religiosity were 
associated with lower hospice utilization (Torke et al., 2019). Furthermore, spiritual support from 
 
4 Hospice care is medical care that focuses on comfort and quality of life rather than a cure. It is designed 
for patients in the final phase of a terminal illness. 
     




a patient’s religious community has been associated with lower rates of hospice enrolment 
(Balboni et al., 2013). By contrast, spiritual support from medical teams has been associated with 
increased rates of hospice enrolment (Balboni et al., 2013).  
 
Another measurable connection between individual religiosity and EOL medical decision-
making involves attitudes about euthanasia. Nonreligious individuals, both medical practitioners 
and non-practitioners, are generally more supportive of euthanasia than their religious 
counterparts (Young et al., 2019). Most theorists believe that this link is caused by the common 
religious teaching that suicide is morally wrong, combined with the notion that euthanasia is 
comparable to suicide. For example, one study demonstrated that 23% of respondents refused to 
sign a DNR because they felt that signing a DNR was equivalent to suicide (Sullivan et al., 
2004). Although the practice of euthanasia is distinct from signing a DNR, many patients and 
surrogates may confound the two medical decisions (Santonocito et al., 2013). Another medical 
term which is sometimes confused with notions of euthanasia and suicide is “deep sedation.”5 
Independent of specialty and ethnicity, physicians who described themselves as nonreligious 
were more likely to report having given continuous deep sedation until patient death and having 
taken decisions they expected or partly intended to end life (Seale, 2010). For a variety of 
reasons, religious patients and physicians avoid suicide or anything that ‘smacks’ of it, possibly 
reducing the number of religious patients and physicians who engage with other related 
processes such as the DNR or deep sedation. 
 
The majority of the literature indicates a link between religiosity and aggressive EOL medical 
care; however, several recent studies have not been consistent with earlier findings. For example, 
Torke’s team found that higher surrogate intrinsic religiosity was associated with lower patient 
receipt of life-prolonging treatments within the last 30 days of life, acknowledging that this 
finding “stands in contrast with much of the research previously conducted with patients making 
 
5 Deep sedation (also known as palliative sedation, terminal sedation, continuous deep sedation, or 
sedation) is a drug-induced loss of consciousness. It is considered an option of last resort for patients 
whose distressing symptoms cannot be controlled by other means. Sedation is not considered a form of 
euthanasia, because its goal is to control symptoms rather than to shorten life; however, it is known to 
have the side effect of hastening death by some degree (Seale, 2010).  
     




decisions for themselves” (Torke et al., 2019:14). The authors hypothesize that their findings 
suggest that it is not religion or spirituality in general that predict associations with EOL care, 
but rather “specific dimensions” of religion or spirituality, such as a belief in miracles (Torke et 
al., 2019:14).  
 
Another EOL researcher, Schroepfer, found that religiosity was not a significant predictor of a 
patient’s consideration to hasten death, but that poor or conflictual social support was a 
significant predictor thereof (2008). Schroepfer’s study might indicate that strong or congruous 
social support, rather than religion per se, might be a significant predictor of a patient’s 
consideration to delay death by employing intensive medical procedures.  
 
Both Schroepfer (2008) and Torke (2019) hypothesize that their results may contradict prior 
research because studies of terminal cancer patients have often been conflated with studies of 
terminally ill elders. In other words, Schroepfer and Torke did not find the link between 
religiosity and preference for, and reception of, aggressive EOL medical care that had formerly 
been reported in the literature. They each hypothesize that this might be because they 
[Schroepfer and Torke] used research samples consisting of geriatric patients. In contrast, many 
previous EOL studies used samples of terminal cancer patients, including those of younger ages. 
The link between religiosity and intensive EOL care may be stronger among terminal cancer 
patients than among terminally ill elders. For one thing, cancer patients are commonly seen as 
falling “victim” to cancer before their “time,” whereas aging is viewed as a natural process 
(Torke et al., 2019). Nevertheless, the literature confirming the link between religiosity and 
aggressive EOL medical procedures outweighs the literature that contradicts this finding (Torke 
et al., 2019; Phelps et al., 2009; Balboni et al., 2013; True et al., 2005). 
 
 
Why is religiosity linked to a preference for more intensive EOL medical procedures? 
 
The finding that increased religiosity is connected to a preference for and use of aggressive EOL 
medical technologies, considered a negative outcome within the literature, defies both social 
     




theories and common knowledge (Garrido et al., 2012). According to theorists, religious coping 
can offer individuals a sense of meaning, control, comfort, and personal growth while facing 
death (Pargament, 2000). A large volume of research indicates that more religious individuals 
have better mental and physical health and adapt more quickly to challenging life situations such 
as facing death, compared to those who are less religious (Koenig, 2002; Sharp, Carr & 
Macdonald, 2012).6 There is a long history of thanatocentric theories of religion based on the 
causal claim that religious belief mitigates the fear of death. As Jong et al. suggest, “There may 
be no antidote to the human fear of death quite like religion” (Jong et al., 2018:5). Religion is 
theoretically and commonly viewed as a method to ease dying. In addition, increased religiosity, 
it may be assumed, would lead patients into more direct contact with church teachings regarding 
EOL practices. All major religions have formal statements advocating life-sustaining treatments 
only when they do not “lead to undue suffering” or to “unnaturally extend life” (Garrido et al., 
2012:801-2).  
 
Because the role of religion would commonly be understood as easing death, and because 
aggressive EOL medical care is considered a burdensome and negative outcome, the link 
between religiosity and aggressive EOL medical care is puzzling. Besides, relatively little is 
known about why religiosity is inversely associated with the likelihood of engaging with 
advance care planning (ACP) or Do-Not-Resuscitate orders (DNR) (Garrido et al., 2012). As 
previously discussed, lower ACP rates leave patients at higher risk for receiving care that is 
discordant with their preferences (Garrido et al., 2012).   
 
The connections between religiosity and EOL medical care are of broad interest to scholars 
(Seale, 2010). There is evidence that underlying religious beliefs related to EOL care contribute 
to medical decisions leading to more aggressive EOL medical care even in the general public or 
among patients and families who do not consider themselves “highly” religious (Balboni et al., 
2019). Religious beliefs influencing illness and medical decisions are critical to understanding as 
 
6  This claim has recently been challenged by a minority of theorists who argue that increased religiosity 
in only linked to positive health outcomes in societies where religiosity is the majority population and is, 
therefore, privileged (Cragun et al., 2016). Other theorists challenge the link between religiosity and 
intensive EOL medical care for other reasons (Heeren et al., 2001). 
     




part of a culturally-sensitive and patient-centred care (Balboni et al., 2019). There is a demand 
for research in other countries outside the USA and the UK (Cherniack, 2002). 
 
Many researchers have called for more studies that explore the mechanisms of religious 
behaviour on medical decision-making, particularly EOL medical decision-making. For example, 
Sharp et al. conducted a multivariable analysis of 2678 records from a 50-year longitudinal 
survey in Wisconsin, USA, to assess the effects of religious ideology on EOL treatment 
preferences (2012). They found no statistically significant differences in EOL treatment and 
preferences when comparing traditionally defined denominations (Catholic, Protestant, other 
religions, no religion), but found the adherence to fundamentalist beliefs within any religious 
tradition to be significantly linked to a higher likelihood of desire for life-extending treatments. 
Sharp et al. concluded their study with a call for “in-depth interviews” to provide insights into 
how individuals use their religious beliefs and social networks to formulate EOL medical 
treatment preferences (Sharp et al., 2012:295). Phelps and associates, who found that a high level 
of positive religious coping at baseline was significantly associated with receipt of mechanical 
ventilation and intensive life-prolonging care during the last week of life, wrote, “Patients rely on 
religious faith to cope, but little is known about the associations between religious coping and the 
use of intensive life-prolonging care at EOL. Further research is needed to determine the 
mechanisms for this association” (Phelps et al., 2009).  
 
2.3 Current hypotheses 
 
What are the hypotheses which have been proposed in the literature? 
 
Many researchers have hypothesized possible mechanisms that link religiosity with an increased 
desire for extraordinary medical care.  An extensive literature survey uncovered multiple 
hypotheses, which I have grouped into the following categories: 
 
a. Sanctity in suffering - “My suffering will be rewarded.”  
     




b. Sanctity (vs. quality) of life - “Not accepting available medical procedures is 
immoral and tantamount to suicide.” 
c. God’s sovereignty - “My job is to prolong my life until God decides I should die.” 
d. Miracles - “I might be healed, no matter what my doctor says.” 
e. Afterlife - “I am anxious about my place in the afterlife.” 
f. Social support - “My friends and family don’t want me to die yet … and I have a 
lot of friends and family.”   
 
Support for each of these hypotheses will be reviewed in turn. 
 
a. Sanctity in suffering. “My suffering will be rewarded.” 
 
Theorists argue that the idea of positive transformation through suffering is inherent to positive 
religious coping (Phelps et al., 2009; Balboni et al., 2019; Smith et al., 2008). Specifically, a 
sacred purpose to suffering may enable patients to endure more invasive and painful EOL 
medical procedures (Bullock 2006; Crawley et al., 2000). Many Christian traditions promote 
suffering to be part of a spiritual commitment to asceticism and sacrifice. Indeed, the central 
Christian narrative and iconography involve Jesus suffering on the cross (Crawley et al., 2000; 
Eberl, 2012). Mainstream Islam teaches that pain, sent by God to test one’s religious 
commitment, is to be faithfully endured (Crawley et al., 2000). In the Buddhist tradition, 
suffering is seen as a process to gain good karma and happiness in rebirth (Lin et al., 2016). EOL 
researchers recognize that pain and suffering can have instrumental value for some patients, as a 
way to enhance their experience in the afterlife and to learn valuable spiritual lessons (Eberl, 
2012). The valuation of suffering, however, is not necessarily compatible with the objectives of 
palliative care, which are to relieve physical and emotional suffering in terminal patients.  
 
“Sanctity in suffering” is included as one of the key indicators on the recently developed 
Religious Beliefs in EOL Medical Care (RBEC) assessment scale (Balboni et al., 2019). The 
RBEC scale is designed to measure the patient’s involvement with four mechanisms 
hypothesized by the authors to be the key indicators connecting religiosity to EOL medical care. 
     




The remaining three mechanisms suggested by the RBEC will be described in the following 
three sections. The RBEC scale was evaluated in a sample of American advanced cancer patients 
(n=275) from Coping with Cancer II, an NCI-funded, multi-site longitudinal, observational study 
of communication processes and outcomes in EOL cancer care. The authors claim the RBEC 
scale is an internally-consistent and valid tool for assessing religious beliefs that are frequently 
endorsed and inversely associated with terminal illness understanding (Balboni et al., 2019).  
 
The RBEC scale was developed by a multi-site team of high-profile, experienced researchers in 
the field of EOL medical studies. The authors of the RBEC scale recognise that there is evidence 
that certain religious beliefs are a “potential causal pathway” between religion and EOL medical 
preferences and care (Balboni et al., 2019:15). The authors created a scale that may reflect the 
causal role of four specific religious variables on EOL decision-making by framing these four 
variables in a way that is relevant for EOL decisions. The RBEC Scale consists of seven 
statements with which participants are asked to agree or disagree in some measure. Statements 
include items such as “I will accept every possible medical treatment because my faith tells me 
to do everything I can to stay alive longer” (Balboni et al., 2019).  
 
The authors of the RBEC scale call for future work examining the longitudinal associations 
between RBEC scores and EOL decisions (Balboni et al., 2019). Based on their initial study of 
275 advanced cancer patients, they found the RBEC scale to be internally consistent, 
unidimensional, positively associated with other indicators of patients’ religiousness and 
spirituality (establishing its convergent validity), and inversely associated with patients’ terminal 
illness understanding and acceptance (establishing its criterion validity). Furthermore, most 
patients (87%) reported some (‘somewhat,’ ‘quite a bit’ or ‘a great deal’) endorsement of at least 
one RBEC item, and 62% endorsed three or more RBEC items. The authors claim that these 
results indicate that the RBEC has potential clinical utility in promoting positive EOL decision-
making (Balboni et al., 2019). The RBEC is suggested as a diagnostic tool to identify patients at 
high risk of making medical decisions that can “forestall acceptance of incurable illness and 
promote the use of care focused on life-prolongation and cure, even in terminal illness” (Balboni 
     




et al., 2019:4). The RBEC is based on a US-sample (n=275) of advanced cancer patients from an 
NCI-funded, multi-site, longitudinal, observational study. 
 
As previously stated, the first four hypotheses in the research study at hand are identical with the 
four religious variables explored in the RBEC scale (sanctification through suffering, sanctity of 
life, God’s sovereignty, and miracles) (Balboni et al., 2019). Evidence supporting the second 
hypothesis, sanctity of life, will now be presented. 
 
b. Sanctity (vs. quality) of life. “Not accepting available medical procedures is 
immoral and tantamount to suicide.” 
 
Prioritisation of the sanctity of life over other considerations (e.g., the quality of life, self-
determination, pain control, or personal dignity) may be one reason that religious individuals 
prefer and receive for more intensive EOL medical care (Balboni et al., 2019; Sharp et al., 
2012:280). Theorists hypothesize that religious individuals prolong life and oppose euthanasia 
for the same reasons that they oppose abortion (Sharp et al., 2012).  In other words, the religious 
position of opposing both euthanasia and abortion highlights the religious individuals’ priority of 
the sanctity of life over competing considerations. Abortion debates, often framed as “right to 
life” vs. “right to choose,” mirror this EOL debate, which may be described in similar terms. 
Cohen and associates argue that a belief in the sanctity of life was a predominant belief among 
their study participants. They summarised the finding in the words of one of their respondents 
who said, “if someone in my family were in a coma...we say that removing someone from life 
support is killing them...” (Cohen et al., 2010:1429). “Sanctity (vs. quality) of life” is included as 
one of the key indicators on the RBEC measurement device (Balboni et al., 2019). 
 
c. God’s sovereignty. “My job is to prolong my life until God decides I should die.” 
 
Closely related to the previous hypothesis, this hypothesis is nonetheless distinct in one crucial 
aspect. Rather than emphasising an individual’s moral choice and responsibility, this hypothesis 
(“God’s sovereignty”) emphasizes an individual’s relative powerlessness in contrast with God’s 
     




perceived omnipotence. Religious individuals are hypothesised to feel less responsible for the 
timing and manner of their own death and potentially view any efforts to control the timing and 
manner of their own death as either unfaithful or futile or both. The most predominant EOL 
behaviour associated with this hypothesis is the decreased participation in Advanced Care 
Planning (ACP) by religious patients and their families. 
 
EOL researchers who investigate the decreased rates of ACP among the highly religious 
hypothesize that this finding may be accounted for by “beliefs about God’s controlling life 
length” (Garrido et al., 2012:801; Torke et al., 2019). The religious belief in the “absolute 
domination of God in matters of life and death” may be connected to preferences for life-
extending treatments, as anything else may be seen as a “usurpation” of God’s authority (Sharp 
et al., 2012; Daaleman & VandeCreek, 2000). There is evidence that the most religious and 
orthodox individuals in all major denominations place a high value on submitting to God’s will 
at the expense of self-determination and independence (Sharp et al., 2012). 
 
The notion of God’s sovereignty may account for the oft-replicated finding that highly religious 
patients create fewer legal documents (DNR, ACP) directed toward their EOL care. Those who 
believe that the nature and timing of death are in God’s control rather than their own will be less 
likely to engage in ACP (Garrido et al., 2012; Torke et al., 2019; Lin et al., 2015). Religious 
patients, it is theorized, may equate creating advanced care directives, especially a DNR, as 
“giving up on God [before God has] given up on them (Phelps et al., 2009:1145). Garrido et al. 
published a US-based, quantitative study (n=305) that associated higher religiosity with a lower 
likelihood of ACP (2012). In defending their results, Garrido et al. argued that, if the timing of 
death is viewed as beyond one’s control, and if submitting to God’s control is a positive value, 
there would be little reason to plan for future health care scenarios by engaging in ACP. “God’s 





     




d. Miracles. “I might be healed no matter what my doctor says.”  
 
Other EOL researchers have hypothesized that a belief in miracles is the mechanism that results 
in more religious patients preferring and requesting life-prolonging medical procedures (Torke et 
al., 2019; Balboni et al., 2019; Steinberg, 2011). Phelps et al. reported that 57.4% of all patients 
in one multi-ethnic study believed that God could heal them even if a physician said it was futile 
(Phelps et al., 2009). Torke et al. found that, out of a range of religious beliefs and practices, only 
belief in miracles was strongly associated with lower DNR preference (2019). Miracle belief is a 
valid consideration in the New Zealand context of the present study as 27% of New Zealanders 
indicated that they connected with Christian miracle belief in a “positive way” (Faith and Belief, 
2018:60). “Belief in miracles” is the fourth and final key indicator included on the RBEC scale 
(Balboni et al., 2019). 
 
e. Afterlife. “I am anxious about my place in the afterlife.” 
 
A belief in an afterlife has been theorized to be the active mechanism motivating religious 
patients to prefer life-prolonging medical treatments (Koenig, 2002; Lin et al., 2016; McClain-
Jacobsen et al., 2004). Uncertainty about an afterlife may exist for adherents who are convinced 
about the existence of an afterlife but are unconvinced about their place in it (Heeren et al., 
2001). Religious or spiritual beliefs may, for some dying persons and their families, create 
“turmoil and distress” (Koenig, 2002). Some individuals may fear judgment, punishment, or 
“eternal damnation,” and these persons “wrestle with their religious beliefs and relationship with 
God” during EOL medical situations (Koenig, 2002). In a US-based study or terminal cancer 
patients (n=276), 38.6% of respondents reported that their afterlife belief either gave them no 
comfort or was distressing to them (McClain-Jacobsen et al., 2004). A minority of religious 
individuals actively engage in negative religious coping behaviours, such as wondering if God is 
punishing them, wondering if God has abandoned them, or questioning God’s love or power 
(Phelps et al., 2009). Belief in an afterlife may motivate patient preference for life-prolonging 
care as a means of delaying a transition into an unknown hereafter.  
 
     




The religious correlates of death anxiety are a matter of interest and debate among scholars. 
Paradoxically, death anxiety may simultaneously motivate individuals to be religious, yet 
religious ideology may also provide one more reason to fear (Jong et al., 2018). Be that as it 
may, “belief in the afterlife” was not included on the RBEC scale, and it has not been mentioned 
as often in the literature as the previously listed mechanisms (McClain-Jacobsen et al., 2004).  
     
2. Social support. “My friends and family don’t want me to die yet. . . and I have a lot of friends 
and family.” 
   
Finally, religious patients may prefer life-extending medical care because religious patients 
generally receive more robust social support, and stronger social support leads to a preference for 
and acceptance of aggressive medical care. Increased religiosity is associated with increased 
family size (Sharp et al. 2012:281, cites Pew Forum 2008b). Organised religions often provide a 
‘church family’ to enlarge and bolster a patient’s biological family (Cragun et al., 2016). 
Besides, mainstream religions offer theological support for notions of filial piety (Lin et al., 
2016) ,which may support a religious family’s commitment to prolong the life of a family 
member. 
 
A larger, stronger whānau (a Māori term in wide use in New Zealand referencing one’s social 
support, family or otherwise) may be linked to a preference for life-prolonging EOL medical 
care for several reasons. Firstly, a Social Control Hypothesis based on early theorists like 
Durkheim7 and Parsons8 would predict that a terminally ill patient may alter his or her behaviour 
because of an internalized sense of responsibility toward other members of the group 
(Schroepfer, 2008). This internalized sense of responsibility to a group may motivate a sick or 
weak patient to prolong their life even in the face of challenges. Alternately, an individual who 
feels less a sense of responsibility to a group, or whose group is less cohesive, may feel less 
motivated to prolong her/his life in the face of challenges. 
 
7 Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) was a French sociologist and one of the founders of the field of modern 
social science. 
8 Talcott Parsons (1902-1979) was an American sociologist whose theories built on the work of Durkheim 
and others. 
     





Indeed, evidence for the idea that a sense of social cohesiveness (or lack thereof) may impact the 
desire for life-prolonging EOL medical treatment was found in a 2008 study of 96 terminally ill 
elders (Schroepfer). Terminally ill patients who considered hastening death report lower levels of 
social support and a lower quality of that support (Schroepfer, 2008). Schroepfer argues that a 
patient’s consideration to hasten death is impacted not merely by the size of the support network 
but by the quality. Indeed, Schroepfer found that that poor or “conflictual” social support was a 
significant predictor of the consideration to hasten death (2008). It has been hypothesized that 
the opposite may also be true: strong social support may be a significant predictor of the 
consideration to prolong life (Schroepfer, 2008).  
 
Social Control Theory, the theory that commitment to relationships determines a wide array of 
human behaviour, may also be active in the decision-making of patient surrogates and family 
members. Multiple studies (from the US, UK, Australia, Taiwan) have shown that more EOL 
medical decisions are made by a patient’s family than by the patient him- or herself, including 
the decision to withhold resuscitation and allow natural death (Cohen et al.; 2010, Lin et al., 
2016, Cherniack, 2002).  Another study, based in the US, found that 40-47% of hospitalized 
adult patients, and 71% of ICU patients, rely upon surrogate decision-makers (Torke et al., 
2019). Most patients say that they want their family to make EOL medical decisions for them if 
they become cognitively impaired, even if those decisions go against the patient’s formerly 
stated wishes (Cherniack, 2002).  
 
Surrogates often misinterpret the EOL wishes of elderly relatives despite the high correlation 
between patients’ and surrogates’ religious beliefs (Torke et al., 2019; Cherniack, 2002). In 
addition, surrogates are routinely unaware of patients’ written DNR (Cherniack, 2002). Family 
members have been shown to miscalculate the EOL medical preference of a patient consistently 
usually overestimating the life-prolonging medical intervention that a patient would desire for 
her/him-self (Yuen et al., 2011; Cherniack, 2002). Furthermore, evidence exists that young 
people consistently overestimate the life-prolonging medical intervention that an older patient 
desires for himself or herself (Lloyd-Williams et al., 2007). As a direct result, although 60 -70% 
     




of people want to die at home, only a fraction do so (Swerissen & Duckett, 2014). In New 
Zealand, approximately 30% of people die at home, at a rate comparable to that in the US, 
Ireland, and France (Swerissen & Duckett, 2014). In the UK, approximately 22% of people die at 
home, and in Australia, the rate is 14% (Swerissen & Duckett, 2014). As discussed earlier, 
families and patients often have little understanding of CPR and other life-prolonging medical 
procedures, which may inadvertently thwart a patient’s desire to die peacefully and at home 
(Cherniack, 2002).  
 
The Social Control Theory, as explained, may motivate the EOL behaviour of both an ill or 
elderly individual and their family/surrogates. The Social Control Theory may also explain why 
medical personnel may alter their behaviour in favour of life-prolonging care when treating a 
patient with strong social support. Physicians, to be helpful and demonstrate their full investment 
to the patient, may be more likely to offer life-prolonging treatment to a patient surrounded by 
larger whānau than a patient with little or no whānau (Koenig, 2002). Medical personnel may 
see death as a failure and a reminder of their inability to help the patient, and seeing the patient’s 
family only increases the guilt (Koenig, 2002). Physicians and family members have been known 
to override a patient’s stated and written desires at critical points in the progress of a terminal 
disease when, for example, a patient may be unable to articulate his or her wishes (Yuen et al., 
2011). 
 
The link between higher family support and lower ACP documents is supported by several 
studies (Freytag & Rauscher, 2017; Torke, 2019; Phelps et al., 2009). ACP may be seen as an 
outside intervention that intrudes upon family communication patterns that have been established 
through generations (Freytag & Rauscher, 2017). Stronger family support and stronger spiritual 
support from a patient’s religious community have been associated with lower hospice enrolment 
and increased use of intensive medical interventions (Torke et al., 2019; Balboni et al., 2013). 
However, one recent study found that higher surrogate intrinsic religiosity was associated with 
lower patient receipt of life-sustaining treatments within the last 30 days of life, a finding which 
challenges established patterns in the literature (Torke et al., 2019). 
 
     




Many studies that indicate multiple and complex connections between patients, religion, and 
patients’ social networks. If religious people, in general, have more reliable social support than 
their nonreligious counterparts, then this may be more significant in understanding EOL medical 
choices than either the patients’ or the surrogates’ religious beliefs. I hypothesise that the 
patient’s social support has a bigger impact on a patient’s EOL medical care than the patient’s 
theological positioning. Therefore, social support is the dominant mechanism whereby religious 
patients prefer and receive more aggressive EOL medical interventions.  
 
In summary, the hypotheses that have been proposed in the literature to explain why religious 
people request and receive more intensive medical interventions revolve around religious 
theology: sanctity in suffering, sanctity (vs. quality) of life, God’s sovereignty, miracles, the 
afterlife). The increased likelihood that a religious person will receive more robust social support 
has also been proposed to explain this phenomenon.  
  
2.4 Religiosity vs. denomination 
 
How is it possible to justify the privileging of religiosity over religious affiliation in the current 
study? 
 
Religion and religiosity are considered to be critical contributors to the high levels of cooperation 
that support human societies, especially large-scale societies that depend on collaboration 
between anonymous individuals (Shaver & Purzycki, 2016). A considerable body of work has 
been devoted to the task of defining religiosity, explaining its prevalence and persistence 
throughout human history, and understanding the socio-cultural mechanisms that global religions 
have in common over time and across the globe (Peters, 2019).  
 
Although the definitions of religion and religiosity have been actively debated in the literature, 
most scholarly definitions characterize the notions in terms of a sense of the supernatural 
(Plavoet, 1990). “All functional elements of religion (beliefs, rituals, prayers) involve efforts to 
     




invoke, activate, and deploy supernatural causal agency of one sort or another” (Peters, 2019). 
Although this definition may be contested by those who wish to include ideologies such as 
patriotism or capitalism within the umbrella of religion, this definition helps separate religiosity 
as an identifiable social construct as compared to terms such as  “spiritual” or other aspects of 
mental health. 
 
Furthermore, the literature supports grouping subjects by the intensity of their religiosity rather 
than their denomination (Schroepfer, 2008; Sharp et al., 2012; Garrido et al., 2012) and explains 
why I have chosen to employ the same strategy in the current study. Sharp and associates discuss 
this methodological decision in some detail, referencing multiple studies that indicate that 
grouping respondents by their orthodoxy/conservatism is more important than grouping 
respondents by their denomination in end-of-life (EOL) medical studies (Sharp et al., 2012). 
Garrido and associates made a similar argument, stating, “Most studies find that spiritual and 
theological conservatism is a more relevant construct than specific religious affiliation” (Garrido 
et al., 2012).  
 
Several studies reveal slight differences in patients’ Christian denominational affiliation and the 
corresponding EOL medical interventions. In each case, the relative insignificance of the 
differences was noted (Heeren, et al., 2001; Cohen et al., 2010). Other EOL researchers found no 
difference in the EOL decisions of respondents from different denominations but did find that 
more orthodox adherents of any denomination had more in common with each other than less-
orthodox co-denominationalists (Sullivan et al., 2004, Sharp et al., 2012).  
 
Scholars of religion argue that one’s theological fundamentalism - defined as the extent to which 
one views God as one’s personal authority and the extent to which one engages in personal 
religious coping behaviours - may be a more robust predictor of EOL treatment preferences than 
one’s denominational group (Sharp et al., 2012). These arguments are based on studies which 
find that measures of fundamentalist theological beliefs are powerful predictors of secular 
behaviours such as voting, sexual behaviour and family formation - more powerful than 
denomination (Cahn & Carbone 2010; Pew Forum 2008a; 2008b, quoted in Sharp et al., 2012). 
     




Fundamentalist theological beliefs are connected to the personal salience of religion in one’s 
everyday life, generally referred to as coping behaviours in the literature (Sharp et al., 2012). 
Thus, researchers argue that a “devotional divide” may replace a “denominational divide” in 
studies of religiosity and religiously motivated secular behaviour (Cahn & Carbone, 2010; Sharp 
et al., 2012).  
 
EOL studies in the past have been faulted for attempting to capture patient religiosity using a 
single indicator (typically denominational group) without considering the wide scope of 
heterogeneity in beliefs and practices (“devotional divide”) within a single denominational group 
(Sharp et al., 2012). Religiosity, it is argued, is linked more closely to one’s placement on a 
spectrum from conservative to liberal than to one’s denomination (Sharp et al., 2012). 
Conservative and liberal co-denominationalists are observed to be more sharply polarized from 
each other than they are from other individuals in other denominations. Individuals with a 
conservatives/orthodox outlook emphasize external and transcendent authority, whereas those 
with a liberals/progressive outlook emphasize personal choice in all areas of life (Hunter, 1991). 
Of note, conservative religious groups are poised to have increasing global impact as their 
membership holds steady in the developed world, expands in the global south, and influences 
radicalized religious groups that have taken a foothold in places such as the Middle East, 
Philippines, and Malaysia (Sherwood, 2018). 
 
Sharp et al. suggest that traditional religious denominations may not be useful analytic categories 
for understanding social attitudes and practices (Sharp et al., 2012). Instead, Sharp indicates that 
measuring religiosity or devotion would be of greater use. Religiosity, argues Sharp, is to be 
measured in a subject’s externally or supernaturally-focused epistemology and salient religious 
coping behaviours - would be of greater use. This argument justifies the methodology of the 
present study, which privileges religiosity over religious affiliation and which examines general 
theological beliefs that are held in common across most denominations and world religions.   
 
There does not seem to be any clear indication in the literature that religious denomination 
makes more difference than religious salience and orthodoxy in EOL preferences and decision-
     




making. Nonetheless, for the sake of transparency and in following conventions established by 
other researchers in the field (Garrido et al., 2012), I have labelled religious affiliations of my 
respondents in the thesis research presented in the following chapters. 
 
 
2.5 Measuring religiosity 
 
How is religiosity measured?  
 
The current project utilizes the Brief RCOPE to assess the religiosity of participants. The Brief 
RCOPE is the most commonly used measure of religious coping in the literature (Phelps et al., 
2009:1146, Torke et al., 2019; Pargament, 2000; Pargament, Feuille & Burdzy, 2011). The Brief 
RCOPE is a 14-item measure of religious coping with major life stressors and has contributed to 
the growth of knowledge about the roles religion serves in managing crisis, trauma, and 
transition (Pargament et al., 2011). The positive RCOPE scale has demonstrated convergent and 
discriminant evidence of validity and internal consistency (Pargament et al., 2011). 
 
The Brief RCOPE consists of seven questions that assess positive religious coping and seven 
questions that assess negative religious coping. Examples of positive religious coping include 
“tried to see how God might be trying to strengthen me in this situation” and “looked for a 
stronger connection with God.”  Negative religious coping includes such notions as “wondering 
whether God has abandoned me” and “felt punished by God for my lack of devotion” 
(Pargament, 2000).  
 
Utilizing the positive religious coping scores from the Brief RCOPE is very common in EOL 
medical studies, particularly in the US and the UK (Phelps et al., 2009; Pargament et al., 2011, 
Balboni et al., 2019). In contrast, negative religious scores are commonly disregarded (Phelps et 
al., 2009). Relative to positive religious coping, negative religious coping is rare; additionally, 
negative religious coping is an indicator of psychopathology (Phelps et al., 2009). For 
     




researchers that intend to study normative rather than pathological religious coping, a patient’s 
positive RCOPE score is a widely accepted score to use as the primary religious coping variable 
(Phelps et al., 2009; Torke et al., 2019). Although the present study asked respondents to respond 
to the complete Brief RCOPE (positive and negative), the negative results were primarily used as 
a way to screen for religious normalcy and functioning. In the present study, negative religious 
coping scores were negligible and, for the reasons described above, were not included in the 
analysis. 
 
Despite its current status, the Brief RCOPE cannot be expected to measure something as 
complex as functional religiousness completely. Positive religious coping, although theoretically 
appealing, does not account for other religious factors (e.g., religiously based morals) that may 
account for the behavioural and medical associations observed in the literature, and “hidden 
confounders” are possible (Phelps et al., 2009:1146). In other words, the Brief RCOPE does not 
account for the entirety of the effect of religiosity on EOL medical decisions. Nevertheless, the 
RCOPE is a well-established survey instrument used by many research teams studying religiosity 
and medical decision-making  (Phelps et al., Torke et al., 2019).  
 
2.6 New Zealand Context 
Most EOL research has been conducted in the US and the UK, with another significant number 
of studies coming from elsewhere in Europe (Cherniack, 2002; Steinberg, 2011). How relevant 
are these findings to New Zealand? How is the medical system structured in comparison with 
other developed nations?  
 
New Zealand is a bicultural country, which makes it unique among developed nations (Faith and 
Belief, 2018). Sometime in the 13th century CE, several groups of Polynesians in long canoes 
(waka) landed on the island. This group of people formed a unique Māori culture, which has 
evolved and which continues to play a significant role in New Zealand society (Faith and Belief, 
2018). British colonisation began in the 1700s, and the UK annexed New Zealand in 1840. Māori 
and European population groups remain the dominant groups in New Zealand. According to the 
     




2018 Census, the majority of New Zealand’s population identifies as New Zealand-European, 
with indigenous Māori as the largest minority, followed by Asians and Pacific Islanders. 
Although minority populations in New Zealand lag behind the European group in many areas of 
prosperity, New Zealand ranks highly overall in international indexes of public performance, 
such as quality of life, civil freedoms, and health. 9   
 
New Zealand is ranked as one of the most secular, tolerant societies in the world.10 According to 
the 2018 New Zealand Census11, the majority of New Zealanders identify with no religion. The 
Christian faith remains the largest religious group in the country, with 37% of respondents 
identified as such. This is a radical departure from the near past in which the great majority of 
New Zealanders practiced some form of Christianity (Faith and Belief Report, 2018). As a 
secular country with a Christian heritage, New Zealand compares with countries such as Sweden, 
the UK, and France.   
 
New Zealand society is well-situated for comparative research about the sociology of religion 
because there are large numbers of religiously-unaffiliated New Zealanders who compare to 
religious New Zealanders in terms of education, political orientation, and socioeconomic status 
(Shaver et al., 2016). The health care system of New Zealand is a mixed public-private system, 
broadly similar to the UK, although with slightly lower rates of medicine use and slightly lower 
spending per capita (Gauld, 2014; Richards, 2010). In a 2019 ranking developed by a UK-based 
industry analyst, the health care systems of New Zealand and the UK received the same score 
(60/100), based on healthcare spending, number of hospital beds, number of doctors and nurses 
per capita, and life expectancy.12 Although New Zealand attitudes are not aligned with those of 
 
9 OECD. Society at a glance: OECD social indicators, 2011. http://www.oecd.org/berlin/47570353.pdf  
10 Ibid. See New Zealand census data for other examples. 
11 2018 Census data can be found at https://www.stats.govt.nz/information-releases/2018-census-totals-
by-topic-national-highlights. 
12 The summary of the report by ID Medical, which ranked 24 OECD countries with public or universal 
healthcare systems, can be found at http://hello.id-medical.com/images/ID-Medical-The-Best-Healthcare-
System.png. 
 
     




the UK (and other European developed nations) in every nuance, both the New Zealand 




Intensive EOL intervention is considered a negative outcome by many medical practitioners, 
patients, and caregivers (Yuen et al., 2011; Torke et al., 2019). Highly religious individuals 
consistently prefer and receive more intensive EOL treatment (Phelps et al., 2009; True et al., 
2005), yet theoretical views of religion predict that increased religiosity would ease the process 
of dying (Garrido, 2012). There is a demand for research that seeks to explain the mechanism 
underlying this finding. Six mechanisms have been proposed in the literature: 1) suffering, 2) 
sanctity (vs. quality) of life, 3) God’s sovereignty, 4) miracles, 5) afterlife, and 6) social support. 
Which of these proposed mechanisms are functional is currently unknown, and neither the 
medical nor the religious communities have provided a widely-accepted explanation.  
 
Relying on relevant arguments in the literature, the present study groups respondents by the 
intensity of their religiosity rather than their religious denomination (Sharp et al., 2012). The 
religiosity of participants in the present study is measured using the Brief RCOPE, which is the 
most widely-respected tool for measuring religious coping behaviour in the field of EOL medical 
decision making (Pargament et al., 2011; Phelps et al., 2009).
     






3.1 Methodological approach  
 
A number of quantitative studies have established a significant behavioural pattern (i.e., religious 
people ask for and use more aggressive EOL medical care), but the mechanisms underlying this 
effect remain unknown (Balboni et al., 2019; Phelps et al., 2009; Torke et al., 2019). Several 
researchers have called for qualitative studies to help uncover this missing link (Sharp et al., 
2012; Phelps et al., 2009). This research project seeks to establish some of the reasons why 
religiosity is an important division in the EOL medical literature (Balboni et al., 2019). 
 
Qualitative descriptive methodology, or phenomenological methodology, is one of several 
categories of qualitative research methodologies, and the one that is best suited for the current 
research question. A qualitative descriptive study - a reasonable combination of sampling, data 
collection, analysis, and re-presentation techniques - is considered to be the method of choice 
when straight descriptions of phenomena are desired (Sandelowski, 2000). Qualitative 
descriptive or phenomenological methodology calls for a sample size of 5 and 25 respondents 
(Sauro, 2015). In-depth, semi-structured interviews are the primary tool for gathering data from 
the sample.  
 
Qualitative research techniques include focus group discussions for investigating attitudes and 
concepts of normative behaviour; semi-structured interviews to seek views on a specific topic or 
with key informants; in-depth interviews to understand a condition, experience, or event from a 
personal perspective; and textual analysis to learn about distributed or private knowledge 
(Hammarberg, 2016). Qualitative methodology does not begin with a well-formed hypothesis, 
but looks to create a dataset sufficient to identify emerging themes which may then be validated 
or cross-checked using other participants (Sauro, 2015). Qualitative research has integrity when 
     




trustworthiness, credibility, applicability, and consistency are transparent (Hammarberg et al., 
2016).  
 
Qualitative data is non-numeric and creates an understanding about how and why decisions are 
made. Themes and findings emerge through the careful analysis of a researcher or a research 
team with broad contextual knowledge of the research question and the study sample. Data is 
collected using open-ended questions embedded in a semi-structured interview survey. When 
qualitative researchers sensitively invite people to reflect on their experience, researchers can 
sometimes learn more than they set out to discover (Hammarberg et al., 2016). Qualitative work 
is flexible, sensitive, and able to incorporate complexity, detail, and context (Hammarberg et al., 
2016). Phenomenological research is not designed to provide definitive explanations, but it can 
increase insights about a phenomenon or a particular finding originally discovered in other ways 
(Hammarberg et al., 2016).  
 
Descriptive methodology calls for the researcher to ask participants direct questions using 
“everyday terms of the individuals to which it is particularly salient” (Sandelowski, 
2000:334,339). Sandelowski recommends that researchers conducting qualitative descriptive 
studies “stay close to their data and to the surface of words and events” and use an inductive, 
iterative process to analyse relevant responses. Qualitative descriptive studies employ an 
approach that relies on participants’ own perspectives to provide insight into their motivations 
and behaviour, rather than a researcher seeking to uncover subconscious motivations of which 
the respondent may be unaware (Hammarberg et al., 2016). 
 
In qualitative research, the researcher is the instrument, an objective stance is considered 
obsolete, and transparency is an integral part of credibility (Hammarberg et al., 2016). Although 
I intend to reveal the attitudes and experiences of my interview participants without interference 
from my own biases, I recognise my limitations in this regard. Thus I find it fitting to describe 
my positioning as an acknowledgement of the active role I played in the research process.   
 
     




3.2 My positioning 
 
I acknowledge that my perspective and background influenced the research, despite my best 
efforts to invite each interview participant to give free expression to his or her experiences. As a 
basic example, I am aware of how a perceived negative reaction from me might induce a 
respondent to be more guarded or defensive. I am also mindful of how a perceived positive 
reaction from me might feel validating to a participant and influence her or him to give a similar 
answer in the future at the expense of a complete response. Too much of my own sharing could 
stifle or distract the respondent; too little of my sharing would make it harder for the respondent 
to confide.   
 
Thus, as an interviewer, I aimed to present the demeanour of an interested, professional, warm 
listener.  I built trust by briefly acknowledging my academic credentials and describing my 
research project, but resisted the urge to turn the interview into an informal conversation. When 
participants asked for my views, I usually deferred, explaining that we could return to my 
perspective at the end of the interview if the participant wished. My aim as an interviewer was to 
give the respondent over 90% of the total talking time during the interview. I resisted sharing 
much information about myself but was scrupulous in ensuring that the information I did choose 
to share about myself was truthful and unexaggerated. 
 
My active listening and perceptive follow-up questions resulted in most of my respondents 
assuming that I was very sympathetic and even believed as they did. The nonreligious 
respondents started using “we” when referring to other nonreligious people or atheists, including 
me in their in-group. For example, one atheist respondent made a humorous but deprecating 
remark about religious people that would have seemed rude if she had guessed that I attend 
church most weeks. However, my chuckle was not forced, as I felt I could sincerely relate to her 
canny observation.  
 
     




Interestingly, nonreligious participants assumed I was nonreligious, but religious people made 
the opposite assumption. As each interview progressed, I noticed religious participants making 
equally untrue assumptions about the number of beliefs that we held in common and including 
me in their religious in-group. One religious man asked me to pray with him at the end of the 
interview because he felt there was such a strong religious feeling between us that he wished to 
acknowledge. As I had joined in an unabashed chuckle with the atheist, I joined this participant 
in a religious ritual (prayer), even though I did not personally share many of his specific religious 
convictions. I did, however, share an appreciation for the personal - and therefore sacred - nature 
of the conversation we had shared. 
 
I enjoyed the interview part of this study very much. My active listening was genuine and 
natural. I felt some uncertainty, even nervousness, preceding each new interview, but left each 
interview feeling a sense of warmth toward, and from, the respondent that was beyond my 
expectations and rather nonclinical. Respondents expressed their warmth in words, but also in 
gestures, such as hugs, warm handshakes, follow-up emails offering to put me in touch with 
friends, an offer of tea, or an expressed desire that I would stay longer. I received this warm 
treatment from all of my respondents, even the ones who had initially expressed some hesitation 
to meet with me or discuss the research topic. For example, one woman had to “think about it” 
for several days before agreeing to meet with me. Yet, after our interview, she invited me to stay 
with her for a while and emailed several updates after we parted. Because of the intimacy that the 
interviews elicited, I returned the warmth as best I could, expressing gratitude for the 
respondents’ time and sharing, and sending thank you texts and email once I returned home. 
 
Most of the interviews were very personal. Several times in different interviews, I witnessed an 
unexpected show of tears as respondents recalled the deaths of people they had known. One 
participant wept when he remembered the sudden healing of a daughter-in-law, the young 
mother of his only grandchildren. Some interviews conjured strong feelings of anger, injury, and 
injustice in the participant, especially in connection with the topic of estranged family members. 
The personal nature of these interviews resulted from the hurt and even shame that participants 
expressed to me because their son, daughter, sister, or wife desired no further contact. Both the 
     




participant and the interviewer felt a certain soberness as we contemplated death and the human 
condition. For example, one respondent told me that she knew something was wrong “in there,” 
vaguely gesturing to her abdomen, but that she was postponing alerting her doctor or children for 
a couple of days. She wanted to rest before starting a series of doctor visits and medical testing. 
It seemed that she was confiding something personal at the time, as she lowered her voice and 
spoke with a tone she had not used up until that point in the interview. I learned from a mutual 
acquaintance that she died just a few weeks after our interview. In retrospect, I realized that she 
was likely confiding more than I realized at the time.  
 
In the spirit of transparency, and so the reader may have more power to draw her/his conclusions 
about how my positioning my effect this research project, I will disclose a more complete stance 
as follows: 
 
I was raised as the oldest child in a religious home. My parents and grandparents stretching back 
seven generations are, and were, practicing members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints. As an adult, I have chosen to remain active in the religion of my heritage. Despite 
recognising with increasing clarity some of the contradictions and potential for damage inherent 
in organised religion in general, and mine in particular, I have also recognised with increasing 
clarity the advantages that come from organised religion in general, and mine in particular.  
 
Although I consider myself a religious person, I felt a bias against highly religious individuals as 
I began this study. I assumed that religiosity, the kind which would drive someone to request and 
receive aggressive EOL care, must be unexamined or even presumptuous. Perhaps, I carried a 
slight sense of exasperation of an insider who can see the weaknesses of a group with which she 
is most familiar. As will be described below, the results of the current study challenged this bias 
and related assumptions.    
 
My long-time partner is a physician who was trained in emergency medicine in the American 
medical education system.  His views, shared by many, that the American medical system 
produces physicians who overmedicate and overtreat patients in EOL situations has undoubtedly 
     




influenced me. Although my partner feels that overtreatment is mitigated in the New Zealand 
medical system, he continues to observe a tendency for some doctors to overtreat, at times, to 
appease families or to avoid difficult conversations. He has seen the tendency for family 
members to request more aggressive EOL care than what the patient desires.  In summary, before 
beginning this project, my views tended toward the notions that 1) less aggressive medical care is 
superior to more aggressive medical care in EOL situations, that 2) highly religious people were 
therefore making poor EOL medical choices, and that 3) the patient’s family was an important 
factor to consider. 
 
3.3 Overview of the study 
 
Face-to-face interviews were conducted with fourteen respondents over the age of sixty-five 
years to document their attitudes about religiosity and EOL medical care.  Half of the 
respondents were chosen because of their high religiosity.  The other half were chosen because 
of their freedom from religious beliefs. Interviews lasted approximately one hour. All interviews 
were recorded, transcribed, coded, and thematically analysed.  The project was reviewed and 
approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee (Appendix A, ref 19/034). Māori 
consultation was carried out via the University of Otago’s Ngāi Tahu Research Consultation 
Committee process (ref 5721_20908).   
  
3.4 Sample and recruitment 
 
The interview process involved the following procedure: 
● Recruiting participants who meet inclusion criteria 
● Determining interview time and location 
● Introductions and pre-interview formalities, including receiving consent 
● Interview itself 
     




● Research journaling 
 
These steps were taken in the process of collecting research data and will be described in more 
detail below. 
 
Method of recruitment: purposive sampling 
The method of recruitment - purposive sampling - is a non-probability recruitment method and 
will limit the claims that will be drawn from the research  (Hammarberg et al., 2016). However, 
a purposive sample met the objective of this study, which was descriptive and exploratory. A 
purposive sample focussed the research on an information-rich population that best enabled the 
researcher to answer the research question within the limited scope of a Master of Arts thesis 
project. 
 
Population from which participants were drawn 
Participants were drawn from the researcher’s network of primary and secondary contacts.  I 
aimed to invite 21 respondents from the New Plymouth area to take part in the study to form a 
purposefully selected sample. I desired to include proportional numbers of Māori respondents as 
well as male and female respondents. I initially aimed to include 7 highly religious, 7 moderately 
religious and 7 low/nonreligious respondents in the study but determined early on that including 
the “moderate” religiosity category presented difficulties that compromised the study integrity. 
Accordingly, this objective was discarded in favour of seeking participants who could be 
definitively identified as either high- or low religiosity. Participants’ religiosity was determined 
by self-identification and RCOPE (Religious Coping Subscale) scores (see “2.5 Measuring 
Religiosity” in the Literature Review chapter).  
 
Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
Criteria for inclusion in the study included:  
● New Zealand citizenship,  
● fluency in English,  
● over the age of 65 years,  
     




● freedom from mental disabilities that might inhibit cognitive functioning,  
● living in own home or apartment, a retirement/assisted living community, or with family 
members. Persons residing in rest homes were not considered for this study. 
● willingness to speak openly about the topic after being informed in advance of the 
interview themes.   
 
Two overarching criteria determined an individual’s eligibility to participate in the study: 1) 
researcher’s observation, and 2) respondent’s self-selection. 
 
Researcher’s observation 
If the answer to all of the following questions was “yes,” the respondent was considered for 
inclusion in the study: 
Does the respondent appear capable of living independently?   
Does it appear that the respondent could prepare and eat a simple meal without assistance?   
Can the respondent speak without slurring?   
Does the respondent converse with clarity?   
Does the respondent maintain his or her personal hygiene?   
Does it seem that the respondent is capable of dressing himself or herself?   
Does the respondent act as if he or she were in relatively good health?   
    
Respondent’s self-selection 
Respondents were given a copy of the Research Information Sheet (see Appendix B) several 
days in advance of the interview, usually by email. Once the respondents had reviewed the 
Information Sheet, they were invited to make an interview appointment. In this manner, 
respondents knew in advance the potentially sensitive nature of the interview topic, the 
approximate length of the interview, that their responses would be confidential and anonymised, 
and that there were no negative consequences for non-participation. 
 
My respondents all self-identified as having Christian backgrounds, which is currently the most 
common religious heritage for New Zealanders. Approximately 89% of New Zealanders identify 
     




as either Pākehā/ New Zealand-European or Māori in the 2018 New Zealand Census. Although 
many of these individuals no longer identify as Christians, their family and cultural heritage 
(post-colonial cultural heritage, in the case of Māori) is Christianity-oriented. However, although 
Christianity represents the religious heritage of many New Zealanders, it is by no means the only 
religious heritage of New Zealanders, and this weakness in the study is noted.  
 
Respondents were recruited through a variety of methods, thereby increasing the strength of the 
sample. Before recruiting, I created a list of potential groups and individuals from which I could 
draw and which included 59 primary and secondary contacts from the local area. Invitations to 
participate were delivered to local churches (five), the New Zealand Humanist and Rationalist 
Society, and several other local community groups such as the New Plymouth Institute of 
Registered Music Teachers with members of the desired age. I gave careful attention to creating 
a selective sample of respondents who represented the full range of socio-economic 
backgrounds, religious denominations (within the Christian tradition), and included both Māori 
and Pākehā. I recognise that my method of recruitment inadvertently targeted people who were 
connected to some local group, whether it was a church or a club or even to neighbours. I did not 
investigate the population of elderly adults who are relatively isolated and lack regular contact 
with other people. This is a weakness of the purposive sample in the current study. 
 
Once a potential participant expressed interest, I initiated either a phone call or an email 
exchange in which I introduced the study purpose and topic in lay terms. I invited individuals to 
participate through a variety of methods: by telephone, email, or via introductions through 
secondary contacts. As one example, I emailed the New Zealand Humanist and Rationalist 
Society through their website, described my project, and attached a Research Information Sheet 
(Appendix B). The website administrator sent the information to the group’s email distribution 
list. Several possible respondents responded to this email. I vetted the individuals who contacted 
me according to the research inclusion criteria, which resulted in the inclusion of one of these 
individuals in my sample.  Other recruitment sources were accessed similarly. Because face-to-
face interviews were deemed advantageous, I declined multiple offers that I received from out-
of-town individuals who saw my advertisements online or who heard about the project from 
     




local friends and relatives and wanted to participate by telephone. I offered to video conference 
some of these potential participants, but, possibly because of the age demographic, this offer was 
not accepted.  
 
Although I recorded and transcribed fourteen interviews for inclusion in this record, I had 
interview-like conversations with many other people during the research process. Although these 
informal conversations were ‘off the record,’ they added context and depth to the analysis. For 
example, I arranged to speak at length with a palliative care physician, one of three such 
specialists in Taranaki. Also, I participated in many informal and educational conversations with 
elderly New Zealanders with whom I have come into contact over the last twelve months.  
 
Determining interview time and location 
After introducing the study to potential respondents in general terms, I asked participants to 
review the Research Information Sheet (Appendix B) before setting up a time and place for an 
interview. I offered several possible interview locations to each participant, such as the library, a 
cafe, or their home. Each of my participants requested that we meet in their homes except one 
participant who asked that we meet at the cafe of our local library. I brought a small gift to the 
people who I met in their homes, usually a bottle of locally produced jam or a grocery store 
voucher.  I offered to pay for coffee for the contact that I met in the cafe.  Each participant 
reviewed and signed a Consent Form (Appendix C) before the interview began. I communicated 
verbally to the participant the moments when I turned on and off the recording device.   
 
3.5 Designing and conducting the interview 
Qualitative research is considered more productive and accurate when participants report a 
positive experience with the process and with the interviewer (Kvale, 2007).  My intention as an 
interviewer was that the responders would feel deeply understood and that the goodwill between 
us would be unmarred by the soberness of the topic. I believe the soberness of the topic enhanced 
the goodwill between myself and the interview subjects. I asked respondents to recall deaths of 
     




people close to them, not to raise melancholy feelings, but to respect and honour the memory of 
people who were important to the respondent.   
 
A preliminary literature review informed the interview survey. After a brief introduction to the 
interview outline, I collected demographic information from the participant, including a 
summary of the participant’s religious background. I then asked about social support, supposing 
that this topic would be the most natural topic with which to build trust. Then each respondent 
was asked to describe their level of religiosity (or lack thereof) using several open-ended 
questions as well as responding specifically to the Brief RCOPE scale (see “2.5 Measuring 
Religiosity” in the Literature Review chapter). The rest of the interview proceeded through the 
key areas of interest, the proposed hypotheses (suffering, sanctity of life, God’s sovereignty, 
miracles, the afterlife, and social support).  The topic of euthanasia was introduced (if the 
participant had not already introduced it her/himself) as a subtopic of “sanctity of life.” 
Advanced Care Directives (ACT) and all EOL legal documents (DNR, Advanced Life Directive, 
Power of Attorney, etc.) were introduced as a subtopic of “God’s sovereignty.” 
 
I started each interview by giving the respondent a brief outline of the interview so that s/he 
would know the format that the interview would follow.  Because a series of empirical studies 
show that respondents’ positive attitude toward the survey process itself increases the level of 
participation, I included my expectation of a positive experience in my introduction (Stocke & 
Langfeldt, 2004). For example, I said, “I have planned for this interview to last approximately 
one hour. In my experience, giving interviews for this project has been a rewarding and warm 
experience, and I anticipate that this interview will be comfortable for both of us. The interview 
begins with basic demographic information, and then I will ask you about your opinions in the 
area of end-of-life medical care.” 
 
I did not send participants an interview schedule in advance of the interview. I asked five of my 
initial respondents whether they would have preferred to see the interview questions before the 
interview, and each of them responded in the negative. They each felt that they might have been 
intimidated or put-off by the directness of the questions if they had considered the interview 
     




survey before meeting me. For example, one respondent said the questions would have appeared 
“harsh” on paper, and he would not have imagined how much easier it would be to discuss them 
with someone of my “aspect” (#6, m, 76yo, Anglican).13  He continued, “Well, if you give 
people a piece of paper, it’s pretty stark...the fact that you, you are here, and who you are, how 
you come across, I think it would make it much easier for people to respond.”  
 
All interviews were recorded using the Voice Recorder App on my smartphone. I informed the 
participant when I started the recorder and then placed the phone to my side during the interview 
itself. Interviews ended by my asking if there was anything else the participant might want to say 
or if they had any final thoughts on the topic. I thanked the participants for their time and 
willingness to share. I told the interview subjects to contact me if they had follow-up thoughts or 
questions and reminded them that my contact information was included on the Research 
Information Sheet.  
 
Interview questions were guided by a list of typed questions that I held in my hand.  Follow-up 
questions specific to each respondent were used to encourage participants to elaborate on their 
answers. The semi-structured interview schedule allowed me to gently probe a participant if 
she/he raised a new idea or issue that was not included on my original schedule.  When I felt we 
had covered the topic at hand, I then referred back to my list of questions to further the interview.   
 
Because of the flexible approach, unanticipated areas of inquiry emerged.  For example, several 
respondents raised issues of estranged family members in connection with EOL planning, a topic 
area that I had not anticipated would be recurrent. Another key area that emerged directly from 
the initial data was the fear of the afterlife. I had included questions about the afterlife on my 
original interview survey as a means of ascertaining the general religious views - or lack thereof 
- of the respondents but did not anticipate it being a topic of anxiety among the religious 
respondents. As explained in the Literature Review chapter, afterlife belief in connection with 
 
13 This form of identifying respondents will be used throughout the remaining chapters. The tag gives an identifier 
(#1-#14), a gender (m or f), an age, and a religious identifier (“Non” for nonreligious participants or the religious 
denomination for the religious participants). 
     




EOL medical care is an understudied topic in the EOL medical literature (McClain-Jacobsen et 
al., 2004). Anxiety about the afterlife was systematically investigated after the first several 
interviews. At that point, I revised the interview survey to insure that I explored the topic with 
the remaining participants. 
 
After I created the initial interview schedule, I trialled the interview to pilot test the 
appropriateness and timing of the interview schedule.  I modified the interview schedule slightly 
as the research progressed, staying within the guidelines of the ethics oversight which I had been 
granted. I offered to let my respondents review the transcripts of their interviews, but only one 
respondent (#7, m, 69yo, Non) responded in the affirmative. However, he emailed me later the 
same day to say that he felt comfortable with our conversation and preferred not to revisit the 
conversation in print.   
 
Interviews were conducted over five months, beginning in May 2019. The average recorded 
interview length was 55 minutes. Face-to-face contact with each respondent, however, averaged 
80 minutes, as basic etiquette required some opening and closing comments between us. Many of 
the interview questions are described as part of the following chapter (Chapter Four: Results). 
An Interview Schedule is included in this document as Appendix D. As part of the interviewing 
process I completed an Interview Systematic Reflection Framework within an hour after 
finishing each interview.  The Interview Systematic Reflection Framework, unique to this 
project, is based on the work of Crabtree and Miller (1999): 
 
Name/Date People present 
How I was feeling   Place, brief description 
Religion   Length of interview  
Marital status   Rate of speech  
     




Ethnicity   No. / length of silences 
Highest Qualification Length of pre/post exchange  
Profession  Relative % of talking  
Time    Control  
Respondent’s Tone Weather 
 






Table 3.5 Interview Systematic Reflection Framework 
 
This framework provides a snapshot of the interview as well as a structure for an initial layer of 
analysis. I grappled with how to accurately define the “tone” of the participant and recording the 
“noteworthy moments.” Noteworthy moments, in my framework, were moments that were 
surprising, unique, or particularly insightful. As I analysed interviews in the weeks and months 
afterward, it was helpful to have a record of how I felt before I began the interview, the weather, 
a brief description of the room in which we sat, and the narrative description. The details I 
recorded helped me quickly and vividly recall the experience. The time of day and the weather 
were methods of involving my sensory memory. One interview happened on a particularly windy 
day, another happened on a pleasant day, and I noted the sunshine shining on one side of the 
respondent’s face. Sensory and contextual recall are elements of cognitive interviewing which I 
incorporated into the research process. 
 
Other indicators on the Systemic Reflection Framework were more about accountability and best 
interview practice, such as “no./length of silences,” “rate of speech,” and “relative % of talking,” 
the documenting of which provided me with accountability for effective interviewing techniques 
and practices. Indicators such as “respondent’s tone,” “emerging themes/noteworthy moments,” 
     




and “narrative reflection” prompted an initial analysis of the interview. In capturing my 
perception of the respondent’s tone in one or two words (“philosophical” or “slightly defensive” 
or “some swagger”) in one or two words, I began to analyse the encounter, including the context 
and my part in it.  
 
The narrative reflection might include a brief description of the encounter, such as this one:  
 
I brought two muffins and a small bottle of jam. A- prepared tea, had already set out the 
muffins, a copy of God is Not Great on her bookshelf, she seemed quite formal but warm, 
and seemed to relax more as we went along, she felt happy to refer me to friends at the 
end of the interview. After the interview, we walked to neighbour’s, but neighbour didn’t 
feel comfortable being interviewed because she said she was still forming her opinions.  
A- had told me previously that her neighbour was very religious (anticipated seeing her 
sister on the other side). A- took this hesitancy to be interviewed as confusion on the part 
of her neighbour and felt proud of her own clarity and peace of mind. (#1, f, 82yo, Non) 
 
The research design called for participants to identify as either religious or nonreligious. During 
the interview, I asked participants to identify themselves on a religiosity scale (extremely 
nonreligious, moderately nonreligious, etc. see Seale, 2010:678). I felt that the terms “religious” 
and “nonreligious” subtly indicated “religious” as the norm and “nonreligious” as an “othering” 
term with implications of outsider status. To avoid putting the nonreligious people in an inferior 
position, and feeling that “atheist” was not a broad enough term, I referred to nonreligious 
individuals as “free from religion” rather than “nonreligious.” For example, at the end of the 
interview, I would ask a religious person, “Is there anything else you would like to tell me about 
how your religiosity might affect the medical decisions that need to be made at the end of life?” 
To ask the same question to a nonreligious person, I would ask, “Is there anything else you 
would like to tell me about how your freedom from religion might affect the medical decisions 
that need to be made at the end of life?” Although none of the respondents specifically 
commented on this terminology, it may have contributed to my nonreligious respondents 
     




assuming that I was also “free from religion,” as they were. Despite using this terminology 
during interviews, I have chosen to use the more standard “nonreligious” in this written report. 
 
Some of the religious participants seemed to resist the label of “religious.” For example, one 
participant said, “I’m very involved, but I’m not religious in the negative sense of the term (#13, 
f, 71yo, Cath). When interviewing religious participants, I often substituted “faithful” or 
“believing” for “religious” because these terms were more comfortable for participants 
themselves. 
 
In addition to the question discussed previously, participants were asked about church attendance 
and asked to complete the Brief RCOPE Scale. In short, nonreligious participants were identified 
as such because they  
1) labelled themselves as “extremely nonreligious” “very nonreligious,” “neither 
nonreligious nor religious” 
2) did not attend church, or only attended church in exceptional circumstances such as a 
funeral or a wedding 
3) scored very low (0/7) on the Brief RCOPE positive assessment 
 
Correspondingly, religious participants were identified as religious because they 
1) labelled themselves as “extremely religious” or “very religious” 
2) attended church most or all weeks of the year 
3) scored very high (7/7) on the Brief RCOPE positive assessment 
 
I discarded only one of the formal interviews which I completed. In this particular case, a 
Catholic man identified himself as very religious, told me he had near 100% attendance at 
Sunday mass, including when he travelled, yet identified with only 3 of the 7 Positive RCOPE 
assertions. The other members of the religious group selected for inclusion in the study identified 
with 7 of 7 of the Positive RCOPE statements. It is beyond the scope of this study to document 
why this particular man’s RCOPE score was outlying for someone with such close ties to 
religion. It may have been as simple as that he did not understand the RCOPE assessment in the 
     




same way as the other religious participants. I completed a formal interview with him, but to stay 
true to the research design, his interview was not included in the data. The data from his 
interview, although not included, supported the data which I had been given from other religious 
participants.  
 
While it would be difficult to claim that saturation of the topic was reached, no new ideas or 





I transcribed all interviews myself, which afforded me a strong familiarity with the data and 
allowed me to critique my interviewing skills as the project progressed. Transcribing my 
interviews allowed me to start analysing the data while close-reading the texts. I made careful 
use of ellipsis in the transcription when a respondent drifted too far from the research topic, 
summarizing the content of the drift for transparency and trustworthiness. I included pauses and 
non-verbal bodily noises in the transcription inside parentheses (e.g. “(laughs)” or “(pause)”). 
Recording non-verbal communication allowed me to capture the sensitivity or sarcasm that 
accompanied some responses. The recorded moments of silence offer a trustworthiness check, 
indicating that respondents were allowed time to think and space for reflection. Transcribing the 
early interviews was a helpful way for me to critique my interviewing skills.  
 
3.7 Coding and analysis 
I used Braun and Clarke’s six-point method (2006:87) to conduct a thematic analysis of the 
interview data. This method includes familiarizing yourself with the data (transcription), 
generating initial codes, searching for themes, reviewing themes, defining and naming the 
themes, and producing the report.  
     





Trustworthiness was guided by expectations established in the academic literature on the subject 
(Nowell, Norris, White, & Moles, 2017:2; Thomas, 2006:243-4; Hammarberg et al., 2016). My 
trustworthiness checks included storing data in well-organised archives, recording of all 
transcripts, reflexive journaling, researcher triangulation, creating an audit trail of code 
generation, and documenting all advisory meetings.  
 
After conducting the initial four interviews, I transcribed the interviews for discussion at an 
advisory meeting. My advisors reviewed the first two interviews to evaluate my interviewing 
style and coding. My advisors and I repeated this process after the 6th and 7th interviews and 
reviewed the project as the interviewing process was complete.  
 
My advisors and I independently coded transcription #7 “blindly” (without any initial 
consultation) as we sought consensus on a coding vocabulary. After a discussion and 
determining a basic set of codes, I moved all the transcriptions into the NVivo software program. 
NVivo allowed me to create a cross-case analysis of the transcriptions by grouping the 
participants’ answers in conjunction with the larger sections of the interview (Patton, 2002:439-
440). After participants’ responses were grouped as they related to each theme, the answers were 
coded at a more detailed level to search for patterns within each category.  
 
3.8 Privacy and anonymity 
I took precautions to respect the privacy of my project respondents. I included detailed 
information about privacy and anonymity in the Research Information Sheet (Appendix B) and 
reviewed this information verbally and in print when I received signed consent (Appendix C). 
Participants’ names were removed from the report and replaced with numbers. Names and any 
other sources of identifiable information were anonymised. Per the University of Otago 
guidelines, both the Information Sheet and the Consent Form included statements asserting that 
participants could withdraw from the project at any point or decline to answer any questions 
without disadvantage. Before beginning each interview, I reiterated these assertions verbally 
     




with the participant. One participant was coincidentally an acquaintance of one of my advisors. 
When the participant informed me of the connection, I asked if the participant was comfortable 
continuing the interview (he was) and exactly how much information he wanted to be shared 
with the advisor. Another participant expressed concern about sharing with me her critical 
opinions about an estranged family member who is a prominent member of our local community. 
The participant deliberately concealed the family member’s name from me, and I reassured her, 
mid-interview, that all personal details would be anonymised. She seemed comfortable once I 
had reiterated the expectations of confidentiality that I had presented at the beginning of the 
interview. Indeed, she expressed relief at having someone to talk to about an issue that had 
troubled her deeply for years. 
 
Basic demographic information was recorded for each participant (gender, ethnicity, age, 
birthplace, educational level, profession, religious affiliation, if any, marital status). This 
information was used in the final report in ways that will not compromise the participants’ 
anonymity. Transcripts and all accompanying field notes are currently stored on a password-
protected laptop. Only I have full access to the transcripts and notes that have been generated. I 
have shared a limited number of transcriptions with my advisors as part of the trustworthiness 
aspect of the project, as outlined above. The audio recordings on which this project depends will 
be destroyed at the conclusion of the project. All hard copies of interviews will be held in secure 
storage in my possession for the allotted time of ten years, and then they will be destroyed as 
mandated by ethics requirements. 
  
     








Fourteen respondents were successfully recruited to participate in the current study. The average 
age of respondents was 74 years, the median age was 73 years, and the age range was 68-82 
years. 50% of participants were female. Respondents identified as Māori (17%) and Pākehā/New 
Zealand European (83%), which roughly corresponds to the size of these groups among the New 
Zealand population as a whole as recorded in the 2018 New Zealand Census (Māori 14.9%, 
European 74.0%). All participants reported good health. All the respondents had received high 
school certificates, six had received a tertiary degree, and one had received a Ph.D. in retirement. 
The range of educational levels within the religious and nonreligious groups was comparable.  
 
Seven of the respondents were selected for high religiosity; seven of the respondents were 
selected for low religiosity. All religious respondents self-identified as either “very religious” or 
“extremely religious." All nonreligious respondents self-identified as “extremely nonreligious,” 
“nonreligious,” or “neither religious nor nonreligious.” The respondents’ religiosity was 
considered more relevant than the denomination to which they belonged (see “2.5 Religiosity vs. 
denomination” in the Literature Review chapter). Nonetheless, a purposive sample that selected 
respondents from religious denominations corresponding to New Zealand demographics was 
chosen as the best method for achieving the descriptive aim of the project. The number of New 
Zealanders who identify with no religion (49%) recently surpassed the number of New 
Zealanders who identify as Christian (38.6%) in the most recent census. The census showed 
further subgroups of the Christian group as Christian-Other (15% of NZ population), Catholic 
(13%), Anglican (12%) according to the 2018 New Zealand Census. Participants from each of 
the largest religious groups were interviewed for the current study.  
 
     




Nonreligious respondents were also purposely selected to represent a variety of religious family 
backgrounds, roughly corresponding with New Zealand demographics. The nonreligious group 
included respondents who considered their Christian denominational roots to be distant or 
unimportant, as well as respondents who felt their Christian denominational upbringing to have 
been strong. In the nonreligious group, two of the respondents had been raised Catholic, one had 
been raised Anglican, and four had been raised in homes of mixed Christian religions.  
 
All respondents completed the Brief RCOPE assessment of religious coping behaviours as a 
measurement of religiosity (see “2.5 Measuring Religiosity” in the Literature Review chapter). 
All of the religious respondents scored 7/7 (100%) on the RCOPE positive religious coping 
behaviour assessment. Six out of the seven nonreligious respondents scored 0/7 on the Brief 
RCOPE, while one nonreligious respondent scored 1/7. These RCOPE scores, either extremely 
high or extremely low, were inclusion criteria for participation in the project.  
 
4.2 Results by hypothesis 
 
Results will be presented in the same order in which hypotheses were discussed in the Literature 
Review Chapter: suffering, sanctity of life, God’s sovereignty, miracles, the afterlife, and social 
support. 
 
a. Sanctity in suffering 
“My suffering will be rewarded.” 
 
End-of-life (EOL) researchers have theorised that religious patients request and receive more 
aggressive EOL medical care because religious patients find spiritual purpose in suffering 
(Balboni et al., 2019). Aggressive EOL medical care prolongs life but increases patient 
discomfort and pain, particularly in the last week of life (Weissman, 2016; Nordquist, 2019; 
Yuen et al., 2011; Wright et al., 2008).  Religious patients may feel honour in suffering if they 
     




believe it is God’s will for them, and may, therefore, be more willing to accept life-prolonging 
medical intervention despite the discomfort it may cause. In other words, religious patients may 
believe that God will reward them for enduring suffering well. Therefore, they may request and 
receive burdensome EOL medical care as a way to ensure they are not avoiding suffering that 
God means for them to experience.  
 
To investigate this possibility, interview questions were modified from the RBEC scale 
developed by Balboni et al. (2019). Religious respondents were asked questions such as, “Do 
you feel that you must accept or endure painful medical procedures because suffering is part of 
God’s way of testing you?” “Do you feel that enduring EOL suffering is ennobling?” “Do you 
admire individuals that endure great suffering at the EOL?”  Nonreligious respondents were 
asked the same questions, although direct reference to God within the questions was modified or 
removed. Follow-up questions further investigated the topic as needed. 
 
None of the respondents, neither religious nor nonreligious, responded affirmatively to these 
questions or any related follow-up questions. Nor did any of the respondents indicate, at any 
point in their interviews, any agreement with the idea that EOL suffering was ennobling.  
 
Religious respondents each (7 of 7) expressed the belief that God did not want people to suffer 
and that pain should be avoided if possible. Religious respondents did not identify any negative 
spiritual or emotional consequences of avoiding pain. One man (#6, m, 76yo, Anglican) 
summarized the perspective of all of the religious participants when he said, “The God that I 
think I believe in, I can’t see him wanting someone to go through this suffering in order to come 
out the other end a better person.” Another respondent (#4, m, 70, Christian-Other) recognized 
the deep-rooted respect for suffering in Christian discourse but did not connect this to an 
admiration for EOL suffering. Instead, he said, “You think of the Saviour, there was no sedation 
there . . . everything to the nth degree was put on the altar, but when you have your family 
members going through that . . . why would they need to suffer right at the very end?” In the 
context of other questions regarding end-of-life care, I asked one woman, “if there was any 
honour in suffering - if, perhaps, God wanted to see how we deal with suffering?” She 
     




responded, “I wouldn’t think that. The Lord doesn’t want us to suffer” (#3, f, 72yo, Christian-
Other). The religious respondents (7 of 7) rejected the idea that EOL suffering served a purpose, 
religious or otherwise. The respondents might have answered these questions differently if we 
had been talking about suffering in general rather than specifically in an end-of-life situation. 
 
Nonreligious respondents (7 of 7) also dismissed the idea of purposive or virtuous EOL 
suffering. Without referring to the concept of God, the nonreligious respondents echoed the 
comments of the religious respondents. For example, one woman (#1, f, 82yo, Non) said, “I 
suppose, as one goes through life, one suffers, and it probably does toughen you up a bit and give 
you a different perspective on things, and you develop, but I don’t think suffering per se to 
improve one [sic] is called for.” Interestingly, the question provoked some repulsion among the 
nonreligious respondents. One (#12, m, 72yo, Non) said, “I can’t think that [suffering is 
ennobling], I’m a bit aghast really.” Another (#9, m, 77yom, Non) agreed, stating in response to 
the question about whether suffering could be ennobling, “I heard of a 94-year-old who wanted 
heart surgery, and my first reaction was revulsion.”  
 
Interview transcriptions were scoured for direct or indirect remarks that may have indicated 
respect for EOL suffering. I found no evidence that religious and nonreligious respondents 
differed substantially in their dismissal of the idea that EOL suffering was ennobling or rewarded 
or admirable. In sum, these data reveal no support for the premise the suffering of an individual 
at the EOL was more appealing to religious respondents than nonreligious respondents. All 
research participants, including religious, recoiled at the notion that EOL suffering was 
ennobling or part of their spiritual commitment.  
 
b. Sanctity (vs. quality) of life  
“Refusing available medical treatment is immoral and tantamount to suicide, no matter my 
quality of life.” 
 
     




Prioritisation of the sanctity of life over other considerations such as the quality of life, self-
determination, pain control, or personal dignity may influence religious individuals to request 
and receive intensive EOL medical care (Balboni et al., 2019; Sharp et al., 2012:280). Theorists 
hypothesize that religious individuals prolong life for the same reasons that they oppose 
euthanasia and abortion (Sharp et al., 2012).  In other words, the religious position in opposing 
both euthanasia and abortion underscores the religious priority of the sanctity of life over 
competing considerations. End-of-life researchers hypothesize that religious patients 
request/receive more EOL medical care because these patients may believe that refusing 
available medical treatment is tantamount to suicide. Suicide is considered immoral behaviour by 
major world religions (Eberl, 2012). 
 
To investigate this hypothesis, respondents were asked questions such as, “Do you believe that 
refusing available medical treatment is tantamount to suicide?” or “What is your opinion about 
the statement ‘I feel that I should do everything I can to stay alive longer’?” Follow-up 
conversations explored the priorities and thoughts held by the respondent if she or he was forced 
to choose between sedation (which might hasten the end life) or uncomfortable medical 
procedures like surgery (that might prolong life). Finally, all respondents were asked to give an 
opinion about euthanasia. 
 
Despite predictions to the contrary, the religious respondents in the current study did not agree 
that refusing available medical treatments was tantamount to suicide (7 of 7), nor did they find 
risky comfort care, such as deep sedation or high doses of morphine to be morally unacceptable 
(7 of 7).  For example, one religious respondent (#6, m, 76yo, Anglican) said,  
I’m not ‘into’ THAT [euthanasia], but I’m aware that pneumonia is sometimes an old 
person’s best friend, or I’ve known old people that . . . are in a lot of pain, and they are 
not going to get better, so they give them a lot of morphine. The morphine keeps the pain 
away, but it also kills them . . . I’m okay with that, sure.  
 
Another participant (#13, f, 71yo, Cath) explained to me that she had formed her opinion that 
refusing treatment was not tantamount to suicide during the time of her own mother’s struggle 
with pancreatic cancer and eventual death. Her mother had come to a point when she had to 
     




make a decision between a surgery that might prolong her life and refusing treatment. This 
participant felt very strongly that it was not ‘wrong’ of her mother to refuse surgery even though 
it might have prolonged her life for a time. In this case, a Catholic priest helped “put her [the 
mother’s] mind at rest about not having surgery” despite the desires of her children that she 
would consider treatment or any fears that refusing treatment might be wrong. This respondent 
said, “I’m against euthanasia. But I’m for withdrawal of treatment and all those things we’ve 
been talking about [sedating care, pain medication even if it may hasten death].”  
 
This latter was the most nuanced response from any of the religious respondents, and even she 
gave a contrary example to explain why she was so sure that refusing medical treatment was 
morally acceptable. The religious respondents in this study agreed that refusing medical 
treatment was not tantamount to suicide and that death-hastening comfort care was morally 
acceptable.  
 
The nonreligious respondents shared the religious respondents’ belief that refusing medical 
treatment and risky comfort care is morally acceptable. None of the nonreligious respondents (7 
of 7) believed that refusing medical treatment was tantamount to suicide. The most nuanced 
response came from the only nonreligious respondent who did not support euthanasia (#5, m, 
72yo, Non, Catholic upbringing).  He said that, according to his religious upbringing, “suicide 
was a no-no,” yet he imagined that if he had a “dreadful disease,” he might use enough morphine 
to “end up with the fairies.” He said, “If I had a bottle of morphine, I would likely take quite an 
amount of it, a bit more than what I should and think, aw, it’s gonna hurry me along, but I 
wouldn’t look on it as taking your own life sort of thing.” Although this man was against suicide 
or legalizing euthanasia, he was representative of all of the nonreligious participants in 
supporting the use of comfort-care medication even if it hastened death. 
 
When asked to imagine being in a painful state with no hope of recovery, the majority (4 of 7) of 
religious respondents introduced the idea of praying for death. In contrast, a majority of 
nonreligious respondents (4 of 7) introduced or re-introduced the concept of euthanasia. 
Nonreligious respondents asserted the right to choose to die, as opposed to waiting/praying for it 
     




to happen. They said things such as, “It would be an individual choice whether you wanted to 




Nonreligious respondents were more in favour of euthanasia than the religious respondents, 
which corresponds with many other published studies (Young et al., 2019). In the current 
sample, 7 of 7 of the religious respondents were wary of euthanasia and opposed legalising it. In 
contrast, 5 of the 7 nonreligious respondents had a positive opinion of euthanasia and supported 
legalising it. One of the nonreligious respondents was “on the fence,”  and 1 of the nonreligious 
respondents did not support euthanasia. David Seymour’s bill to legalise euthanasia was a matter 
of public debate during the time of my interviews. The bill passed in New Zealand parliament 
69-51 in November 2019 and is subject to a referendum in 2020.  
 
The religious respondents who were against euthanasia cited various reasons, many of which 
were administrative rather than theological: 
- Hospice care and pain medications are sufficiently comfortable (#3, #8, #14). These 
participants had witnessed hospice care and made comments such as,  
- It’s not natural, a form of suicide (#8, #13). 
- Families may see patients as a nuisance and want to use euthanasia to get them out of the 
way (#4, #6). 
- “It leaves itself open to despicable doctors” (#2). 
- There are unintended consequences of legalising something (#6). 
- Doctors should not be placed in a position of administering injections to kill someone - it 
would be acceptable if the patient were lucid enough to take a lethal draft (#4). 
 
The predominant reason nonreligious people gave for supporting the legalisation of euthanasia 
was that they felt that an individual has the right to choose (#1, #9, #10, #11, #12).  I heard many 
     




variations of the idea expressed succinctly by one participant when I asked about euthanasia, 
“People should have a choice” (#10, f, 74yo, Non).  
One man explained his support of the euthanasia bill in these words, 
I feel an emotion bordering on anger towards some of the people opposing David 
Seymour’s bill. I’m very prepared to let them follow their inclinations, including their 
religious inclinations . . . and I am very prepared for them to refuse any form of 
euthanasia. What I cannot accept is that they have the right to deny me and others what I 
regard as a right, I really do, that’s the strongest thing I can come down to, and I fear that 
it may yet happen, that this repressive, to me, attitude will eventually triumph. 
 
Other nonreligious respondents were more cautious, making comments such as this one, “I 
support euthanasia in principle [individual choice], but I don’t believe I’d ever want it for myself 
. . . Life is kind of sacred and not meant to be messed with too much” (#11, f, 68yo, Non).  
 
Both religious and nonreligious respondents brought up positive experiences with the New 
Zealand hospice system in the context of discussions about euthanasia. For example, one woman 
who said that she had been politically active in support of euthanasia as a younger woman had 
become less convinced of the importance of legalising euthanasia after a personal experience 
with the hospice system. She said, “Interestingly, having seen my husband and how he was cared 
for so well in the hospice, I don’t feel quite as strongly as I did before” (#1, f, 82, Non). The 
nonreligious respondent who was “on the fence” about the euthanasia bill said,  
I’ve only known good deaths, and in more than one of them, perhaps, there’s been a 
touch of euthanasia, but it’s never been branded as such . . . I think some people calling 
for euthanasia don’t understand the options or don’t understand what really goes on and 
think that they have no rights at all at that time, and they do, they can ask for things. In 
the cases I’ve been involved in, people have been eased on their way in the loveliest way 
(#7, m, 69yo, Non). 
 
Another woman said, “I don’t think we need it [euthanasia], having seen people under hospice 
care, they’re really well looked after” (#3, f, 70, Christian-other).  
 
In summary, religious respondents were against euthanasia (7 of 7) in contrast to nonreligious 
respondents who were largely in support (5 of 7). Despite their difference of opinion about 
     




euthanasia, however, there was scant evidence to support the “Sanctity of Life” hypothesis as an 
explanation for religious patients receiving more aggressive EOL medical care.  
 
Although more religious respondents preferred the option of praying for death rather engaging in 
euthanasia (if legal), all religious respondents (7 of 7) expressed the opinion that refusing 
medical treatment, accepting sedation, and accepting high doses of morphine are morally 
acceptable behaviour. Religious respondents felt that these behaviours should be differentiated 
from suicide. All nonreligious respondents (7 of 7) also expressed the opinion that refusing 
medical treatment, accepting sedation, and accepting high-doses of morphine are morally 
acceptable behaviours. Based on their statements, it is unlikely that the religious participants in 
this study would prefer or accept more aggressive EOL medical procedures because they viewed 
refusing such treatments as immoral or as tantamount to suicide.  
 
Although the religious and nonreligious groups differed significantly in their support of 
euthanasia, the participants did not connect their views on euthanasia to their views about 
refusing life-prolonging medical care or accepting risky comfort care. Of course, there may be an 
underlying or hidden inverse relationship between euthanasia acceptance and a preference for 
life-prolonging medical care. However, under direct scrutiny on the issue, the religious 
participants in the current study did not express more of a preference for life-prolonging care 
than the nonreligious participants based on the idea that refusing it would be tantamount to 
suicide. Nor did the religious participants express any sense that refusing medical treatment 
would be immoral. This matter may be of interest to future researchers. 
 
c. God’s sovereignty  
“It’s my job to prolong my life until God decides I should die.” 
 
Researchers theorise that religious patients may receive more aggressive EOL medical care 
because they engage in, on average, fewer EOL legal documents (Garrido et al., 2012). Religious 
patients may view the creation of an ACP as interfering with God’s authority, which is closely 
     




tied to the belief in the “absolute domination of God in matters of life and death” (Sharp et al., 
2012). Researchers hypothesize that religious people have fewer EOL legal documents because 
they believe that God’s sovereignty pre-empts the need to create these documents. In other 
words, if religious people think that God should decide when and how they die, then they may 
view legal documents as interfering with God’s will for them. As a result, physicians and family 
members, lacking directives, may overtreat patients in terminal medical situations. 
 
I sought to evaluate this hypothesis by asking respondents, “who decides when someone dies.” I 
also asked if they had created legal documents that would be useful in an EOL situation and why 
or why not. Respondents were asked what advantages and disadvantages they saw in signing a 
DNR order or creating an ACP, and whether their religious convictions would inform these 
decisions. I asked the religious respondents if signing a DNR order would feel like acting against 
their religion in any way. As appropriate, follow-up questions were employed to explore the 
topic.   
 
I discovered no relationship between religiosity and the creation of legal EOL documents. The 
majority of respondents (64%) had created durable power-of-attorney (PofA) documents. 5 of 7 
religious respondents had created PofA, while 4 of 7 nonreligious respondents had created PofA. 
Two of the respondents (1 religious and 1 nonreligious) expressed satisfaction with their EOL 
legal documents, as will be described in the following paragraph. Respondents of each group 
gave very similar reasons for choosing to complete or not to complete EOL legal documents.  
 
Two of the respondents had created EOL documents in addition to their PofA. One nonreligious 
respondent (#1, f, 82yo, Non) had created a DNR (Do Not Resuscitate order). Another 
respondent, who has passed away since sitting for her interview (#8, f, 82yo, Christian-Other), 
had filled out an ACP (Advanced Care Plan) booklet from the local hospital. Both of these 
respondents expressed great satisfaction with these documents.  They had created their 
documents at the instigation of someone other than a physician. The nonreligious respondent (#1, 
f, 82yo, Non) had created a DNR document provided by an organisation that advocated 
euthanasia to which she and her husband had belonged years earlier. The religious respondent 
     




(#8, f, 82yo, Christian-Other) had created an ACP through a family member who worked at the 
hospital and who had organised someone from the hospital coming to the respondent’s home to 
help her complete it.  
 
The remaining 12 respondents expressed various misgivings about creating EOL legal 
documents. Respondents’ concerns about EOL legal paperwork is summarised in the following 
table. Respondents were able to express more than one concern. 
 
 
Misgiving Total # of 
respondents 
Total # of 
religious  
Total # of 
non- 
religious  
Informal discussion with family members preclude 
the need to create legal documents 
9 4 5 
The physician will not notice or follow my legal 
documents in an EOL situation anyway 
9 3 5 
I am postponing legal documents until experiencing 
serious illness 
7 5 2 
I trust physicians and family members to make good 
decisions without formal or informal discussions 
5 2 3 
Expense  2 0 2 
My family members are emotionally distant and 
therefore unavailable to sign documents 
1 0 1 
Table 4.2c1  Reasons that participants had not created EOL legal documents 
 
     




I found no convincing relationship between the types of concerns respondents expressed 
regarding EOL legal documents or ACP and respondents’ religiosity. Analyses did not uncover 
differences between the reasoning or motivations between religious and nonreligious 
respondents. The table is included to highlight the similarity between religious and nonreligious 
participants and to delineate the range of concerns that the respondents expressed about EOL 
legal paperwork. It may be noted that none of the religious respondents expressed any 
theological reason not to engage in ACP. 
 
 
When asked, “Who decides when somebody dies?” the religious respondents replied either that 
God decides (5 of 7) or that the persons themselves decide (2 of 7). The nonreligious respondents 
answered either that the person decided (5 of 7) or that it was a “natural process” or “organ 
failure” (2 of 7).  
 
 
Who decides when someone dies? Total # of 
respondents 
Total # of 
religious  
Total # of 
non- 
religious  
God/Fate 5 5 0 
The person  7 2 5 
No one (natural process or organ failure) 2 0 2 
Table 4.2c2  Who decides when someone dies? 
 
The marked difference between the beliefs of religious and nonreligious respondents is evident 
in the data. When asked who decides when someone dies, most religious respondents made 
comments such as, “the Lord knows when our time is up ... there is a time to go for all of us.” 
(#4, m, 70, Christian-Other), or “God has his time” (#6, m, 76yo, Anglican), or simply answered, 
“God” (#2, f, 78yo, Christian-Other ).  
     





However, two of religious respondents claimed that God expected them to decide (#3, f, 72yo, 
Christian-Other and #8, f, 82yo, Christian-Other). Interestingly, both of these respondents 
identified as Māori. All other respondents identified as Pākehā or New Zealand European. 
Further research would be necessary to determine if the connection between Māori identity and 
the sense of death agency was coincidental to the current study or more widespread. Because 
both of the participants referred to the broader Māori culture when giving their responses, which 
was not the case when discussing other themes, I have deemed it worthwhile to include both of 
the specific responses below: 
 
Interviewer: “Some people feel that God should make those decisions [about when 
someone dies], so it might be wrong to have a DNR order because it might be going 
against God’s will. Is that something that rings true to you? “ 
 
She (#8): No, it doesn’t, because it’s your choice. He’s given you free agency. That’s 
how I see it . . . [to believe otherwise] is a little bit flippant, you haven’t really got the 
lesson. That’s just me, that’s just me . . . I knew some Māori that do say, ‘No, No, that’s 




Interviewer: Who decides when someone dies?  
 
She (#3): I think it’s the people themselves. (pause) I know Māori, Māori are very strong 
at that time of going, what they usually do is wait until everyone is gone out of the room 
even, they seem to prefer to die without anyone around, I’ve witnessed that, my own 
mother did that, but she used to talk about Māori people doing that, waiting until other 
people have left the room, so I don’t know, maybe something to do with culture. 
 
When questioned further, this latter woman backed off from her assertion, saying that she didn’t 
know the ‘old ways’ and might not have understood properly. I was unable to verify either of 
these comments in the limited scope of the present study, and the comments suggest topics for 
future research. 
 
     




Even the religious respondents whose first answer was “God” often acknowledged the role that 
an individual played in the process.  For example, one man said, “I think [God] expects us to 
plan” and “it’s irresponsible to think that his will will be done without us doing anything to plan 
for it, but the Lord knows when our time is up…” (#4, m, 70yo, Christian-Other) 
 
Another man, a retired Anglican vicar who had ministered to congregants in EOL situations, 
conflated the role that God plays with the role of the individual in comments such as, “I’ve often 
been with people that are obviously at the end (...) I’ll say,  
‘Let’s pray that the Lord will take them because they are not going to recover, so let’s ask 
him to take them,’ so we’ll talk to the person, even if they’re unconscious, ‘It’s okay, you 
can go now, we’ll let you go, we release you,’ and, it’s amazing, within an hour they’ve 
gone! (...) It’s almost as if they are hanging on to comfort the people that are there.   
 
In short, most religious respondents’ initial response was that God decided when they died (5 of 
7), but that the individual had a role to play in preparation and submission. A minority of 
religious respondents’ initial response was that the individual played the dominant role (2 of 7).  
 
By contrast, when I asked nonreligious respondents, “Who decides when someone dies?” most 
of the initial responses centred on the idea that the person themself played the dominant role (5 
of 7). They made comments such as, 
 (#1, f, 82yo, Non) “The individual’s choice. Yes. 
 (#10, f, 74yo, Non) “It’s up to us to decide.” 
 (#12, m, 72yo, Non) “There is a certain will to die.” 
Other nonreligious respondents initially answered that death was neither fated nor an individual’s 
choice but a biological process (2 of 7): 
 (#5, m, 72yo, Non) “I believe that it’s just going to happen.” 
 (#11, f, 68yo, Non)  “Organic failure.” 
  
In summary, although religious and nonreligious respondents contrasted markedly in their 
opinions about who or what ‘decided’ when they would die, the two groups showed no 
difference in their views about EOL legal documents or their misgivings or motivations to create 
them.  The current study, therefore, does not support the hypothesis that religious people engage 
     




less with ACP because of the notion that engaging with ACP shows a lack of faith in or 
submission to God’s sovereignty. The idea of God’s sovereignty, although active in the belief 
system of the religious individuals, was not overtly linked to, or causative of, their engagement 
with ACP. Further research would be needed to rule out or confirm an underlying connection. 
 
d. Miracle/Unexpected turn of events  
“I might be healed no matter what my doctor says.” 
 
Researchers have hypothesized that the hope for a miracle might motivate religious patients to 
desire more aggressive EOL care (Torke et al., 2019; Balboni et al., 2019; Steinberg, 2011). 
Among religious people, receiving life-prolonging medical care may be seen as a method for the 
patient to “buy time,'' time in which a miracle might intervene. In addition, a patient who 
believes in miracles may be willing to engage in high-risk therapies and procedures, hoping to 
beat the odds of survival miraculously. These high-risk therapies and procedures would be 
considered burdensome or aggressive EOL medical care if the patient dies soon after receiving 
them. Torke and associations found that, out of a range of religious beliefs, only the belief in 
miracles was strongly associated with lower DNR preference (Torke et al., 2019). 
 
I investigated this prediction by asking respondents if they believed that a miracle might cure 
them of a disease like cancer, even if doctors said it was impossible. Nonreligious respondents 
were asked about the “unexpected turn of events” rather than a “miracle,” but otherwise, the 
questions were the same for religious and nonreligious participants. All respondents were asked 
how much stock they would put in a doctor’s prognosis, if the doctor had told them how many 
more months s/he thought they would live. Follow-up questions extended the conversation as 
needed. 
 
Religious respondents in the current study were unified in miracle belief. All of the religious 
respondents (7 of 7) expressed a belief in miracles. Religious participants shared stories of 
people they had known who had been miraculously healed through prayer, and these experiences 
     




seemed to elicit strong feelings in many of the participants and tears in one. One man (#14, m, 
76yo, Cath) shared a dramatic story about how he had been given a certain number of months to 
live by doctors but had been miraculously healed. Participants also shared stories of people they 
had known who had not been miraculously healed through prayer and how they had come to 
terms with that. In addition, religious respondents described miracles in their lives that were not 
about health but about finding the ‘right’ home, receiving an inspired idea, landing an unusual 
job, or receiving timely financial help.  
 
Although miracle belief was strong among religious respondents, most of them (6 of 7) distanced 
themselves from the idea that they would expect a healing miracle if they began to have failing 
health at their age. When speaking about miracles, participants volunteered caveats such as, “If I 
got sick like that, that [a miracle] would be the first thing that all my friends would pray for 
[however]. . . . I believe that it could happen, just not that it must happen” (#6, m, 76yo, 
Anglican). Another man said, (#4, m, 70, Christian-Other), “It would be a ‘yes’ answer because 
you have to believe [in miracles]. Whether it would happen in respect to [me] for various reasons 
[can’t be known] . . . ” His tone of voice and trailing sentence implied to the interviewer that he 
would not expect a miracle for himself. Another woman expressed a similar point of view in the 
following exchange: 
 
Interviewer: “If you had cancer or some other serious disease, and a doctor gave you a 
terminal diagnosis of how many more months she/he thought you would live, would you 
hope for a miracle to cure you?” 
 
She (#13, f, 71yo, Cath): “That wouldn’t be where my thoughts go first. I would think 
about how to organise my life, make the most of that time. If I were the mother of a 
young child, I would certainly be praying for a miracle, though.” 
 
Religious respondents explained, without prompting from the interviewer, that they would not 
necessarily expect a healing miracle to happen to them (6 of 7). The healing miracles that were 
described were explicitly connected to young patients. While religious participants did not 
     




believe that a healing miracle would prevent or thwart the natural course of aging, they were 
unified in miracle belief and united in the idea that miracles may confound physicians’ 
professional prognoses. 
 
By contrast, the nonreligious respondents were less open to the idea of an “unexpected turn of 
events” that might prove a doctor’s prognosis wrong. In fact, the majority of nonreligious 
respondents reacted with scorn to the question. For example, (#1, f, 82yo, Non) “I think it’s very 
sad when these people go haring off to Mexico or what not, looking to be cured, (laughs) I think 
it’s really sad,” and (#12, m, 72yo, Non) “it’s a ridiculous way to think.” 
 
Two other nonreligious respondents offered similarly dismissive opinions when I initially asked 
about an unexpected turn of events, but on further reflection expressed some openness to the 
idea, amending their initially dismissive comments with comments such as: 
(#5, m, 72yo, Non) “that’s odd, but it does happen, doesn’t it?”  
(#7, m, 69yo, Non) “I think the power of the mind is enormous.” 
These nonreligious respondents recognised that unexpected things might occur, but they did not 
attribute these unexpected events to God nor believe that unexpected events resulted from 
religious behaviour. Instead, there was an acknowledgement among the nonreligious respondents 
that there are aspects of health and healing of which medical professionals are ignorant.  
 
The data suggests that the religious respondents, although believing in miracles in general (7 of 
7), would not expect a healing miracle at their age. Religious respondents expressed miracle 
belief but did not expect a healing miracle for themselves. Therefore, data suggests with this 
sample, that the link between belief in miracles and aggressive EOL care is unsupported. The 
data suggests, however, that miracle belief might be a more active motivator in EOL medical 
decision making within a younger population. When compared to a younger patient, a geriatric 
EOL cancer patient may be less likely to be viewed as a ‘victim’ or as someone dying ‘before 
their time’ and thus less likely to receive a healing miracle.  
 
     




It can be difficult to differentiate an EOL situation from an urgent or acute non-EOL situation, 
especially in patient populations that are compromised by disease or age. Computer algorithms 
are under development that predict the time of a patient’s death based on physiological data, but, 
as of the time of writing, algorithms are less accurate than an experienced medical practitioner at 
predicting whether an EOL situation is imminent (Swetz et al., 2014). However, even an 
experienced medical practitioner is not able to accurately predict the end of life (Swetz et al., 
2014)). Family members and friends of a patient, lacking medical training, are understandably 
less accurate in their predictions. Even if a religious patient or surrogates eschew the idea of a 
miracle intervening at the point of death, they might have a strong hope for a miracle in a time of 
severe sickness. If a religious patient and surrogates do not realise that the EOL was indeed upon 
them, it follows that they would maintain their hope for a miracle, thereby asking for more 
aggressive medical care than someone who did not share miracle belief.  
 
e. Afterlife 
“I believe in an afterlife, and therefore I desire to delay the transition.” 
 
Some researchers have hypothesized that anxiety about an afterlife may motivate religious 
people to prolong life longer than their nonreligious counterparts. The afterlife, even if imagined 
to be a peaceful and beautiful place, would necessitate a massive transition; religious people may 
feel anxiety about experiencing culture “shock” (#6, m, 76yo, Anglican). Additionally, religious 
people from a Christian background may fear the idea of facing a judgement or feel ambivalent 
about their place in the afterlife (Heeren et al., 2001; McClain-Jacobsen et al., 2004). EOL 
researchers such as Koenig report that religious patients “wrestle with their religious beliefs and 
relationship with God” when they perceive that they may be close to death (Koenig 2002:21). In 
this way, religiosity may create turbulence for a religious patient and their family, resulting in the 
desire to delay death by any means possible, including aggressive EOL medical care when 
available. 
 
     




To explore this idea, I first asked respondents an open-ended question: “What do you believe 
about an afterlife?” Following this question, respondents were also asked to describe which 
aspects of their afterlife belief brought positive feelings, or if there was anything about the 
afterlife (or lack thereof) to which they looked forward.  Then, respondents were asked which 
aspects of their afterlife belief brought ambivalent or negative feelings and if anything about the 
idea of an afterlife (or lack thereof) ever worried them.  
 
All of the religious respondents reported an afterlife belief (7 of 7). The majority of the 
nonreligious respondents did not believe in an afterlife (6 of 7), except one agnostic individual 
who thought it was impossible to know one way or the other. Nonreligious respondents did not 
express feelings of either anticipation or anxiety about an afterlife. Any fears were tied to 
experiencing pain during the dying process, but there was no indication of anxiety/anticipation of 
“not being." Nonreligious respondents seemed matter-of-fact and neutral on the subject.  In 
response to my question about an afterlife, most nonreligious respondents replied with direct 
assertions, such as the woman (#1, f, 82yo, Non) who said: “I have no belief in the afterlife.” 
Another respondent (#5, m, 72yo, Non) said, “it doesn’t worry me - we all have to die.” In 
response to questions about the afterlife, one woman (#11, f, 68yo, Non) said, “I believe it is a 
fairy tale and social control. We will gradually fade from people’s memories.” Another 
respondent (#9, m, 77yom, Non) said, “the freedom from such a belief [as the afterlife], I find 
liberating." He added, “I don’t have any emotional capital saved or banked for any life ahead.” 
 
By contrast, the religious respondents seemed eager to discuss my questions about an afterlife 
and offered a variety of speculations, opinions, beliefs, and experiences. Positive expectations of 
the afterlife included seeing family members again, seeing God, worshipping, servanthood, and 
the belief that the afterlife would be “very beautiful” (#3, f, 72yo, Christian-Other). One religious 
respondent stated, “[God] does make it as good as you can accept it….I am looking forward to 
it” (#8, f, 82yo, Christian-Other). Another exclaimed, “Oh! It’s going to be great!” and “I’m 
happy to go where I’m going, I have full assurance that that’s going to be fine” (#6, m, 76yo, 
Anglican). One woman said, “I know there’s life after death!. . .I’m really looking forward to 
seeing my parents again” (#2, f, 78yo, Christian-Other). When I asked one participant to what 
     




she might look forward in the afterlife, she replied, “relationships,” and “feeling really whole - 
light - yes, just the word ‘light’” (#13, f, 71yo, Cath).  
 
Yet anxiety paralleled the anticipation of positive afterlife experience in a majority of the 
religious respondents (6 of 7). The reasons for anxiety centred around the idea of being judged 
by God and adjusting to a new situation. For example, one respondent (#4, m, 70, Christian-
Other) said,  
“I think there’s always a worry, not knowing [if my family and I will be ‘exalted’] ... and 
it would be nice to be with our families, and at the moment, all of our families are active 
and involved and doing things that we know the Lord would want them to do … The 
negative thing would be if we fell off, or someone [we loved] fell off. A bit more 
determination [is needed] . . .”  
 
Another respondent (#3, f, 72yo, Christian-Other) expressed her fear that there would be “empty 
chairs” in the next life because her loved ones had fallen short of the requirements for heaven. 
One woman told me about her mother, on her deathbed, wondering if “her name was written in 
God’s black book” (#12, f, 71yo, Cath). A retired Anglican priest (#6, m, 76yo) told me about 
visiting a 99-year-old parishioner and jokingly asking her the secret to living a long life. He 
recalled that she responded with abrupt soberness, “I’m too afraid to die.” He continued the 
story, “She’d been a member of the church for years! I said, ‘what do you mean?’ She replied, 
‘Oh, have I been good enough? Will God accept me?’”  
 
When I asked this respondent if he had witnessed this fear in low- or medium-commitment 
parishioners more often than in high-commitment parishioners, he specifically referenced other 
church leaders and individuals in his “home group” and said, “People who one would expect to 
have grasped the faith . . . seem to have constant fears, they haven’t been good enough” (#6, m, 
76yo, Anglican).  Even the religious respondent who expressed the least amount of anxiety about 
an afterlife acknowledged the phenomenon of judgement-anxiety. She said, “I don’t focus, if 
anything stirs at the back of my mind, it might be that [a final judgement], but it’s not very 
strong, doesn’t fit with my image of God, that he’s keeping score of my life (#12, f, 71yo, Cath). 
Her anxiety about judgement was not strong, but she still mentioned that it “stirs at the back of 
[her] mind” and that she chooses not to focus on it. 
     





Respondents from Catholic backgrounds described the anxiety that they or loved ones would 
experience if they could not prepare for death either by receiving the last rites from a Catholic 
priest or reaching resolution in another way. For example, speaking of his mother, one 
respondent (#7, m, 69yo, Non) said,  
She didn’t think she was so fabulous she wouldn’t have worried. I think her being judged 
when she died would have been (pause) real in her mind . . . She would have had 
confession and communion. She would have been primed up, a suitcase packed for the 
moment that she wanted to go.  
A practicing Catholic said,  
If anyone wants last rites, then fantastic, but there are a lot of other ways that people can 
experience this blessing, in close times with family, or other relationships. Last rites can 
be a blessing for people and bring a sense of peace, but they are not the only way to 
experience that feeling” (#12, f, 71yo, Cath).  
Respondents from Catholic backgrounds told me that last rites or a sense of peace within 
families and relationships should alleviate the anxiety of a dying person, but that a Catholic 
person would have reason to fear the afterlife without these preparations.  
 
Religious respondents described a determination to meet a looming transition with courage. One 
respondent said, ”I’m sure it’s going to be a very different life. I’m sure we are all going to get a 
shock” (#6, m, 76yo, Anglican), and another wondered, “if there’s an afterlife, where is it?” (#2, 
f, 78yo, Christian-Other).  One woman said, “I don’t know what to say. It’s a total mystery (#12, 
f, 71yo, Cath); another resolutely said, “When that time comes, I will face it” (#8, f, 82yo, 
Christian-Other). 
 
Religious respondents expressed anticipation and anxiety about the afterlife in a pattern that was 
different than the nonreligious respondents. This pattern may be linked to the differences 
between religious and nonreligious in receipt of aggressive EOL medical care in the last week of 
life.  Most nonreligious participants were matter-of-fact about the natural course of their life 
ending in death and ceasing to exist at that point (6 or 7). In interviews, they did express either 
positive or negative aspects of ceasing to exist.  Religious respondents, on the other hand, all 
     




expressed strong afterlife belief (7 of 7). They described the afterlife in positive terms and 
anticipated a better world. At the same time, they wondered how they would fit into this world, 
wondered if they would be acceptable, and were aware that transitioning to the afterlife would 
require an adjustment. It is plausible that religious patients and families with strong afterlife 
belief find simultaneous cause for anticipation and anxiety in this idea, which may translate into 
a preference for life-prolonging medical care. None of the respondents directly made this 
connection, however. Logically, one may assume that people might be more likely to pause 
before a big transition or want to delay a difficult process, especially one with an unknown 
outcome (such as a final judgement). Further research is needed to determine if religious 
patients’ afterlife belief may be causing them to request and receive more EOL medical care. The 
evidence in the current study would indicate that such a connection is possible and should not be 
dismissed. 
 
f. Social support  
“My family and friends don’t want me to die … and I have a lot of family and friends.”  
 
Strong social support may be a significant predictor of the consideration to prolong life 
(Schroepfer, 2008). A terminally ill patient may alter her or his behaviour in favour of extending 
life if s/he perceives that is what the group desires or if s/he recognises that delaying death will 
postpone a difficult grieving process (Schroepfer, 2008). Younger and relatively healthier family 
members may overestimate the extent of life-prolonging medical intervention that a patient 
would choose for her/himself (Yuen et al., 2011; Cherniack, 2002; Lloyd-Williams et al., 2007). 
Family members may be under-informed about the efficacy of medical procedures that may be 
considered burdensome, particularly cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) (Cherniack, 2002). 
Compounding matters, a physician who treats a patient with strong social support may feel more 
pressure to take more action on behalf of the patient when compared with a physician who treats 
a patient who perceives that social support is either lacking or conflictual (Yuen et al., 2011). 
Finally, there is evidence that in the United States, patients with stronger social support create 
     




fewer ACP documents (Freytag & Rauscher, 2017), which may result in protocol-driven EOL 
medical care.  
 
I explored this topic by asking if respondents were familiar with the term “whānau.” They all 
responded in the affirmative. Then I asked, “Who are your whānau?” To clarify which of the 
whānau would be involved in a potential EOL situation, I specifically asked questions such as 
“who would be involved if you became very sick or had a medical emergency” and “who would 
speak for you if you became so ill that you were unable to speak for yourself?” Additional 
questions were asked for clarity as appropriate. 
 
Religious respondents report a larger social support network 
 
When I asked the question, “who are your whānau?” all respondents told me about their 
biological family. In addition, and without my prompting, the religious people each (7 of 7) 
mentioned their church community as being part of their whānau. Some of the nonreligious 
respondents (4 of 7) also mentioned, without prompting, extra-familial groups as part of their 
whānau, such as close friends or fellow-members of a tramping club, a bowling club, and a 
climate change activism group.  
 
Yet an interesting difference emerged when I asked the final question (“Who would be involved 
if you became very sick or had a medical emergency?”). In a situation of medical vulnerability, 
the nonreligious respondents’ whānau shrank to include only the biological family members 
among 6 of 7 respondents (the one exception merits discussion which will be discussed below). 
By contrast, the religious respondents’ whānau was larger in possible situations of medical 
vulnerability and included both biological and church whānau.  
 
For example, when I asked one religious respondent (#2, f, 78yo, Christian-Other) who would be 
involved if she became very sick or had a medical emergency, she promptly replied, “my 
daughter and son and people from the church.” Later in the interview, she explained that her 
family was supportive, but that “[the church] is a good back up,” adding, with some frankness, “I 
     




find the H----’s [a couple from church] very useful.” Another respondent (#8, f, 82yo, Christian-
Other) told me that during a recent illness, her children supported her as much as they could, but 
they were often unavailable during the daytime hours. She offered one vivid illustration of how 
her church whānau supported her during her illness:  
Sister Ollie14 came over, and she rubbed my legs and rubbed my feet, and she made sure I 
had something to eat….she hung out all day and hung out my laundry and chopped my 
wood. She was a regular beaver...then Paul came, our [minister], and his wife, Rachel, 
had said, tell Paul to put his hand on your head and give me a blessing. 
 
Another religious respondent (#4, m, 70, Christian-Other) described his own recent life-
threatening illness. He said that “of course” his family came first, but “it’s amazing how quickly 
the church network finds out” and becomes involved. The findings affirm the experience of a 
religious respondent (#6, m, 76yo, Anglican) who had recently taken a bad fall at home. His first 
call was to a particular couple in his church which he described as “deep friends.” He said, “I 
called; they came.” Only after first calling his church family did he make his second call to his 
eldest son. This respondent felt his son was “very supportive,” but that this son already had many 
responsibilities raising his own young family. The respondent continued, “if I suddenly got 
cancer and needed looking after for a while, what would happen? I’m not sure . . . these other 
friends, if I was in that position, they may well take me.” A Catholic respondent said that in an 
EOL situation that required decision-making, her family and individuals from her church group 
would “be happy to work together” (#13, f, 71yo, Cath). 
 
The only nonreligious respondent who included extra-familial individuals among the social 
support he would expect in a life-threatening situation was a man (#9, m, 77yo, Non) who 
credited his uniquely strong social network to his wife and the time they mutually spent to 
nurture their social relationships. When I asked who would be involved if he became very sick or 
had a medical emergency, he replied that, in addition to his family, he would imagine support 
from, “7 [friends] within the day, 3 [friends] within a couple of days because of geographical 
distance.” When I commented on the relative strength of his whānau, he said that his wife “made 
the point years ago that we need to be active in our friendships” and “work at them.” Even 
 
14 Names changed to maintain anonymity 
     




though this man was proud of the friendships that he and his wife had nurtured, he contrasted his 
small circle of deliberate friendships to the large church whānau of two “very strongly 
committed Anglican friends” in these words: 
Just on the most mundane level, you can’t walk along Devon Street with them without 
them greeting person after person. Their lives are full of church activities and meetings, 
and they get the warmth and support from the constant meeting with people. That’s very 
much a feature [of a religious life]. 
 
In summary, religious respondents expected to rely on their biological families and their church 
families in times of medical vulnerability. By contrast, the majority of the nonreligious 
respondents (6 of 7) expected their social support during a serious medical illness to consist of 
biological family members.  
 
 
Religious respondents whānau were stronger in that they were less susceptible to 
problematic estrangements 
 
In addition to having a larger whānau in the first place, religious participants were less likely to 
be estranged from key family members. A majority of the nonreligious participants (5 of 7) told 
me about managing negative feelings toward key family members they perceived as alienated.  
By contrast, only one (1 of 7) of the religious participants told me about an estrangement within 
their family. Estranged family was a topic of surprising intensity in the interviews in which the 
topic emerged.  
 
In the current report, the reference to “family estrangement” is not to be understood as the 
accumulation of disappointments inherent in any long-term relationship. Rather, the term 
“estrangement” refers to the severing of contact in a previous-existing familial relationship. For 
example, one man described his son as “estranged” because they had argued and had not had 
contact for years (#5, m, 72yo, Non). A woman, when asked about her whānau, said that she was 
“estranged from a large family, my decision ...but it’s always relevant” (emphasis by the 
speaker) (#11, f, 68yo, Non). Another woman said, “I’m estranged from one daughter … Her 
     




choice. I have no idea why and it’s very painful for me (#10, f, 74yo, Non). Speaking of her only 
relation living nearby, one participant said, “I’m afraid we’ve had a serious falling out after [my 
husband’s] death so we don’t see them” (#1, f, 82yo, Non). Finally, one man described his wife, 
who had separated herself from him many years ago and was unresponsive to his efforts to 
restart the relationship, despite living nearby, saying the failure was among the “deep 
challenges” of his life (#6, m, 76yo, Anglican).              
 
I did not introduce the topic of estranged family in any of the interviews, and it was not one of 
the initial themes for which I coded.  However, after transcribing the interviews and noticing a 
pattern, the interviews were re-analysed and coded specifically for the topic of “estranged 
family.” On average, 0.52% of the word count of interview transcriptions of religious 
respondents were on the topic of estranged family or difficult familial relationships. By contrast, 
6.08% of the word count of the interview transcriptions of nonreligious respondents were 
involved with this topic. This difference becomes especially striking when one considers that the 
interview survey contained no questions targeting family estrangement. The nonreligious 
respondents volunteered, on average, ten times the amount of time talking about family 
estrangements as compared to the religious respondents. 
 
The results of a descriptive qualitative study, such as the present one, are not designed to be 
numeric, and it would take further research to uncover a pattern of statistical significance. 
However, the present study was positioned to find possible lines of investigation beyond the 
initial scope of the line of questioning. The data suggest that family estrangement may be a topic 
of significance to both religious and nonreligious individuals in the context of EOL 
considerations and that this may be a source in the difference between social support from 
religious and nonreligious individuals. In the current study, the data suggest that nonreligious 
individuals’ social support may not only be smaller than religious individuals’ but also more 
susceptible to troubling estrangements. 
 
     




Based on these interviews, involvement with other people gives patients a reason to live and 
a reason to endure painful/uncomfortable medical procedures; and a religious patient with 
a bigger whānau has a greater likelihood of experiencing this motivation. 
 
Both religious and nonreligious respondents reported instances in which someone had prolonged 
their own life for the sake of their family. In addition, both religious and nonreligious 
respondents reported feeling some obligation or desire to prolong their lives for the sake of 
others. Since religious respondents had more people in their lives and were less troubled by 
estrangements, it might be deduced that religious people would experience more desire or 
pressure to prolong their lives for the sake of others. Therefore, religious patients, with their 
typically larger and stronger whānau, may feel that they have more reason to live. This, in turn, 
may result in the patient requesting/receiving more aggressive EOL medical care. 
 
It may be argued that patients with smaller families might feel more obligated to prolong a 
painful life because they would see their loss as less likely to be filled by another. It could also 
be that patients with unresolved estrangements might be motivated to prolong their lives in order 
to resolve family conflict. Indeed, one person described a relative who had prolonged their EOL 
medical treatment because of “unfinished business” in the family. But, the weight of the 
evidence supports the opposite conclusion: people prolong their lives out of duty, obligation, 
protection, and love for others. People are more likely to hasten death, not prolong it, when there 
is family conflict (Schroepfer, 2008).  
 
Out of the several examples of individuals prolonging their lives for the sake of their whānau or 
shortening it for the sake of their conflictual whānau, several stand out. For example, one 
respondent (#10, f, 74yo, Non) told me about the recent death of her sister, who had hastened 
death in the presence of family conflict: 
One of [my sister’s] daughters came to live with her, and the daughter’s granddaughter 
was there too, who was a hot one. . . the granddaughter that was living there was very 
difficult and violent . . . the combination of things made my sister decide she had enough 
. . . my sister decided to stop taking her medication. So she did. And she died. 
. 
     




Another man (#12, m, 72yo, Non) described a relative who elected surgery “toward the end” 
even though it was a “hopeless case” because he felt a “sense of duty towards his wife.” Another 
(#5, m, 72yo, Non) told me of a relative who had accepted medical treatments with decreasing 
assurances “down to a 5% chance before saying she’d had enough for the sake of the orphaned 
grandkids.” Another man (#7, m, 69yo, Non) felt that his mum had deliberately prolonged her 
life until all her children were out of the room because she had said to them, “I want to spare you 
the suffocating silence of death.” He continued, “Mum wasn’t scared of death, but she was 
scared of us having to endure it.”  A Māori woman (#8, f, 82yo, Christian-Other) expressed her 
desire to stay alive in order to attend large family events and link generations together. She said: 
“I’m still here. I’m still here. My brother died. I was thankful that I was there. Absolutely 
thankful.” She was able to help three generations connect and “learn how close we are in the 
family.” She wanted to be alive to “tell her truth” at the tangi (funeral): 
I went and sat with [my brother’s corpse]. Yes. And his son, I told him a few truths then 
about his parents, and he cried, but I said, well, you’ve got to know the truth, and your 
father was a good man, but he had his own rules, and it wasn’t for your mum . . .” 
 
I heard multiple accounts of people who prolonged their life out of a sense of connection with 
their family members. When family members recognised this, they sometimes encouraged the 
patient to “let go,” meaning to let themselves die, rather than endure any more suffering for the 
sake of the living. For example, one man (#9, m, 77yo, Non) wept as he told me, “One of my 
friends, a younger friend, whose lovely wife died in her early 60s, sat beside her and said, ‘Let 
go,’ (pause/weeping) ‘Let go, lass. Let go.’”  
 
One man who had witnessed death and dying many times in a pastoral role shared his 
experiences that support this theme. A retired Anglican vicar (#6, m, 76yo, Anglican) told me of 
visiting bedsides of very old patients who were “obviously at the end.” He said, “We’ll talk to 
the person, even if they’re unconscious, [saying] ‘it’s okay, you can go now, we’ll let you go, we 




     




He: Yep, I’ve had experiences like that. 
 
Interviewer: Many? Or just- 
 
He: No, not many, two or three. It’s almost as if they are hanging on to comfort the 
people that are there . . . you don’t know what’s going on in a person’s mind at that stage, 
so you talk with them, you say, ‘it’s okay, you can go now.’ 
 
Inside these tender stories and the other similar accounts found in the interview transcriptions, 
lies the assumption that the patient may purposely cling to life for the sake of loved ones. 
 
I did not specifically ask the respondents to talk about the topic of ‘hanging on’ for the sake of 
loved ones. This theme emerged in all of the interviews, both religious (7 of 7) and nonreligious 
(7 of 7). I argue that the theme applies to the research question at hand, not because religious 
people would have deeper feelings toward their loved ones than nonreligious people, but because 
religious people would have a larger whānau. Therefore religious people would, on average, be 
surrounded by more people creating this particular pressure to stay alive. 
 
Whānau may directly or indirectly pressure an EOL patient to endure uncomfortable or 
painful medical treatment for the sake of the whānau. Therefore, a religious patient with a 
bigger whānau may have a greater likelihood of experiencing this pressure. 
 
This theme describes the ‘flip side’ of the previous theme. An EOL patient desires to prolong her 
or his life for the sake of the family; a family desires to prolong a patient’s life for the sake of the 
patient. As discussed in Chapter 2, family members routinely overestimate the effectiveness of 
life-prolonging medical interventions and overestimate the number of intensive interventions that 
a patient would desire for himself or herself (Yuen et al., 2011). Younger people, in general, 
have been shown to overestimate the life-prolonging medical intervention that older people, as a 
group, desire (Lloyd-Williams et al., 2007).  It would be a logical conclusion, then, that the 
larger the whānau, the stronger the pull toward life-prolonging medical intervention a patient 
would experience as s/he accommodates the desires of the group. 
 
     




I found evidence to support this hypothesis. Firstly, there was no difference in the life-prolonging 
medical care desired by religious participants vs. nonreligious participants. This indicates that if 
differences in medical care do arise in EOL situations (as predicted by previous research), the 
differences are either the result of external factors (such as family members) or the subconscious 
motivations of the patients themselves. All respondents spoke of wanting autonomy and 
prioritised being free from pain over prolonging life.  I did not find differences in the desires 
expressed by the participants regarding their preference for aggressive or life-prolonging EOL 
medical care or in their willingness to engage with DNR’s or other advanced life planning. 
Although none of the respondents wanted aggressive EOL medical care for themselves, 
respondents told me about a situation in which they had wanted another person to receive life-
prolonging care. In fact, respondents recognized situations in which they had wanted more 
aggressive EOL medical care for a loved one than the person desired for her/himself. For 
example, one respondent (#7, m, 69yo, Non) described a sense of rejection when his mother 
refused any further medical treatment at the end of a long course of cancer:  
I can remember her saying very calmly, “I’ve told the doctors I’m not having anything 
else done." . . and that was surprising that mum said that . . . because it was like her 
saying that I’m ready to leave you all now, so there’s a part of you, a bit of me, that 
thinks, oh, well, is that all? You are leaving us? You could stay around. (#7, m, 69yo, 
Non) 
 
The woman (#10, f, 72yo, Non) who told me about her sister who stopped taking her medication 
because of contention in the home said, “I felt really angry and bitter that she decided she didn’t 
want to see me anymore.”  Another respondent (#9, m, 77yom, Non), speaking about the 
possibility of ending his life via euthanasia, predicted that his daughter would be hurt by his 
wish, even though euthanasia was something he’d tried to convince her was his desire. “[Our 
daughter] always reacts instinctively toward the kinder side of things, the more loving side of 
things. I imagine our wish to end our lives would compromise or assault that feeling.” One 
woman  (#1, f, 82yo, Non) described the pressure her husband felt to stay alive for the sake of his 
daughter:     
It was about nine months before he died, he was in a bad state, and he and I talked, 
perhaps it’s time to come off the dialysis. He said, “I’ll have to talk to S- [daughter] about 
it.” He seemed, you know, okay with the idea. (gasps) That was one day. The NEXT day 
I went into the visiting house, and she’d come all guns blazing, she DID NOT WANT 
     




this to happen, so she carried on. I think things would have been so much better if he’d 
come off dialysis when we talked about it because the next few months were not at all 
good … She just didn’t want him to die. Her dad, you know, he was important to her, fair 
enough. (emphasis added by the speaker)  
 
Another woman (#2, f, 78yo, Christian-Other), considered answering in the affirmative when a 
doctor asked her if she wanted her dying father resuscitated if his heart stopped. At that very 
moment, “my father ‘came to’ and said, ‘Just let me die!’ And I said, ‘Well, there’s the answer, 
just leave him alone and make him comfortable.’” She acknowledged that this would have been a 
more difficult choice without her father’s abrupt input. In each of these instances and others from 
the data, the family member is described as desiring more EOL medical care for a dying person 
than the dying person wanted for themselves. Religious people may be surrounded by more 
people at the end of life, and being surrounded by more people increases the odds that direct or 
indirect pressure will be exerted toward life-prolonging medical care.  
 
The current study did not produce evidence for or against the idea that most EOL medical 
decisions are made by family members rather than the patient, nor did the interview questions 
probe for data on this topic. However, the data suggest that if family members were responsible 
for making EOL medical decisions on behalf of a patient, those family members would tend 
toward life-prolonging care. Of course, there comes a certain point when even family members 
recognize medical futility, and may then be able to say, “Let go, lass. Let go.” But when that 
point of medical futility is obscure or when medical treatments are yet available, it is less likely 
that patients with strong social support are going to be told by their whānau to “let go.” The 
evidence suggests that a whānau is more likely to give spoken or unspoken permission to a 
patient to “let go” only when all medical options have been attempted. 
 
4.3 Summary of Results 
 
To answer the research question of why religious patients request and receive more aggressive 
EOL medical care, interviews were initiated with seven individuals expressing high religiosity 
and seven individuals expressing low/no religiosity. Respondents were asked to respond to 
     




questions exploring six proposed hypotheses that may help to explain this phenomenon: 
suffering, sanctity (vs. quality) of life, God’s sovereignty, miracles, the afterlife, and social 
support.  
 
Although respondents were polarised in their theological beliefs, there was convergence in their 
beliefs about EOL values and medical decision making. In other words, observed theological 
stances were not viewed by the religious participants themselves as reasons to engage with more 
aggressive EOL medical care, especially in the context of a discussion about death and dying 
among an elderly population. Of course, theological differences may be influencing EOL 
medical decision-making in ways that are obscured from the participants themselves, and further 
research with different methodology would be needed to uncover possible causative 
relationships.   
 
A brief summary of the results of investigating each hypothesis will be presented in order.  
 
Sanctity in suffering - “My suffering will be rewarded.”  
The religious group was slightly more open to the idea of purposive suffering in general, 
acknowledged by several to be fundamental to their religion in Christ’s suffering on the cross, 
but all religious respondents (7 of 7) rejected the idea that EOL suffering was ennobling, would 
enhance their afterlife experience, or was God’s test of one’s righteousness. All nonreligious 
respondents rejected the idea that EOL suffering was ennobling or admirable. This data does not 
support the idea that religious patients or their families would choose life-prolonging EOL 
medical care to earn merit with God. 
 
Sanctity (vs. quality) of life - “Refusing available medical treatment is immoral and 
tantamount to suicide, no matter my quality of life.” 
All religious respondents disapproved of euthanasia (7 of 7). When asked to imagine dealing 
with medical futility, the majority of religious respondents (4 of 7) introduced the idea of praying 
for death to come quickly. On the other hand, the majority of nonreligious respondents approved 
of euthanasia (5 of 7). When asked to imagine dealing with medical futility, the majority of 
     




nonreligious respondents (4 of 7) introduced or re-introduced the idea of euthanasia. Despite 
these differences, religious and nonreligious groups were united in their belief that refusing 
medical treatment and accepting death-hastening sedation were morally acceptable EOL 
behaviours.  
 
God’s sovereignty - “It’s my job to prolong my life until God decides I should die.” 
When asked “who decides when someone dies,” the majority of religious respondents (5 of 7) 
responded that God decided. When asked the same question, the majority of nonreligious 
respondents (5 of 7) responded that the person themselves played the decisive role in 
determining the moment.  However, participants were equally likely to engage in an Advanced 
Care Plan (ACP). The data does not support the notion that religious individuals do not engage in 
EOL planning or documents such as Do-Not-Resuscitate (DNR) order because they view ACP as 
immoral or usurping God’s will.  
 
Miracles - “I might be healed no matter what my doctor says.” 
All religious participants expressed a belief in healing miracles (7 of 7); none of the nonreligious 
participants expressed a belief in miracles (7 of 7) and a minority of nonreligious participants (2 
of 7) expressed a belief in an “unexpected turn of events” that might reverse a professional 
terminal prognosis. However, the religious respondents did not believe that older adults could 
reasonably expect a miracle to heal them of a professional terminal prognosis (7 of 7). Rather, 
the religious participants felt that miracles would be of the non-healing variety (finding the 
‘right’ home, receiving an inspired idea) or directed toward younger individuals. Because 
miracle belief was seen as a legitimate possibility, however, one must assume that miracle belief 
may be playing a role in religious individuals requesting/receiving more aggressive EOL medical 
care. After all, medical futility is difficult to identify, and an EOL situation is often not seen as 
such in the moment. 
 
Afterlife - “I believe in an afterlife, and therefore I desire to delay the transition.” 
The religious group was unanimous in their belief in an afterlife (7 of 7). The majority of the 
nonreligious respondents did not believe in an afterlife (6 of 7), with one respondent unsure. The 
     




religious group was anticipatory of the pleasant elements of an afterlife, but also expressed 
anxiety about their place in the afterlife, or the place of loved ones. The nonreligious group 
expressed neither anticipation nor anxiety about the lack of a future existence. Although this 
difference in belief was not directly linked to aggressive EOL medical care, it is a possible 
mechanism for the observed behaviour that religious individuals request and receive more 
intensive EOL medical care and warrants further investigation. 
 
Social support - “My family and friends don’t want me to die … and I have a lot of family and 
friends.”  
The data suggest that religious respondents have larger social support networks that would be 
involved during times of medical vulnerability and that these social support networks may be 
more resilient. In addition, involvement with a larger and more resilient social support network 
may create direct or indirect pressure toward aggressive EOL medical care as both patients and 
family members alter their behaviour to accommodate the group. 
 
Hypothesis Support Comments 
Suffering no No support for EOL suffering from either group. 
Sanctity (vs. quality) 
of life 
no Despite polarised beliefs about euthanasia, both 
groups expressed the belief that refusing medical 
treatment and accepting deep sedation are 
acceptable EOL values.  
God’s sovereignty no Despite polarised beliefs about who decides when 
someone dies (God or the person), both groups had 
similar views about ACD. 
Miracles mixed Despite polarised beliefs about the possibility of 
miracles in general, the religious group eschewed 
the idea of an EOL miracle for themselves or other 
elderly patients. Miracles possible for younger 
patients. 
Afterlife mixed -Polarised afterlife belief between two groups. -
Religious group expresses both anticipation and 
anxiety about the afterlife.  
     




-Nonreligious group expresses little anticipation or 
anxiety about the lack of an afterlife. 
Social support yes -The religious group reported a larger social 
support network that would be involved at EOL, 
including biological family and ‘church family’. 
-The religious group reported fewer incidents of 
estrangement from key family members. 
-Involvement with a larger social support network 
may directly or indirectly pressure patients to 
prefer/accept more life-prolonging care.  
Table 4.3 Summary of Results 
  
     




5. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
5.1 Overview of discussion  
 
Religiosity has been found to influence patients’ experiences of terminal illness (Balboni et al., 
2019; Freytag & Rauscher, 2017). Religiosity also plays a role in terminal patients’ quality of 
life and medical decision making (Sullivan et al., 2004; Balboni et al., 2013; Phelps et al., 2009). 
Patients in developed countries in North America, Europe, Asia and Australia who rely upon 
positive religious coping behaviours have been shown to receive more extraordinary medical 
interventions (e.g., cardiopulmonary resuscitation and ventilation) in the last week of life when 
compared to those who do not rely on religious coping behaviour (Phelps et al., 2009; Steinberg, 
2011; Cherniack, 2002). Moreover, patients who receive spiritual support from their religious 
community are found to request and receive more intensive EOL medical interventions than 
patients who receive spiritual support from their medical teams (Balboni et al., 2013). Many 
empirical studies have also found a negative correlation between religiosity and advance care 
planning (Garrido et al., 2012; Allen et al., 2003; Balboni et al., 2013; Phelps et al., 2009; True et 
al., 2005).  
 
Intensive EOL medical intervention and lower patient input in advance care planning are viewed 
by the medical community as negative outcomes for the patient (Solomon, 2014; Yuen et al., 
2011; Cherniack, 2002). A common view of religion and religiosity might predict that increased 
participation and adherence would ease the process of dying, including the medical decisions that 
must be made, however empirical data points to the opposite effect (Garrido et al., 2012).  
 
Studies have established a link between religiosity and EOL medical decisions, but relatively 
little is known about how and why religion shapes EOL medical decisions. Hypothesized 
mechanisms include belief in miraculous cure, equating forgoing aggressive therapies as 
violating God’s sovereignty, seeing religious purpose in suffering, and psycho-social factors 
     




arising from interaction with an individual and his or her religious community (Balboni et al., 
2013, 2019). Understanding why certain patients request and receive extraordinary EOL medical 
intervention is considered crucial for improving EOL care (Garrido et al., 2012; Cherniack, 
2002; Yuen et al., 2011). 
 
I designed a qualitative research study that employed a semi-structured interview methodology to 
address the current topic. A purposefully selected sample of adults was chosen to participate in 
the study. Inclusion criteria included age (65+ years old), independent or semi-independent 
living (must be able to dress themselves, cook for themselves), and an ability to communicate 
clearly. Respondents were selected to roughly correspond to New Zealand demographics 
regarding ethnicity and religious affiliation. Finally, as determined to best address the aims of 
this study, respondents were chosen if they were identified as either highly religious or highly 
nonreligious.  
 
Respondents' religiosity was determined using the Brief RCOPE assessment described in more 
detail in the Literature Review chapter. The RCOPE assessment has emerged as a useful and 
respected instrument in addressing questions of religious psychology and behaviour (Pargament, 
2000). RCOPE has been used in a series of research studies conducted in the last ten years on the 
subject of religiosity and EOL medical decision-making (Phelps et al., 2009). According to their 
RCOPE assessment scores, respondents were grouped by a measurable indicator of religious 
coping behaviours or lack thereof. In addition to the RCOPE scores, respondents’ religiosity was 
assessed using self-identification and church attendance. 
 
Interviews were designed to evaluate hypotheses that have been forwarded by other researchers 
in the field. Interviews were transcribed and analysed thematically, according to Braun and 
Clarke’s six-point method (2006), as previously described (see “3.7 Coding and analysis” in the 
Methodology chapter).  
 
A discussion of each hypothesis and relevant results is presented below: 
 
     




a. Sanctity in suffering 
“My suffering will be rewarded.” 
 
Despite extensive speculation about the valuation of suffering by both medical researchers and 
religious theorists (Eberl, 2012; Balboni, 2019), the present study found no evidence that 
religious respondents would experience more meaning in end-of-life (EOL) suffering than 
nonreligious respondents. Religious respondents viewed non-EOL suffering through a religious 
lens, and they expressed a more articulate belief that non-EOL suffering may be purposive and 
ennobling in certain situations. However, the careful analysis found no evidence that any of the 
respondents, whether religious or not, viewed EOL suffering as ennobling or admirable or 
purposive in any way. EOL suffering, then, was differentiated from non-EOL suffering. All the 
respondents clearly rejected a valuation of EOL suffering.  
 
Religious respondents did not dismiss the idea that all suffering is ennobling, rather they 
dismissed the idea that suffering in the particular instance under discussion (suffering for elderly 
at the EOL) was ennobling. Thus, the comment by one man (#6, m, 76yo, Anglican), “The God 
that I think I believe in, I can’t see him wanting someone to go through this suffering in order to 
come out the other end a better person” (italics added) places his opinion in a particular context 
(elderly EOL situations). Another respondent (#4, m, 70, Christian-Other) said, “you think of the 
Saviour, there was no sedation there . . . everything to the nth degree was put on the altar, but 
when you have your family members going through that . . . why would they need to suffer right 
at the very end?” (italics added) This person believes that Christ’s suffering on the cross was 
purposive within the Christian narrative, but that suffering of family members “at the very end” 
was not similarly purposeful.  
 
Nonreligious respondents (#1, f, 82yo, Non) said, “I suppose, as one goes through life, one 
suffers, and it probably does toughen you up a bit and give you a different perspective on things, 
and you develop, but I don’t think suffering per se to improve one [sic] is called for.” This 
respondent also sees value in suffering at an earlier point in life as a method of character 
development, but differentiates this purposive suffering with the non-purposive suffering in the 
     




context of EOL suffering in elderly patients. Thus religious and nonreligious people may value 
suffering when it has the potential to create good, but all respondents dismissed the suggestion 
that suffering would be instrumental in an EOL situation for an elderly patient. Thus, I argue that 
the current study provides little evidence that “sanctity in suffering” is a primary mechanism in 
religious individuals requesting/receiving more burdensome EOL medical care.   
 
EOL researchers have theorised that religious patients request and receive more aggressive EOL 
medical care because religious patients find purpose in suffering (Phelps et al., 2009; Balboni et 
al., 2019). As a result, “sanctity in suffering” is included as one of the key indicators on the 
recently developed Religious Beliefs in EOL Medical Care (RBEC) assessment scale (Balboni et 
al., 2019). The authors claim the RBEC scale is an internally-consistent and valid tool for 
assessing religious beliefs that are frequently endorsed and inversely associated with terminal 
illness understanding and choices in EOL medical care (Balboni et al., 2019).  
 
The data from the present study would support Balboni’s assertion that religious individuals are 
more likely than nonreligious individuals to endorse the general idea that suffering can be 
sanctifying. Religious respondents acknowledged with more clarity and with more persuasion 
that suffering might result in good, while nonreligious respondents were more cautious about 
endorsing suffering as purposive or rejected the idea with vehemence.  
 
However, data from the present study would also indicate that religious individuals, although 
possessing a ready discourse to explain the existence of general suffering in purposive terms, do 
not believe that EOL suffering is desirable or purposive. All religious respondents (7 of 7) 
expressed the belief that God did not want people to suffer and that pain should be avoided if 
possible, without negative spiritual or emotional consequence. Interview transcriptions were 
searched without success for direct or indirect remarks that may have indicated respect for 
elderly EOL suffering.  
 
Balboni’s inclusion of “sanctity in suffering” as a key indicator and possible mechanism for EOL 
medical decision making may either indicate a non-causal connection or be more viable in the 
     




context of cancer patients or patients facing a terminal medical diagnosis before ‘their time’ than 
in the context of elderly or aged patients. It may be noted that Balboni’s study was based on a 
sample of 275 advanced cancer patients whose average age was 69, well below the average life 
expectancy in developed countries.15 Thus participants in Balboni’s study may have employed a 
different narrative around EOL suffering than patients in the present study who were asked to 
consider an elderly EOL situation. Finally, the lack of evidence in the current study for the 
“sanctity in suffering” hypothesis may be the result of mechanisms obscure to the present study. 
For example, although religious respondents claimed that they did not value EOL suffering and 
felt there would be no negative consequences of avoiding suffering, their behaviour may be 
inconsistent with their claims or beliefs. Another mechanism obscure to the present study is the 
differences between Balboni’s US-based sample and the current study’s New Zealand-based 
sample. 
 
The religious respondents in the present study seemed to believe that suffering can have value, 
but not that suffering must have value.  Although religious and nonreligious people perpetuate 
variant discourses in regards to the purpose of suffering, there is no evidence from my interviews 
that these differing beliefs are active in EOL medical decision-making. Based on these data, 
therefore, I would argue that “sanctity in suffering” is not a primary mechanism that would 
influence religious respondents in my study or their surrogates to accept burdensome EOL 
medical care.  
 
Both religious theorists in the literature and religious respondents in the present study seem very 
eager to defend suffering as purposive in God’s plan, indeed a necessary supposition before one 
can believe in the existence of a benevolent God in the face of human suffering. However, the 
data from the present study does not support the idea that “sanctity in suffering” is at play in 
respondents’ views of EOL situations for elderly adults. Therefore, the data does not support the 
 
15 Average life expectancy for females in developed countries is 82 years; for males, 78 years. 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/274507/life-expectancy-in-industrial-and-developing-countries 
(accessed October 29, 2019). 
     




idea that experiencing a sense of “sanctity in suffering” would be a substantial mechanism 
creating the link between high religiosity and life-prolonging EOL medical care.  
 
 
b. Sanctity (vs. quality) of life 
“Refusing available medical treatment is immoral and tantamount to suicide, no matter my 
quality of life.” 
 
My data suggests that religious and nonreligious respondents have differing opinions about the 
sanctity (vs. quality) of life and the priority that should be placed on preserving life in any form, 
yet these differences of opinion disappeared in the specific context of elderly EOL scenarios. In 
the specific context of elderly individuals facing an appropriately aged and natural death, 
religious and nonreligious respondents’ opinions converged around the idea that quality of life 
matters and life should not be preserved at the cost of human suffering or dignity. The majority 
of religious respondents did not support euthanasia (7 out of 7), results which contrasted the 
majority opinion of nonreligious respondents who did support euthanasia (5 of 7).   
 
Although religious respondents were decisive about their rejection of euthanasia (“I’m not ‘into 
that [euthanasia]” said one respondent with derisive emphasis on “that” (#6, m, 76yo, 
Anglican)), they were also decisive about their rejection of the idea that life should be sustained 
at all costs and at the expense of other priorities such as comfort or personal dignity. Although 
the respondents seemed to comprehend the possible contradictions between comfort care and 
suicide, they expressed the belief that it is morally acceptable to accept comfort care and reject 
life-prolonging medical intervention if it hastened death without directly causing death (7 out of 
7). Thus one nonreligious respondent said, in regards to morphine in terminal illness “aw, it’s 
gonna hurry me along, but I wouldn’t look on it as taking your own life sort of thing” (#5, m, 
72yo, Non). Another religious respondent rejected euthanasia in the same sentence as he said, 
“the morphine keeps the pain away, but it also kills them [elderly EOL patient]. . . I’m okay with 
that, sure” (#6, m, 76yo, Anglican).  
     





Religious respondents who felt that taking direct action to end their life would be morally 
unacceptable felt that praying for death would be acceptable, with the assumption that praying 
for death was an indirect action with God having final sovereignty to accept or reject the prayer. 
Nonreligious respondents used more agentive terminology, making comments such as “it would 
be an individual choice whether you wanted to keep living in a difficult, painful situation” (#10, 
f, 74yo, Non). 
 
Results of the present study indicate that, although religious and nonreligious respondents had 
different reasoning or contrasting discourse on the subject, they arrived at the same conclusion: 
quality of life matters and life should not be preserved at the cost of human suffering or dignity, 
especially in the context of older adults facing a natural end of their life. Religious respondents’ 
answers were specifically couched in the context of EOL situations. Nonreligious respondents’ 
answers were couched in more general terms, appealing to an overall sense of human autonomy 
salient at any point in an individual’s life. 
 
Prioritisation of prolonging life over other priorities such as the quality of life, self-
determination, pain control, or personal dignity, has been proposed as one of the mechanisms 
which motivate religious individuals to prefer more intensive EOL medical care (Balboni et al., 
2019; Sharp et al., 2012). Some EOL theorists posit that religious individuals would view 
palliative sedation or the refusal of life-prolonging technology in the same negative light as 
abortion or euthanasia (Sharp et al., 2012). In other words, the religious position opposing both 
euthanasia and abortion highlight the religious individuals’ prioritisation of the sanctity of life 
over competing priorities.  
 
Balboni included “sanctity (vs. quality) of life” on the RBEC measurement device because a 
significant difference of opinion on the topic had been observed between religious and 
nonreligious people. While it is true that religious and nonreligious people may differ markedly 
in their views about the sanctity of life, the respondents of the present study did not differ in their 
view that an elderly person at the natural end of their life should be kept alive by every means 
     




possible, even at the expense of their quality of life. Thus, in the context of EOL scenarios, 
religious and nonreligious people in the present study did not appear to have different views 
about the acceptability - even desirability - of death-hastening comfort care or refusing life-
prolonging medical procedures in order to heighten the quality of life of an older adult. 
 
Similar to the previous hypothesis, the “sanctity (vs. quality) of life” hypothesis is not supported 
by data from the present study. Balboni’s inclusion of “sanctity of life” as a key indicator and 
possible mechanism for EOL medical decision making on the RBEC assessment may either 
indicate a non-causal connection, be more viable in the context of cancer patients or patients 
facing a terminal medical diagnosis before their time, or indicate mechanisms obscure to the 
present study such as the particular New Zealand context of the study. 
 
This finding supports conclusions made by bioethicists such as Eberl, who argue that patients, 
both religious and nonreligious, “hold that the non-utilization of life-sustaining treatment, the use 
of pain-relieving medication that may hasten a patient’s death, and the use of palliative sedation 
may be - under certain conditions - morally acceptable means of alleviating pain and suffering” 
(Eberl, 2012:252). These “certain conditions” to which Eberl refers may likely include EOL 
situations for the elderly. The data from the present study support Eberl’s observation, leading to 
the conclusion that religious patients’ belief in the sanctity (vs. quality) of life is not a key 
mechanism that would cause them to request and receive more aggressive EOL medical care. 
 
c. God’s sovereignty 
“It’s my job to prolong my life until God decides I should die.” 
 
Previous research has uncovered an inverse relationship between a patient’s religiosity and the 
likelihood that he or she will create an advanced care plan (ACP), sign a do-not-resuscitate order 
(DNR), or engage in other EOL legal documents (Garrido, 2012; Phelps et al., 2009; Sharp et al., 
2012; Lin et al., 2006; Freytag & Rauscher, 2017). Researchers theorize that this may be the 
result of a religious belief in the absolute domination of God in matters of life and death, and that 
     




any decision against life-prolonging medical care would be seen as a usurpation of God’s 
authority (Sharp et al., 2012).  
 
According to the results of the present study, there was no correlation between religiosity and the 
creation of legal EOL documents. Roughly equal numbers of religious and nonreligious 
respondents had completed durable power-of-attorney (PofA) documents, DNR (Do Not 
Resuscitate order), or other forms of ACP (advance care planning). In addition, the respondents 
of each cohort gave very similar reasons for choosing to complete or not complete EOL legal 
documents. My analysis did not uncover a significant difference between the reasoning or 
motivations between religious and nonreligious respondents in creating EOL legal documents. 
 
Two of the respondents, one religious and one nonreligious, expressed satisfaction with their 
EOL documents, which included easily-accessible DNR’s and ACP booklets. The remaining 12 
respondents expressed various misgivings or confusion about creating EOL legal documents. 
Respondents’ misgivings about EOL legal paperwork included:  
● Informal discussion with family members precludes the need to create legal documents. 
● Physicians will not notice or follow my legal documents in an EOL situation anyway. 
● Postponing legal documents until experiencing serious illness or poor health 
● Trust physicians and family members to make good decisions without formal or informal 
discussions 
● Expense 
● Family members are unavailable to sign documents 
 
This information indicates future lines of research. For example, according to the results of this 
study, the most pronounced difference in the religious respondents and the nonreligious 
respondents lay in the category “postponed legal documents until experiencing serious illness.” 
In other words, the religious respondents more often cited the reason that they had not created 
any EOL legal documents as the fact that they were not old enough or sick enough yet (5 versus 
2). This corresponds with research that religious people tend to view their prognoses with more 
     




optimism and have less understanding of the serious/terminal nature of their condition (Balboni 
et al., 2019).  
 
Although roughly equivalent in their preparation of legal documents, respondents differed 
markedly in their assertions about whether God/fate, the person, or biological process decided 
the timing of their death. The results of the present study do not support previous research in the 
field in which a difference in religiosity has been linked to a difference in ACP likelihood 
(Garrido et al., 2012; Lin et al., 2016; Torke et al., 2019; Freytag & Rauscher, 2017; Phelps et 
al., 2009; Sharp et al., 2012). Religious and nonreligious respondents in the current study were 
similarly likely to engage in ACP.   
 
Probing on the topic did not uncover any more negativity or hesitation toward ACP among 
religious respondents than among nonreligious respondents. Although the majority of religious 
respondents felt that God was indeed ultimately responsible for the time of their death, they did 
not connect that this belief in God’s sovereignty to motivation or moral imperative to desist from 
ACP.  
 
Religious and nonreligious respondents had similar misgivings about becoming involved with 
EOL legal documents. However, there was a marked difference in the respondents’ initial 
reaction to questions about who ‘decides’ when someone dies, with religious respondents much 
more likely to answer God (5 of 7) and nonreligious respondents much more likely to answer the 
person themself (5 of 7).  
 
Since religious and nonreligious respondents were equally amenable to the idea of creating ACP 
for themselves, one possible conclusion is that there is another mechanism at play, separate from 
the patient’s individual theology, causing a decreased rate of ACP participation among religious 
EOL patients. I would argue that the results of the present study give supportive evidence to the 
idea, only recently forwarded in the literature, that surrogates and family members are causing 
religious patients’ decreased ACP engagement, not the theological notions of the individual 
     




patient (Torke et al., 2019). This conclusion will be explored more fully in the upcoming section 
of this paper (see “Social support” later in this chapter).  
 
Based on the results of this study (i.e., religious and nonreligious individuals did not have 
substantial differences in their individual attitudes toward ACT or DNR), I would argue that the 
mechanism behind the difference in rates may be linked with a larger/stronger family rather than 
ideological or theological differences. 
 
d. Miracle/Unexpected turn of events  
“I might be healed no matter what my doctor says.”  
 
Religious respondents and nonreligious respondents differed markedly in their reactions to 
questions about “miracles” or “the unexpected turn of events.” Religious respondents (7 of 7) 
expressed a belief that a divine miracle could cure them of a disease, such as cancer, that doctors 
deemed intractable. However, religious respondents also offered the opinion that they would not 
expect a miracle to cure them (6 of 7), deferring to younger patients as more likely miracle 
beneficiaries. Nonreligious respondents did not support the idea of an unexpected turn of events 
defying a physician’s prognosis (6 of 7). Therefore, despite an initial difference in regard to 
miracles or the unexpected turn of events, both religious and nonreligious respondents dismissed 
the idea of a miracle intervening in the death of an appropriately aged and frail individual. 
 
Religious respondents expressed a belief in the possibility of a miracle curing them of a disease 
like cancer even if the doctors thought it was impossible (7 of 7), but all added caveats such as 
“it’s not expected” (#3, f, 72yo, Christian-other), and “I believe that it could happen, just not that 
it must happen” (#6, m, 76yo, Anglican). Nonreligious respondents were not as open to the idea 
of an unexpected turn of events intervening in a medical diagnosis (7 of 7). Some reacted with 
scorn (“it’s a ridiculous way to think” - #12, m, 72yo, Non). Although all nonreligious 
respondents initially dismissed the idea of an unexpected turn of events, two of the respondents 
     




later amended their initial reaction with thoughtfulness, “I think the power of the mind is 
enormous” (#7, m, 69yo, Non).  
 
Despite this marked difference in miracle belief, scant evidence emerged in the present study to 
support the hypothesis that religious respondents would expect a miracle to intervene specifically 
in an elderly EOL scenario. This conclusion supports the findings of a 2019 study by Torke and 
colleagues. The authors interviewed 291 patients/surrogate dyads and collated medical records 
after patient death in order to analyse the connection between religious beliefs and life-
prolonging interventions. Torke and colleagues found that only belief in miracles showed any 
connection to a specific EOL medical behaviour (lower preference for DNR). But even though 
these patients had decreased DNR participation, they had no corresponding increase in life-
prolonging medical care. In fact, high religiosity in patient/surrogate dyads corresponded both to 
decreased DNR participation and decreased life-prolonging medical treatment. In other words, 
religious patients and surrogates belief in miracles was linked to decreased DNR participation 
but not to increased life-prolonging medical care participation. 
 
In contrast to previous studies, Torke and colleagues found that no other religious belief or 
religious coping behaviour was linked in any way to life-sustaining medical treatment (2019). 
The authors wrote the following speculation about why their findings contradicted previous 
studies in the literature: 
The difference in findings between the present study and several prior studies of patients’ 
decision making for their own healthcare may be due to the population of the patients, as 
some of the prior studies included younger patients with illnesses such as cancer. There 
may be a greater acceptance of death when patients are older or have severe cognitive 
impairment as in the present study (Torke et al., 2019:11-12).  
 
Torke and colleagues speculated that the belief in miracles might be an active mechanism in life-
prolonging medical preferences in EOL situations involving younger patients, but found no 
direct evidence that belief in miracles was an active mechanism in medical decision-making in 
elderly patients. 
 
     




The data from the current study would support Torke’s conclusion. I also argue that a belief in 
miracles has little effect on aggressive EOL care in the context of elderly patients, but might be 
more important among younger patients. Further research to investigate whether belief in 
miracles might be an active mechanism in younger patients preferring and receiving more 
intensive EOL medical care is a topic recommended for future research. 
 
EOL researchers investigating religiosity and spirituality in EOL have not historically 
differentiated between elderly EOL and other EOL scenarios such as terminal cancer or end-
stage liver disease. For example, some researchers explicitly recruited “elderly” subjects for their 
EOL research (Torke et al., 2019, Schroepfer, 2008), but based their research on assumptions 
and conclusions culled from EOL studies based on terminal cancer patients (Phelps et al., 2009; 
Balboni et al., 2013 and 2019). Authors such as Cherniack (2002) conflate conclusions and 
findings from EOL research based on elderly subjects with conclusions and findings from EOL 
research based on cancer patients or other terminal diseases without differentiating between the 
two groups. The present study may also be included in the list of EOL research that builds on 
previous EOL studies without regard to whether the study samples were elderly or if they 
included younger patients with a terminal disease. This is a shortcoming of the present study and 
a criticism of the literature about religiosity and EOL in general.  
 
That said, it is difficult to determine what exactly an “elderly” EOL situation is, in order to 
segregate this data from “advanced-cancer” EOL situations. Most end-stage cancer patients are 
at least somewhat elderly. One EOL study recruited “advance cancer patients” who had an 
average age of 69 years (Balboni et al., 2019). Indeed, even trained medical professionals have a 
very difficult time determining an EOL situation from a routine medical sickness among older 
adults. Otherwise, it would be clear to them when intensive medical procedures should be given 
and when they are futile (Yuen et al., 2011).  
 
Although religious and nonreligious respondents have differing views about the existence of 
miracles or the unexpected turn of events, the present study found no evidence that this 
difference in belief would affect the respondents’ likelihood of engaging life-prolonging medical 
     




care, specifically in a situation of an elderly patient of age-appropriate frailty. The current study 
does provide evidence that miracle belief may be a more active mechanism in younger patient 
populations. Because there is not an empirical way to determine when a patient is too young to 
die, miracle belief may be present to a lesser degree even in the elderly population. It is 
recommended that further studies take into consideration the variations in data drawn from 
geriatric patient samples vs. younger, advanced-cancer patient samples. 
 
e. Afterlife 
“I believe in an afterlife, and therefore I desire to delay the transition.” 
 
Religious participants reported an afterlife belief (7 of 7). The majority of the nonreligious 
respondents did not believe in an afterlife (6 of 7), with one respondent unsure. The religious 
group anticipated pleasant elements of an afterlife, but also expressed anxiety about their place in 
the afterlife, or the place of loved ones in the afterlife. The nonreligious group expressed 
negligible anticipation/anxiety about the lack of a future existence. Although this difference in 
attitude is not directly linked to aggressive EOL medical care, it is a possible mechanism for 
requesting and receiving extraordinary medical care and merits further investigation. 
My data suggests that this may be an especially noteworthy area of further research. 
 
In the current study, the majority of nonreligious respondents were matter-of-fact, decisive, and 
outwardly unemotional in stating that they did not believe in any manner of afterlife (6 of 7). By 
contrast, religious people were emotive and eager to talk about an afterlife. Indeed, all religious 
respondents in the present study expressed a strong belief in an afterlife (7 of 7). This latter 
group anticipated pleasant aspects of an afterlife such as “seeing my parents again,” “very 
beautiful,” “it will be as good as you can accept it.” There were underlying contradictions in the 
data, however, as anxiety about an afterlife emerged in parallel to the anticipation. Anxiety 
centred around the idea of judgement and fear of the unknown. 
 
     




The subject of afterlife belief in connection to EOL medical decision making is understudied 
(McClain-Jacobsen et al., 2004) and was not included by Balboni, et al. in their recent RBEC 
assessment tool which specifically designed to assess religious beliefs and behaviours relevant to 
EOL medical decision making (2019). I suggest that the strong contrast between religious and 
nonreligious respondents on this topic warrants further investigation. Further research may 
uncover evidence that “afterlife belief” should be included in the RBEC assessment (Balboni et 
al., 2019). The unacknowledged fear of an afterlife may be a possible mechanism for the 
differences perceived in religious and nonreligious EOL patients and their choices to engage in 
ACD and life-prolonging medical procedures (Lin et al., 2016).  
 
The effect of afterlife beliefs among the respondents in the present study remains obscure. The 
role of afterlife beliefs on EOL psychological functioning and medical decision making has been 
virtually ignored (McClain-Jacobsen et al., 2004). One study of terminally-ill cancer patients 
(n=276) found that patients who reported belief in an afterlife had less desire for hastened death 
than those who were unsure about their beliefs (McClain-Jacobsen et al., 2004). Both the 
literature and the data from the present study point to this area as warranting further 
investigation. 
 
f. Social support  
“My family and friends don’t want me to die … and I have a lot of family and friends.” 
 
Many studies indicate multiple and complex connections between patients, religion, and patients’ 
social networks in EOL situations. Indeed, the patient’s social network may have a bigger impact 
on a patient’s EOL medical choices than the patient’s theological positioning, and, therefore, 
social support may be the dominant mechanism by which religious patients prefer and receive 
more aggressive EOL medical care. In support of this hypothesis are studies such as the one by 
Cragun and team (2016), who found higher religiosity to be linked to better physical and mental 
health only when an individual belonged to the majority religion in the geographic area in which 
s/he lived. Alternately, in societies where religiosity was the minority population, religiosity was 
     




linked with decreased physical and mental health (Cragun et al., 2016; Barber, 2013). Some 
researchers would point to the social benefits of religion as playing a bigger role than either 
denomination or the conservative/liberal divide, a conclusion which the present study supports 
(Torke et al., 2019; Schroepfer, 2008).  
 
There is evidence that religious respondents in the present study belong to larger and more 
resilient whānau as compared to the nonreligious respondents. The religious respondents 
included family and church family in the positive support that they would imagine in an EOL 
situation (7 of 7). Nonreligious respondents, meanwhile, did not include extra-familial support 
among the kinds of social resources that they might draw upon in an EOL situation (6 of 7). 
Additionally, nonreligious respondents reported being more susceptible to problematic 
estrangements in their family networks (5 of 7 nonreligious, compared to 1 of 7 religious).  
 
Both religious and nonreligious respondents reported instances of family members “hanging on” 
for the sake of loved ones, as well as family members who pressured patients to “hang on” out of 
a sense of group loyalty. A larger and stronger whānau might create an incentive for intensive 
EOL medical care not for theological reasons but through the dynamics of social cohesion and 
accommodation.  
 
Since religious and nonreligious respondents were equally amenable to the idea of creating ACP 
for themselves, one logical conclusion is that religious patients’ larger and more reliable whānau 
may be the decisive factor in previous findings linking religiosity and intensive EOL medical 
care. As reported above, most DNR’s are signed by family members rather than the individual 
patient (Cohen et al., 2010; Lin et al., 2016). Religious families may be less likely to sign DNR’s 
for a variety of reasons which do not necessarily include or reflect the patient’s own religious 
beliefs. In other words, the family’s cohesiveness or sense of involvement may have a greater 
effect on this finding (that religiosity is linked to decreased DNR/ACP participation) than the 
patient’s notions of morality. The current research supports the idea that religious families sign 
fewer DNR’s because of the family’s social cohesiveness and involvement, as none of the 
religious respondents in the current study expressed any religious reason against signing DNR’s 
     




and, indeed, were equally likely to have signed DNR’s or prepared other EOL legal documents 
when compared to the nonreligious respondents. 
 
The evidence supports the conclusion that a religious person’s larger and more resilient social 
support, including both biological and church family members, is the primary mechanism behind 
religious patients’ increased use of life-prolonging medical care. This conclusion corresponds to 
that of Lin et al. in a study of DNR rates in a hospital in Taiwan (2016). They found a significant 
inverse correlation between patients who had indicated a religion on their admission forms and 
the likelihood of a DNR on patient medical records. In the discussion of their findings, the 
authors recognized that their study did not differentiate between DNR’s that had been signed by 
the patient from ones signed by the family. In addition, they noted that social support, such as 
marital and employment status, was also inversely linked to the likelihood of DNR completion. 
Similar conclusions were articulated by Torke et al. in a quantitative study of elderly 
patient/surrogate dyads (2019). These authors found that the religiosity of surrogates correlated 
with decreased DNR participation, but also a decreased use of intensive EOL medical care. Thus, 
a lack of DNR among religious individuals may not indicate uneasiness about death, but rather a 
family’s sense that they are present enough - and trusted enough - to make EOL decisions on 
behalf of the patient.  
 
Freytag and Rauscher linked increased family support to lower rates of DNR and ACP 
participation and hypothesized that ACP might be seen as an unnecessary outside intervention 
which intrudes upon family communication patterns (2017). The assumption may be that the 
family can be trusted with the decisions. Freytag and Rauscher’s study did not investigate 
religiosity but only investigated how the strength of family support was related to the likelihood 






     






The data from the present study is consistent with findings presented by Freytag and Rauscher 
(2017), Torke et al. (2019), and others. Evidence is presented to support the notion that a 
patient’s social support may have a more significant influence on the decision to request/receive 
aggressive or protocol-driven EOL care than a patient’s theology. Participants in the current 
study, both religious and nonreligious, were unified in their desires for EOL care and their idea 
of a good death. Their religious beliefs were polarized, but they did not directly associate their 
divergent theology with engagement with life-prolonging EOL medical care. However, religious 
respondents’ social support was more substantial, included extra-family individuals more often, 
and showed more resilience. If family members are both making EOL medical decisions on 
behalf of the patient and if both family members and patients feel pressured to maintain the 
group cohesiveness, this would explain why religious patients both request and receive more life-
prolonging medical care. 
 
5.3 Strengths and limitations of the study 
 
One strength of this study is the methodology employed - a qualitative descriptive analysis - to 
answer a call for such research from experts in the field (Yuen et al., 2011; Phelps et al., 2009; 
Sharp et al., 2012). Hypotheses were investigated in a more profound, more flexible manner than 
what has been accomplished through previously published quantitative studies (Phelps et al., 
2009). Another strength of this study includes the use of the Brief RCOPE to assess and compare 
potentially relevant aspects of religiosity in a manner that intersects with other contemporary 
research in the field (Phelps et al., 2009; Pargament, 2011; Torke et al., 2019). In addition, the 
New Zealand setting of this study expands the geographic range of EOL medical studies, which 
are currently concentrated in the USA and the UK (Cherniack, 2002).  
 
Limitations include the exclusion of participants of non-Christian backgrounds, of which there is 
an increasing number in New Zealand (New Zealand 2018 Census). Longitudinal studies with 
     




larger samples would allow for a better sense of the causation of certain EOL behaviours such as 
engaging in aggressive medical procedures. Do respondents’ views change as they age or 
experience increasing health problems? Do respondents’ views align with the treatment they 
eventually receive? Can patients’ social support be measured and EOL outcomes compared?    
 
As noted earlier, my method of recruitment inadvertently targeted people who were connected to 
some local group, whether it was a church or a club or even to neighbours. I thereby did not 
investigate the population of elderly adults who are relatively isolated and lack regular contact 
with other people. Finally, a further limitation of this study includes the fact that it is based on a 
finding (religious people request/receive more intensive medical care) that has been replicated in 
several international locations, but not specifically in New Zealand. The current study would be 
strengthened if that finding could have been replicated in New Zealand before designing the 
current study on the assumption. A large quantitative study would now be useful, and the current 
study could usefully inform its design. 
 
5.4 Implications for future research 
 
The findings of the present study point to several possible directions for future research. EOL 
studies of terminal cancer patients are often conflated with EOL studies of terminally ill elders 
(Schroepfer 2008; Torke, 2019). For example, the link between religiosity and intensive EOL 
care may be stronger among terminal cancer patients than among terminally ill elders. Research 
could further examine whether these two groups of EOL patients have differing preferences for 
and reception of aggressive EOL care. A meta-analysis to segregate the existing EOL research 
into geriatric vs. non-geriatric studies is recommended. Furthermore, research into the topic of 
EOL care in the future should more carefully differentiate the studies upon which the research is 
designed to avoid, for example, building a geriatric study based on non-geriatric assumptions. 
Future research into the mechanisms relating high religiosity to intensive EOL care may be 
strengthened by a careful distinction between younger terminally ill cancer patients and elderly 
terminally ill patients, although difficulties in determining a line of demarcation are recognized.  
     





If religious beliefs, such as miracle and afterlife belief, sanctity in suffering and sanctity of life, 
are the mechanisms by which religious patients are desiring/receiving more aggressive EOL 
medical care (a negative outcome), then it would be logical to suggest an intervention that rested 
on theological arguments. In this case, intervention would address concerns of religion and 
morality. If, on the other hand, social support is the primary mechanism by which religious 
patients are desiring/receiving more aggressive EOL medical care, then intervention should be 
aimed at educating both the whānau and the patient. Such intervention would address concerns 
of group loyalty. In addition, an intervention could be designed to educate the whānau and 
patient about ACD and intensive medical procedures such as resuscitation that preclude the 
opportunity for a natural death. Interventions would target the whanau as much as the patient. 
Such interventions could include topics such as demystifying death conversations, ACD, and 
definitions of important concepts such as hospice, resuscitation, and medical futility. Hospice 
New Zealand is already attempting such intervention, as evidenced by their government-
sponsored website.16  
 
Researchers could work to develop definitions for terms that would increase the effectiveness of 
research in the field: medical futility, end of life (EOL), and burdensome or life-prolonging 
medical care are terms that carry little technical meaning and must be re-defined in every study 
(Swetz et al., 2014). Despite the relevance and importance of these terms to discussions within 
contemporary medicine, asset allocation economics, and religious psychology, these terms are 
under-addressed. Opportunities exist to educate those who must use them in professional and 
personal settings.  
 
Neither physicians nor computerised models can predict medical futility, although computerised 
models are improving in accuracy with time (Swetz et al., 2014). Increasing the ability to predict 
medical futility would allow more patients to avoid the negative outcomes associated with over-
treatment at the EOL and the use of burdensome EOL medical procedures. Further research in 
 
16 See https://www.hospice.org.nz/ (accessed December 1, 2019). 
     




this area would be of great benefit to those seeking to improve the death experience of both 
patients and whānau, as well as avoiding the costs of burdensome protocol-driven EOL care.  
 
If the goal is to reduce burdensome EOL care, this research suggests several lines of future 
inquiry. Specifically, more research about the mechanisms linking high religiosity with intensive 
medical care may focus on the influence and choices of well-meaning whānau. Patients and 
surrogates need more education and understanding of EOL medical options, why certain 
procedures may be burdensome, and why utilising these procedures may contradict a desire to 
“let nature take its course.” To reduce the chance of a patient receiving burdensome EOL 
medical care, practitioners could identify patients with strong social support, and educate the 
entire whānau about a positive death experience and how to avoid negative outcomes in EOL 
medical decision-making.  Rather than targeting religious patients for such intervention based on 
the theological beliefs of the patient, as Balboni and team are proposing to do with their recently 
developed RBEC assessment (2019), practitioners could target the at-risk population by 
assessing the social support of the patient.   
 
If the goal is to understand the common mechanisms underlying religious behaviour as it 
contrasts with nonreligious beliefs and behaviour, however, then belief in miracles and an 
afterlife might be important domains to investigate further. Differences in belief are striking 
between the religious and nonreligious respondents in areas such as belief in miracles and belief 
in an afterlife. Still, these differences, although marked, may not be causative of the 
extraordinary EOL medical procedures at the centre of the present study. Longitudinal studies 
would be necessary to test causation, which is also a direction for future research.  
 
If the social support model is correct, as I am suggesting, then theological differences, although 
interesting, may be incidental. Researchers have been distracted by stark differences in theology 
between religious and nonreligious patients, which indeed exist, but the mechanism in question 
may be more relational than theological. Further research my target the hypothesis that social 
support matters more than patient theology in EOL medical decision-making. 
 
     






In conclusion, religious and nonreligious respondents in the present study exhibited differences 
in belief regarding miracles and an afterlife. However, the connection between afterlife belief 
and EOL medical decisions remains speculative. These beliefs (miracles and afterlife) may be 
very relevant to EOL situations that are not seen as natural or a result of old age, such as cancer 
or other terminal diseases in younger patients.  
 
A body of literature connects religiosity with increased EOL medical interventions; another body 
of literature connects increased social support to EOL care. Few researchers have linked the two 
bodies of research, as I have, arguing that religiosity causes stronger social support, which, in 
turn, causes an increased likelihood of aggressive EOL medical choices.  
                               
This study, a descriptive qualitative study of religiosity and EOL medical choices, found marked 
contrast between the beliefs of religious and nonreligious elderly respondents on the topics of 
suffering, sanctity of life, God’s sovereignty, the morality of ACP, miracles, and the afterlife. 
However, the data suggest that these variant notions may not be affecting EOL medical decision-
making as much as the patient’s social support, particularly in the context of a geriatric EOL 
situation. In other words, the effects of increased social support may be the mechanism by which 
religious people request/receive more EOL aggressive medical care, not their specific religious 
beliefs. This finding questions many studies in the current literature which assume a specific 
religious belief or an aspect of a religious doctrine to be the dominant causative factor/s in the 





Atkins D.L., S. Berger, J.P. Duff, J.C. Gonzales, E.A. Hunt, B.L. Joyner, P.A. Meaney, D.E.  
Niles, R.A. Samson, and S.M. Schexnayder. 2015. ‘Part II: Pediatric basic life support 
and cardiopulmonary resuscitation quality: 2015 American Heart Association Guidelines 
Update for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation and Emergency Cardiovascular Care.’ 
Pediatrics 136: S519-525. 
 
Balboni, Tracy A., Holly G. Prigerson, Michael J. Balboni, Andrea C. Enzinger, Tyler J.  
VanderWeele, and Paul K. Maciejewski. 2019. ‘A Scale to Assess Religious Beliefs in 
End-of-Life Medical Care.’ Cancer 125 (9): 1527–35.  
 
Balboni, Tracy A., Michael Balboni, Andrea C. Enzinger, Kathleen Gallivan, M. Elizabeth  
Paulk, Alexi Wright, Karen Steinhauser, Tyler J. VanderWeele, and Holly G. Prigerson. 
2013. ‘Provision of Spiritual Support to Patients with Advanced Cancer by Religious 
Communities and Associations with Medical Care at the End of Life.’ JAMA Internal 
Medicine 173 (12): 1109–17. 
 
 Bekelman, Justin E., Scott D. Halpern, Carl Rudolf Blankart, Julie P. Bynum, Joachim Cohen,  
  Robert Fowler, Stein Kaasa, et al. 2016. ‘Comparison of Site of Death, Health Care 
 Utilization, and Hospital Expenditures for Patients Dying With Cancer in 7 Developed 
 Countries.’ JAMA 315 (3): 272–83. 
 
Bullock, Karen. 2006. ‘Promoting Advance Directives among African Americans: A  
Faith-Based Model.’ Journal of Palliative Care 9 (1): 183-195. 
 
Cahn, Naomi and June Carbone. 2011. Red Families v. Blue Families: Legal Polarization and  
the Creation of Culture. Oxford University Press.  
 
Cherniack, E P. 2002. ‘Increasing Use of DNR Orders in the Elderly Worldwide: Whose Choice  
 Is It?’ Journal of Medical Ethics 28 (5): 303–7. 
 
Chidwick, Paula, Robert Sibbald, and Laura Hawryluck. 2013. ‘Best interests at end of life: an  
 updated review of decisions made by the Consent and Capacity Board of Ontario.’  
 Journal of Critical Care 28 (1): 22-27. 
 
Cohen, Marya J., Jessica B. McCannon, Susan Edgman-Levitan, and William A. Kormos. 2010.  
 ‘Exploring Attitudes toward Advance Care Directives in Two Diverse Settings.’ Journal  
 of Palliative Medicine 13 (12): 1427–32. 
 
Crabtree, Benjamin and William Miller, Eds. 1999. Doing Qualitative Research. 2nd ed.  
Thousand Oaks, CA; London: Sage. 
 
Cragun, Deborah, Ryan T. Cragun, Brian Nathan, J. E. Sumerau, and Alexandra C.H.  
     




Nowakowski. 2016. ‘Do religiosity and spirituality really matter for social, mental, and 
physical health?: A tale of two samples.’ Sociological Spectrum 36 (6): 359-377. 
 
Crawley, LaVera, Richard Payne, James Bolden, Terrie Payne, Patricia Washington, September  
Williams, and for the Initiative to Improve Palliative and End-of-Life Care in the African 
American Community. 2000. ‘Palliative and End-of-Life Care in the African American 
Community.’ JAMA 284 (19): 2518–21. 
 
Curtis, Randall J. And Robert A. Burt. 2007. ‘Point: The Ethics of Unilateral “Do Not  
Resuscitate” Orders: The Role of “Informed Assent.”’ Chest 132 (3): 748-751. 
 
Daaleman, Timothy P., and Larry Vandecreek. 2000. ‘Placing Religion and Spirituality in  
End-of-Life Care.(Commentaries).’ JAMA, The Journal of the American Medical 
Association 284 (19): 2514–17.  
 
Eberl, Jason T. 2012. ‘Religious and Secular Perspectives on the Value of Suffering.’ National  
Catholic Bioethics Quarterly. 12 (2): 251-261. 
 
Emanuel, Ezekiel and Linda Emanuel. 1998. ‘The Promise of a Good Death.’ The Lancet 351:  
21-29. 
 
Faith and Belief Report in New Zealand. 2018. Wilberforce Foundation / McCrindle Research. 
 
Freytag, Jennifer & Emily A. Rauscher. 2017. ‘The Importance of Intergenerational  
Communication in Advance Care Planning: Generational Relationships among 
Perceptions and Beliefs.’ Journal of Health Communication 22 (6): 488-496.  
 
Gauld, Robin, professor of health policy, and University of Otago. 2014. ‘NHS Can Learn a Lot 
from New Zealand’s Healthcare System.’ The Guardian, 21 October 2014, sec. Healthcare 
Professionals Network.  
 
Garrido, Melissa M., Ellen L. Idler, Howard Leventhal, and Deborah Carr. 2013. ‘Pathways  
From Religion to Advance Care Planning: Beliefs About Control Over Length of Life 
and End-of-Life Values.’ The Gerontologist 53 (5): 801-816. 
 
Gopalraj, Rangaraj K, Laura J. Grooms, Belinda K. Setters, Arthi Kaundar, and Christian Davis  
Furman, 2012. ‘Decision-making in older adults with serious illness: barriers to the goals 
of care discussion.’ Aging Health  8 (4): 367-376. 
 
Gramelspacher, G. P., X. H. Zhou, M. P. Hanna, and W. M. Tierney. 1997. ‘Preferences of  
Physicians and Their Patients for End-of-Life Care.’ Journal of General Internal 
Medicine 12 (6): 346–51. 
 
Hammarberg, K., M. Kirkman, and S. de Lacey. 2016. ‘Qualitative Research Methods: When to  
Use Them and How to Judge Them.’ Human Reproduction 31 (3): 498–501.  
     





Heeren, Oscar, A. Srikumar Menon, Allen Raskin, and Paul Ruskin. 2001. ‘Religion and End of  
Life Treatment Preferences among Geriatric Patients.’ International Journal of Geriatric 
Psychiatry 16 (2): 203–8.  
 
Hunter, James Davison. 1991. Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America. New York: Basic  
Books. 
 
Jha, Ashish K. 2018. ‘End-of-Life Care, Not End-of-Life Spending.’ JAMA 320 (7): 631–632.  
 
Jong, Jonathan, Robert Ross, Tristan Philip, Si-Hua Chang, Naomi Simons and Jamin  
Halberstadt. 2018. ‘The religious correlates of death anxiety: a systematic review and 
meta-analysis.’ Religion, Brain & Behavior 8 (1): 4-20.   
 
Koenig, Harold G.  2012. ‘Religion, Spirituality, and Health:  The Research and Clinical  
Implications.’ ISRN Psychiatry Article ID 278730: 33 pages. 
 
Koenig, Harold G. 2002. ‘A Commentary:  The Role of Religion and Spirituality at the End of  
Life.’  The Gerontologist 42 (Issue suppl_3): 20-23. 
 
Kvale, Steiner. 2007. Qualitative Research kit: Doing interviews. London: SAGE Publications. 
 
Lin, Kuan-Han, Yih-Sharng Chen, Nai-Kuan Chou, Sheng-Jean Huang, Chau-Chung Wu, and  
Yen-Yuan Chen. 2016. ‘The Associations Between the Religious Background, Social 
Supports, and Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders in Taiwan.’ Medicine 95(3): e2571. 
 
Lloyd-Williams, Mari, Vida Kennedy, Andrew Sixsmith, and Judith Sixsmith. 2007. ‘The End of  
Life: A Qualitative Study of the Perceptions of People Over the Age of 80 on Issues 
Surrounding Death and Dying.’ Journal of Pain and Symptom Management 34 (1): 60–
66. 
 
Martin, Elizabeth, ed. 2015. Concise Medical Dictionary (9 ed.). Oxford University Press. 
 
McClain-Jacobson, Colleen, Barry Rosenfeld, Anne Kosinski, Hayley Pessin, James E. Cimino,  
and William Breitbart. 2004. ‘Belief in an Afterlife, Spiritual Well-Being and End-of-
Life Despair in Patients with Advanced Cancer.’ General Hospital Psychiatry 26 (6): 
484–86.  
 
Muñiz Antonio E. 2005. Ethics in Resuscitation. In: Ornato J.P., Peberdy M.A. (eds)  
Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation. Contemporary Cardiology. Humana Press. 
 
Nordquist, Christian. n.d. ‘End-Of-Life Care For Elderly Often Too Aggressive.’ Medical News  
Today. Accessed 27 May 2019. 
 
Pargament, K., M. Feuille, and D. Burdzy. 2011. ‘The Brief RCOPE: Current Psychometric  
     




Status of a Short Measure of Religious Coping.’ Religions 2 (1): 51–76.  
 
Pargament, Kenneth I., Harold G. Koenig, and Lisa M. Perez. 2000. ‘The Many Methods of  
Religious Coping: Development and Initial Validation of the RCOPE.’ Journal of 
Clinical Psychology 56 (4): 519–43.  
 
Patton, Michael Quinn. 2002. Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods. 3 ed. Thousand  
Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications. 
 
Peters, Ted. 2019. ‘The Future of Religion’s Past.’ Dialog 58 (3): 162–63.  
 
Phelps, Andrea C., Paul K. Maciejewski, Matthew Nilsson, Tracy A. Balboni, Alexi A. Wright,  
M. Elizabeth Paulk, Elizabeth Trice, et al. 2009. ‘Religious Coping and Use of Intensive  
Life-Prolonging Care near Death in Patients with Advanced Cancer.’ JAMA 301 (11):  
1140–47. 
 
Platvoet, Jan. ‘The Definers Defined: Traditions in the Definition of Religion.’ 1990. Method  
and Theory in the Study of Religion. 2 (2): 180-212. 
 
Sandelowski, Margarete. 2000. ‘Whatever Happened to Qualitative Description?’ Research in  
Nursing & Health 23 (4): 334–40.  
 
Santonocito, Cristina, Giuseppe Ristagno, Antonino Gullo, and Max Harry Weil. 2013.  
‘Do-Not-Resuscitate Order: A View throughout the World.’ Journal of Critical Care 28  
(1): 14–21.  
 
Sauro, Jeff. ‘MeasuringU: 5 Types of Qualitative Methods.’ 2015. n.d. Accessed 13 November  
2019.  
 
Schroepfer, Tracy A. 2008. ‘Social Relationships and Their Role in the Consideration to Hasten  
Death.’ The Gerontologist 48 (5): 612–621.  
 
Seale, Clive. 2010. ‘The Role of Doctors’ Religious Faith and Ethnicity in Taking Ethically  
Controversial Decisions during End-of-Life Care.’ Journal of Medical Ethics 36 (11): 
677–82.  
 
Sharp, Shane, Deborah Carr, and Cameron Macdonald. 2012. ‘Religion and End-of-Life  
Treatment Preferences: Assessing the Effects of Religious Denomination and Beliefs.’ 
Social Forces 91 (1): 275-298. 
 
 Shaver, John H., Geoffrey Troughton, Chris G. Sibley, and Joseph A. Bulbulia. 2016. ‘Religion  
  and the Unmaking of Prejudice toward Muslims: Evidence from a Large National 
 Sample.’ PLOS ONE 11 (3): e0150209. 
 
Shaver, John H., and Benjamin Grant Purzycki. 2018. ‘The Evolution of Religious Diversity.’  
     




Religion, Brain & Behavior 8 (4): 444–47.  
 
Sherwood, Harriet. 2018. ‘Religion: Why Faith Is Becoming More and More Popular.’ The  
Guardian, 27 August 2018, sec. News.  
 
Smith, Alexander K., Ellen P. McCarthy, Elizabeth Paulk, Tracy A. Balboni, Paul K.  
Maciejewski, Susan D. Block, and Holly G. Prigerson. 2008. ‘Racial and Ethnic 
Differences in Advance Care Planning among Patients with Cancer: Impact of Terminal 
Illness Acknowledgment, Religiousness, and Treatment Preferences.’ Journal of Clinical 
Oncology : Official Journal of the American Society of Clinical Oncology 26 (25): 4131–
37.  
 
Solomon, Mildred Z. 2014. ‘Modern Dying: From Securing Rights to Meeting Needs.’ Annals of  
the New York Academy of Sciences 1330 (1): 105–10. 
 
Stocké, Volker, and Bettina Langfeldt. 2004. ‘Effects of Survey Experience on Respondents’  
Attitudes Towards Surveys.’ Bulletin de Méthodologie Sociologique. Bulletin of 
Sociological Methodology, no. 81 (January): 5–32. 
 
Sullivan, Maria A., Philip R. Muskin, Shara J. Feldman, and Elizabeth Haase. 2004. ‘Effects of  
Religiosity on Patients’ Perceptions of Do-Not-Resuscitate Status.’ Psychosomatics 45 
(2): 119–28.  
 
Steinberg, Steven. 2011. ‘Cultural and Religious Aspects of Palliative Care.’ International  
Journal of Critical Illness and Injury Science 1 (2): 154–156.  
 
Swerissen, Hal, Stephen Duckett, Joanna Farmer, and James Button. 2014. Dying Well. Grattan  
Institute, ISBN: 978-1-925015-61-4.     
    
Swetz, Keith M., Christopher M. Burkle, Keith H. Berge, and William L. Lanier. 2014. ‘Ten  
Common Questions (and Their Answers) on Medical Futility.’ Mayo Clinic Proceedings 
89 (7): 943–59. 
 
Torke, Alexia M., George Fitchett D. Min, Saneta Maiko, Emily S. Burke, James E. Slaven, Beth  
Newton Watson, Steven Ivy, and Patrick O. Monahan. 2019. ‘The Association of 
Surrogate Decision Makers’ Religious and Spiritual Beliefs with End of Life Decisions.’ 
Journal of Pain and Symptom Management 0 (0). 
 
True, Gala, Etienne J. Phipps, Leonard E. Braitman, Tina Harralson, Diana Harris, and William  
Tester. 2005. ‘Treatment Preferences and Advance Care Planning at End of Life: The 
Role of Ethnicity and Spiritual Coping in Cancer Patients.’ Annals of Behavioral 
Medicine 30 (2): 174–79.  
 
Weissman, Joel S., Zara Cooper, Joseph A. Hyder, Stuart Lipsitz, Wei Jiang, Michael J. Zinner,  
     




and Holly G. Prigerson. 2016. ‘End-of-Life Care Intensity for Physicians, Lawyers, and 
the General Population.’ JAMA 315 (3): 303–305. 
 
Wenger, Neil S., Russell S. Phillips, Joan M. Teno, Robert K. Oye, Neal V. Dawson, Honghu  
Liu, Robert Califf, Peter Layde, Rosemarie Hakim, and Joanne Lynn. 2000. ‘Physician 
Understanding Of Patient Resuscitation Preferences: Insights and Clinical Implications.’ 
Journal of the American Geriatrics Society 48 (S1): S44–51.  
 
Wright, Alexi A., Baohui Zhang, Alaka Ray, Jennifer W. Mack, Elizabeth Trice, Tracy Balboni,  
Susan L. Mitchell, et al. 2008. ‘Associations Between End-of-Life Discussions, Patient 
Mental Health, Medical Care Near Death, and Caregiver Bereavement Adjustment.’ 
JAMA 300 (14): 1665–73.  
 
Venneman, S. S., P. Narnor-Harris, M. Perish, and M. Hamilton. 2008. ‘“Allow Natural Death”  
versus “Do Not Resuscitate”: Three Words That Can Change a Life.’ Journal of Medical 
Ethics 34 (1): 2–6.  
 
Young, Jessica, Richard Egan, Simon Walker, Anna Graham-DeMello, and Christopher Jackson.  
2019. ‘The Euthanasia Debate: Synthesising the Evidence on New Zealander’s 
Attitudes.’ Kōtuitui: New Zealand Journal of Social Sciences Online 14 (1): 1–21.  
 
Yuen, Jacqueline, M. Reid, and Michael Fetters. 2011. ‘Hospital Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders:  
 Why They Have Failed and How to Fix Them.’ Journal of General Internal Medicine 26  














     




APPENDIX A: Ethics Approval  
Academic Services 
Manager, Academic Committees, Mr Gary Witte 
     
       
     
      
19/034 
     
    
        
     
      
Dr J Shaver Religion 
     
     
      
26 March 2019 
     
    
    
     
      
Dear Dr Shaver, 
I am again writing to you concerning your proposal entitled “Religiosity and End-of-Life 
      
Medical Care in New Zealand”, Ethics Committee reference number 19/034. 
      
Thank you to Holly Miller Jones, student investigator on the above project, for her emails of 22nd March 
2019 with response and revised application attached addressing the issues raised by the Committee. 
      
On the basis of this response, I am pleased to confirm that the proposal now has full ethical approval to 
proceed. 
      
Approval is for up to three years from the date of this letter. If this project has not been completed within 
three years from the date of this letter, re-approval must be requested. If the nature, consent, location, 
procedures or personnel of your approved application change, please advise me in writing. 
     




      
Upon approval, it is expected that all members of the research team are made aware of what the standard 
conditions of ethical approval covers. This includes the date ethical approval expires, as well as the 
process regarding applying for amendments to the research. 
      
The Human Ethics Committee asks for a Final Report to be provided upon completion of the study. The 
Final Report template can be found on the Human Ethics Web Page 
      
http://www.otago.ac.nz/council/committees/committees/HumanEthicsCommittees.html 
     
    
   
   
    
     
      
Yours sincerely, 
     
    
        
         
Mr Gary Witte 
      
Manager, Academic Committees 
      
Tel: 479 8256 
Email: gary.witte@otago.ac.nz 
      
c.c. Religion  
 
  
     




APPENDIX B: Research Information Sheet 
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Religiosity and End-of-Life Care in New Zealand 
INFORMATION  SHEET FOR  
PARTICIPANTS 
  
   
What is the Aim of the Project? 
  
The purpose of this study is to further understand the connection between religiosity and end-of-
life (EOL) medical decisions.   
  
What Types of Participants are being sought? 
  
Participants are being sought who are New Zealand citizens over the age of 70.  Participants 
from a range of religious and nonreligious views are being sought.   
   
What will Participants be Asked to Do? 
  
Participants will be asked to participate in an oral interview, in which you will be asked to 
discuss your life experiences and beliefs surrounding religion and end-of-life medical care.  This 
interview will take approximately one hour.  The interview will be recorded and transcribed.  
Interviews will take place at a location convenient to you.   
  
The risks you run by volunteering for this study are minimal.  They include the sacrifice of your 
time and the discussion of your opinions and feelings on topics that are considered sensitive by 
some people.   
  
What Data or Information will be Collected, and What Use will be Made of It? 
  
Interviews will be recorded and transcribed.  Data will be securely stored on a password-
protected electronic device.  Data obtained as a result of the research will be retained for at least 
five years in secure storage.  Any personal information held on the participants may be destroyed 
at the completion of the research, even though the data derived from the research will, in most 
cases, be kept for much longer or possibly indefinitely.    
  
The project involves an open-questioning technique.  The general line of questioning revolves 
around the participant’s background, family, experiences with the medical community, religion, 
and plans for end-of-life medical care.  The interview questions have been predetermined, but 
follow-up questions will depend on the way in which the interview develops.  Consequently, 
although the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee is aware of the general areas to be 
     




explored in the interview, the Committee has not been able to review the precise questions to be 
used.  
  
The participant will be reminded that if the line of questioning does develop in such a way that 
the participant feels hesitant or uncomfortable, he or she has the right to decline to answer any 
particular question(s) and also that the participant may withdraw from the project at any stage 
without any disadvantage of any kind.  
  
The results of the project may be published and will be available at the University of Otago 
Library (Dunedin, New Zealand).  Participant anonymity will be protected.   
   
Can Participants Change their Mind and Withdraw from the Project? 
  
Participants may withdraw from participation in the project at any time before or during the 
interview and without any disadvantage of any kind.  
   
What if Participants have any Questions? 
  
Research is conducted by Holly Miller Jones, MA candidate at Otago University, under the 
supervision of Dr John Shaver and Dr Richard Egan.  Any questions about the project, either 
now or in the future, may be directed to 
  
Holly Miller Jones 
Religion Programme 
University of Otago 





University of Otago 




Preventive & Social Medicine 
University of Otago 




Any questions or concerns about end-of-life medical planning which may have been raised by considering 
this research project may be directed to the Counselling Team at Hospice Taranaki (06 753 7830) or if 
you are located outside Taranaki, to your local hospice counselling centre. 
  
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee.  If you have any 
concerns about the ethical conduct of the research, you may contact the Committee through the Human 
Ethics Committee Administrator (ph +64 3 479 8256 or email gary.witte@otago.ac.nz).  Any issues you 
raise will be treated in confidence and investigated, and you will be informed of the outcome. 
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Religiosity and End-of-Life Medical Care in New Zealand 
CONSENT  FORM  FOR  
PARTICIPANTS 
  
I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is about.  All 
my questions have been answered to my satisfaction.  I understand that I am free to request 
further information at any stage. 
  
I know that:- 
1.      My participation in the project is entirely voluntary; 
  
2.      I am free to withdraw from the project before its completion; 
  
3.      I will not be identified by name or by any personal details in the publication of this research.  
Personal identifying information (such as audio recordings) may be destroyed at the conclusion of 
the project, but any raw data on which the results of the project depend will be retained in secure 
storage for at least five years; 
  
4.      This project involves an open-questioning technique. The general line of questioning 
includes the participant’s background, family, experiences with the medical community, religion, 
and advance life directives.  The precise nature of the questions which will be asked have not been 
determined in advance but will depend on the way in which the interview develops and in the event 
that the line of questioning develops in such a way that I feel hesitant or uncomfortable, I may 
decline to answer any particular question(s) and may withdraw from the project without any 
disadvantage of any kind. 
  
5.      The results of the project may be published and will be available at the University of Otago 
Library (Dunedin, New Zealand), but every attempt will be made to preserve my anonymity. 
  
I agree to take part in this project. 
  
...........................................................................         ………………..…………..……………….. 
           (Signature of participant)                                                 (Date) 
  
...........................................................................         ……………….…………..……………….. 
                     (Printed Name)           (Name of person taking consent) 
              
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If you have 
any concerns about the ethical conduct of the research, you may contact the Committee through 
     




the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph +643 479 8256 or email 
gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated, and 












     




APPENDIX D: Interview Survey - Sample Questions 
 
Expectations  
“I have planned for this interview to last approximately one hour. In my experience, giving 
interviews for this project has been a very rewarding and warm experience, and I anticipate that 
this interview will be comfortable for both of us. The interview begins with basic demographic 
information, and then I will ask you about your religious background and your family support. 





Name    
Year of birth 
Age at the time of this interview 
Place of birth  
Place of current residence 
Profession  
Highest level of education 
Gender  
Ethnicity  




Who is your whānau?  
How would you describe the support you feel from your family and friends? Why? 
1-Very weak  2-Weak          3-Moderate    4-Strong        5-Very Strong 
  Do you feel you have someone in your life with whom you can discuss your hopes and 
fears?  If so, who?  How often do you have contact?   
Do you feel you have someone in your life with whom you can share a good time?  If so, 
who?  How often do you have contact?  
If you suddenly became so sick that you were hospitalized, who would know within a week and 
be involved? 
     




What if you became so ill that you were unable to speak for yourself?  Who do you imagine 
would be involved in making medical decisions for you in this situation? 
Do you imagine [they] would make the decisions for you that you would want to be 
made? 
 
Have you spoken with anyone about your desires for end-of-life medical care? With whom? Did 
the conversation/s go well, in your opinion? 
 
Religious History 
Would you describe yourself as (Seale, 2010:678) 
● Extremely religious 
● Very religious 
● Somewhat religious 
● Neither religious nor nonreligious 
● Somewhat nonreligious 
● Very nonreligious 
● Extremely nonreligious 
● Spiritual but not religious 
● Can’t choose 
 
 







● Any/other _________ 
● None/not stated 
 
 




     














Brief RCOPE Assessment  (14 statements) 
 
What are your desires for medical care in the last week of life?  
 
Sanctity in suffering  
Do you feel that suffering is ennobling? A test of faith? Will God reward you for suffering? 
Do you admire individuals that endure great suffering at the EOL?  
Do you feel that you must accept or endure painful medical procedures because suffering is part 
of God’s way of testing you? 
Do you feel that enduring EOL suffering is ennobling? 
 
Sanctity (vs. quality) of life 
If you had advanced cancer, would you be giving up on your (worldview/faith) if you stopped 
pursuing cancer treatments? Why or why not? 
Would you accept every available medical treatment because your (freedom from faith/faith) 
tells you to do everything you can to stay alive longer? Why or why not? 
Is refusing available medical treatment tantamount to suicide?  
What are your thoughts about someone at the EOL being sedated to ease pain even though this 
may hasten death? 
If you could choose, would you prefer (1) a course of treatment that focused on extending life as 
much as possible, even if it meant more pain and discomfort, or (2) on a plan of care that focused 
     




on relieving pain and discomfort as much as possible, even if that meant not living as long? 
(Phelps et al., 2009) 
Would you want the doctors to do everything possible to keep you alive even if you were going 
to die in a few days anyway? (Phelps et al., 2009)  
 
Euthanasia 
What are your views on euthanasia?   
 
God’s sovereignty 
Who decides when someone dies? 
Would you say that your (freedom from) belief in God relieves you of needing to think about 
future medical decisions (e.g., do-not-resuscitate order or healthcare proxy), especially near the 
end of life? 
Do you think that agreeing to a do-not-resuscitate order is against your religion in any way?  
Do you have any advance care plan?  Why or why not? 
Do-Not-Resuscitate order?  Advanced life directive?  Living will?   Durable power of 
attorney?   
What is your perception of the advantages or disadvantages of these documents?   
Do you feel that your religious convictions play a role in whether you’d sign a DNR or 




Do you believe that (the unexpected turn of events/a miracle) that might cure you of a disease 
like cancer even if the doctors say it is impossible?  
If you had cancer or some other serious disease, and a doctor gave you a terminal diagnosis of 
how many more months she/he thought you would live, how much stock would you put in the 
prediction?  Why? 
 
     





What are your beliefs about an afterlife?   
What thoughts about the afterlife (or lack thereof) bring positive feelings? Is there anything 
about it that you look forward to? What thoughts about an afterlife bring ambivalent or 
negative feelings? Does anything about it ever worry you? 
Do you believe that your religious convictions increase or decrease anxiety about an 




Have your ideas about end-of-life decisions been influenced by anyone in particular?   
Have you had conversations with others about these types of ideas?  If so, who?  Have 
you heard other people speak about these types of ideas, for example, on television, in 
the newspapers, in church, in community meetings?   
  
Is there anything else you would like to tell me that would help me understand how your 
(freedom from religiosity) religious views inform your views about the medical decisions that 
need to be made at the end of life? 
 
I would always welcome a phone call or an email from you if you have any further ideas or 
questions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
